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dc.contributor.authorMaciaszek, Janusz
dc.contributor.editorKaczmarek, Janusz
dc.contributor.editorKleszcz, Ryszard
dc.identifier.citationMaciaszek J., The Notion of Action in Kotarbiński’s Praxeology, [w:] Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, s. [123]-136, doi: 10.18778/8088-538-7.11pl_PL
dc.description.abstractThe aim of the paper is to recast main notions of Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s praxeolology in terms of Donald Davidson’s theory of action. The paper focuses also on ontological commitments of both theories. Though Kotarbiński did not admit events in his reistic ontology, in his praxeology conceived actions as compounded entities without any clue how to reduce the parts of action into things. I argue that Kotarbiński’s restrictive ontological reism cannot be maintained in case of praxeology, and propose to admit events as existing objects. This enables to simplify extremely complicated net of Kotarbiński’s concepts and to find the counterparts of the parts of action in Kotarbiński’s sense in Davidson’s theory of action.pl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofKaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016;
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.titleThe Notion of Action in Kotarbiński’s Praxeologypl_PL
dc.typeBook chapterpl_PL
dc.rights.holder© Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016pl_PL[123]-136pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Łódź, Department of Philosophypl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1963], “Actions, Reason, and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy 60, 685–701. Reprinted in Davidson 1980: 3–9.pl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1967], “Causal Relations”, The Journal of Philosophy 64, 691–713. Reprinted in Davidson 1980: 149–62.pl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1969], “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?”. Feiberg, J. (ed.) Moral Concepts. Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Davidson 1980: 21–42.pl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1971], “Agency”, [in:] Binkley, R., Bronaugh, R., Marras, A. (eds), Agent, Action, and Reason. University of Toronto Press. Reprinted in: Davidson 1980: 43–61.pl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1980], Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clerendon Press.pl_PL
dc.referencesDAVIDSON, D. [1982], “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, Wollheim, R.,Hopkins, J. (eds) Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289–305.pl_PL
dc.referencesKOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1929], Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk. Lwów: Second edition 1961.pl_PL
dc.referencesKOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1955], Traktat o dobrej robocie. Wydział I Łódzkiego Towarzystwa Naukowego. Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich.pl_PL
dc.referencesKOTARBIŃSKI, T. [1972], Abecadło praktyczności. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna.pl_PL

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Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska
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