Problem prawdy w perspektywie filozofii dialogu
Glinkowski, Witold P.
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The issue of Truth in the philosophy of dialogue The paper discusses the relation between truth and the philosophy of dialogue on the basis of Martin Buber’s thought. The latter objects mainly reducing the issue of truth to an epistemic dimension. For truth – when occurring in an anthropological and axiological perspective – becomes a way of life for a concrete – and not abstract – human being. The status of human being in the world as first of all being towards other persons, and then, secondarily, towards things causes that truth can be recognized by a human in a context the source of which is a dialogical relation. This relation opens for a human being a chance to recognize herself as a person who is something more than a subject of cognitive exploration of an objective world. The truth concerning human I, which is not only an abstraction, and idea, an element of a theoretical model but a real human being, can be expressed only under the condition of taking into consideration the relation of dialogue, which is its natural environment. If truth concerns a cognitive between a cognitive relation between a cognizing subject and a being it is because it turns out to be inalienable component of human existence. In the perspective of the philosophy of dialog truth shows its relational but not relative character. It turns out that it does not come from what is perceived and understood by a human but from what is heard by her. A human being does not meet truth, but is invited to find herself in its presence, to meet it and tell about it. The teller becomes a witness of truth and by this act she demonstrates in a credible way – because the act fully engages her existence – her being responsible.
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