

EUGENIUSZ CZAPLEJEWICZ
Warszawa

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO CRITICAL ANALYSIS?

1. ANALYSIS—A METHOD OF BRANCH OF STUDIES? ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

It would be a great simplification to state that while 19th century Polish studies on literature were marked by the development of synthesis, the following century is characterized by something quite the opposite, by the intensification of analysis. It is a simplification because, in actual fact, it is difficult to talk about any time sequence here. Both in the previous and the present century, synthesis and analysis have developed as if in a parallel manner. The only difference is that both the synthesis and the analysis are not the same as they were. At the same time, though, much points to the fact that the new 20th century model, as we could agree to call it, has reached the climax of its development over the last few years. This climax is actually a turning — point as analysis in its 20th century form, as well as our understanding of its place and role in literary research, is in a state of crisis i.e. it cannot be continued normally but has to undergo a fundamental transformation.

A symptom of this crisis seems to be the ambiguous criticism of analysis itself, and the results achieved in this way. It is necessary to mention here that in studies on literature there undoubtedly does exist a cult for analysis. Analysis is identified with being methodical, honest and scientific. One continuously hears that only analysis permits one to come close to the truth. At the same time, however, this same analysis is sometimes treated instrumentally and as an auxiliary, more as a means than a goal. It is the latter, the goal, that is usually the synthesis. In the final count, synthetic works are placed higher than the analytic ones as they are proof of the investigative maturity of the scholar, school, of the whole branch of knowledge.

On the other hand, the notion of analysis itself becomes complicated, it takes on many meanings, becomes unclear and opalescent. Even if

it still means a method, it is difficult to say which one. Is it the resolute method that Galileo had in mind, i.e. the method of searching for the parts of every "whole" that one comes across, and then studying them. Or is it only the generally defined way of acting in a detailed way, an activity that is formal and that sets things in order, that does fragmentary and preparatory things and avoids great constructive thoughts. By manipulating with parts and elements, though, it is not concerned with the direction (goal) of those manipulations, i.e. it may divide the whole into elements just as well as put it together.

To prove this second understanding of the analytical method in Polish poetics, one can point to examples from the beginning of both the 19th century as well as the 20th. In the first years of the 19th century, Euzebiusz Słowacki understood analysis as being similar to induction, as the passing "from detailed observations [...] to general truths".¹ The model of analysis proposed by J. Kleiner at the beginning of the next century is much clearer in the sense that it is based on passing from the whole — through studying the details — to the whole.²

It is possible to observe from the above that in analysis one can find elements that are resolute, composite and constructive. This does not mean, though, that the first understanding of analysis as a method has become completely obsolete. It is quite the opposite as is evident to this day in descriptive poetics which is mainly concerned with parsing, as it was once called. As it so happens, it is done not for the understanding of literary "wholes" but for illustrating, showing, or at best, finding certain general principles in them.

Does analysis really mean a method in literary studies today? It seems that while using this notion we more and more often talk about what we do and not how we do it; what we study and not how we study. Our information is about the subject of our studies, not about the method. Analysis, which treated, until recently, all types of literary "subjects" in a specific manner, more and more often refers solely to the studying of a single literary work, irrespective of the applied investigative method. On the other hand, it leaves the various grouping together of literary works to synthesis.³ Thus it is possible to say that

¹ E. Słowacki, *O wymowie (Teoria wymowy)* [On Oratory (The Theory of Oratory)], [in:] *Dziela z pozostałych rękopisów ogłoszone* (Works from the Remaining Presented Manuscripts), Wilno 1826, vol. II, pp. 25–26.

² Cf. J. Kleiner, *Analiza dzieła (The Analysis of a Literary Work)*, 1914, [in:] *Studia z zakresu literatury i filozofii* (Studies in Literature and Philosophy), Warszawa 1925, pp. 147–158, esp. pp. 157–158.

³ Cf. S. Sawicki, *Początki syntezy historycznoliterackiej w Polsce. O sposobie syntetycznego ujmowania literatury w pierwszej połowie w. XIX* (The Beginnings of Historical and Literary Synthesis in Poland. About the Synthetic Way of Treating Literature in the First Half of the 19th century), Warszawa 1969, p. 6 and *passim*. The footnote on this page is characteristic and worth

having one's whole investigative subject at one's disposal, analysis gradually changes from a method to a separate and, in many respects, independent branch of studies (discipline). Undergoing such a change in its meaning, analysis makes its subject concrete and, at the same time, stable. As a method, it did not possess, and did not have to possess, its own subject; its subject always "belonged" to the discipline it served. Being an investigative discipline, it behaves differently: it is primarily concerned with defining its subject clearly and to making sure that it will be solely at its disposal.

Has this process of the analysis slipping its way from "pure" methodology onto "disciplinary" ground and obtaining for itself a separate subject already come to an end? It is hard to say. The customary way of thinking (relating analysis to method), acquired earlier, makes it rather difficult to look at the situation objectively. This process is probably still taking place although it is also not known whether it must be brought to an end.

Whatever the actual situation, analysis, by changing its character and gaining an investigative subject, such as a single literary work, comes in direct contact with interpretation. Interpretation comes from different epistemological sources than analysis. Using the terminology of W. Windelband, it is possible to say that in as far as the latter is closer to the nomothetic approach, interpretation represents idiographic knowledge. They belong to different types of scientific cognition. When they are interested in one subject, they approach it from two different angles.

In the field of interpretation, it is also possible to observe the process of passing from the status of the general method or "acquirement" to the status of a type of discipline. In addition, it is a discipline that, similarly to that of analysis, sees its main, if not only, subject in a single literary work. In as far as the gradual methodological neutralization of both of them (analysis as well as interpretation stop being methods) makes them similar, interest in the same subject leads to a meeting on the grounds of a definite literary work. As a result of this meeting, analysis not only comes in contact with interpretation but becomes interpretation, or absorbs it.

Can the belief about the contrast between analysis and interpretation still hold true in this situation? Or does it belong to that part of our consciousness that is false? It is possible to quote numerous examples from our times where both analysis, in the true meaning of the word, and, similarly, interpretation appear side by side. This can be observed in J. Lotman's book *Анализ поэтического текста. Структура стиха*, 1972, which contains analysis and in the interpretations found in *Sztuka inter-*

mentioning. It says that at the beginning of the 20th century the notion of synthesis was referred to larger collections of literary works.

pretacji (*The Art of Interpretation*), edited by H. Markiewicz, 1971—73. In the latter, with the title *The Art of Interpretation* after all, there appear with equal success and having equal rights already famous and classical analysis such as B. Eichenbaum's "How is 'The Greatcoat (*Shinel*)' done", V. Shklovsky's "How is *Don Quixote* done?" and "Dostoevsky's Novel, *Poor People*, against the Background of the Literary Evolution of the Forties" by V. Vinogradov. If one were to have a closer look at those analysis, one would undoubtedly find that they do differ from interpretations due to the method used, but definitely not to such an extent as to talk about contrasts. They are rather internal differences, differences within a clearly defined union.

It would definitely be an interesting and educational matter to investigate who talks about analyzing and who talks about interpretation while dealing with a literary work today. It would probably be more difficult, though, to find out why one is called one thing and not another. It seems that real theoretical and literary, methodological or philosophical views are not so important here. What is of greater value are, for example, language habits, a personal tendency to a certain type of terminology, etc. What is more, the same discussion on a given work is once called an analysis while at other times and interpretation.⁴ Such chaos does not only exist in research but also the theoretical reflection on the separating of analysis from interpretation causes more and more problems.

Doubts concerning how to define analysis and interpretation, the mixing up of notions, or even their overlapping, shows us that this does not happen by chance, that behind the above one can see that what was different, i.e. analysis and interpretation, is now definitely becoming closer in meaning. Another matter is whether this move has become a stable feature (if only relatively) or vice versa: Is it only something in passing, a temporary disorientation? Until the situation has become more fully explained, it would be better to use a double terminology: analysis—interpretation (abbreviated to AI).⁵ Although this terminology is clumsy and slightly inconvenient, it best expresses what, in effect, has taken place—the coming closer together of analysis and interpretation, and, at the same time, does not remove the uncertainty that still exists and troubles us in this matter.

⁴ Cf. e.g. *From the Editors* [in:] *Nowela — opowiadanie — gawęda. Interpretacje małych form narracyjnych* (*The Short story—Narrative—Tale. Interpretations of Small Narrative Forms*), 2nd. ed., ed K. Bartoszyński, M. Jasińska-Wojtkowska, S. Sawicki, Warszawa 1979, pp. 8—11.

⁵ The most practical solution: the use of the third term, being neutral in the given tradition, (e.g. in the Polish—"eksplikacja" (explanation)) is faulty here as it omits methodological issues that are important for our article.

2. THE ATTITUDE OF AI TO THEORETICAL POETICS

If the analysis—interpretation of a literary work, understood in this way, has become in actual fact a field (branch) of studies on literature or is only here for the time being, it is necessary to ask what place it takes, or wishes to take, in literary studies, what its relations are with other branches of this type of research and generally with other types of studies on literature. Its meaning depends on this.

Still appearing clearly as a method of research and belonging to poetics, the analysis of a literary work was treated in it in a very particular manner. Although it will be difficult for those who have read the works of the Russian formalists and Czech structuralists to believe this, analytic studies have been the focus point of research workers relatively seldom in the history of poetics. Attempts have been occasionally made, though, to preserve a balance in poetics between “pure” theorizing and analyzing the work. An example here would be M. K. Sarbiewski's *De perfecta poesi, sive Vergilius et Homerus* and *Characteres lyriici seu Horatius et Pindarus*.⁶ Most often, however, analysis was left to theoretical deliberations. This happened both when they took on a normative or descriptive form and were concerned with the different “levels” of a work as well as when they suggested a theory of a literary work, a genre, or placed themselves on an even more general level—on that of aesthetics or the philosophy of literature. A classic example here may be Aristotle's *Poetics* where the analysis of a work is brought down to the very minimum and appears only sporadically in the role of examples. The analysis proper seems to be on the outside here—not hidden within the text but outside it. One could say that it was not worthy enough to appear in the “final” version of the discussion with poetics.

In classicistic or classicizing poetics, analyses simply appear in the form of “parsings” or are even more often functionally substituted by examples. In many works, they become part of theoretical deliberations. This was done by Stanisław Potocki, for example, who wrote *O wymowie i stylu* (*On Oratory and Style*) (1815) or by Ludwik Osiński in his lectures on comparative literature.⁷ But some Polish textbooks on poetics, published in the 19th century, ostentatiously keep their dual title, e.g. *Nauka poezji zawierająca teorię poezji ułożoną przez Hipolita Cegielskiego z dobranymi przykładami* (*The Study of Poetry Containing the*

⁶ Both works came into being in the years 1619—1626, see M. K. Sarbiewski, *O poezji doskonałej czyli Wergiliusz i Homer* (*De perfecta poesi, sive Vergilius et Homerus*), trans. M. Plezia, compiled S. Skimina, Wrocław 1954; *Wykłady poetyki* (*Praecepta poetica*), trans. and comp. S. Skimina, Wrocław 1958, pp. 21—158.

⁷ Lectures at Warsaw University, 1819—1831, see L. Osiński, *Dziela* (*Works*), Warszawa 1861, vol. II—IV.

Theory of Poetry Arranged, with Selected Examples, by Hipolit Cegielski) (1st ed., 1845). Oftentimes, those examples would be even separated from the theoretical thesis by their form of publication and both loosely connected parts seemed to be going their own chosen way. It sometimes happened that one and the same person would write those two parts separately in the form of two different publications. Karol Mecherzynski did this when he published *Prawidła pisania* (*The Rules of Writing*) (1841) and *Stylistyka, czyli nauka obejmująca prawidła dobrego pisania* (*Stylistics, the Rules of Good Writing*) (1870) and later *Przykłady i wzory z najcenniejszych poetów i prozaików polskich zebrane i zastosowane*. (*Collected and Applied Examples Taken from the Best Polish Poets and Prose Writers...*) (1874, 1977—78). There were also cases, however, when somebody completely different would add those examples to a theoretical lecture on poetics and rhetoric. This would take place in totally different conditions and in another period of time. The works of Euzebiusz Słowacki, for example, that came into being in the course of his school and university lectures from 1807—1826, and also in the form of a separate textbook entitled *Prawidła wymowy i poezji* (*Rules of Oratory and Poetry...*) 1st. ed., 1826. Apart from theoretical deliberations they also contain numerous “parsings”. Independently of the above, there appeared I. Szydłowski’s *Przykłady stylu polskiego w rozmaitych rodzajach wymowy i poezji* (*Examples of Polish Style in Various Types of Oratory and Poetry*) vol. I, (1827), given as an illustration of E. Słowacki’s rhetoric and poetics. It is necessary to stress here that the “examples” from the past are not solely an anthology of literature (or a collection of choice passages as they were later known) but also contained analyses of literary works (“parsings”).

In 20th century works on poetics, especially in textbooks, the role of the old “examples” is taken over not by choice passages from literature but rather by collections of analyses of literary works. Just as before, their relation towards “pure” theory is varied. Despite this similarity, there are certain differences. What used to be called “rules” is now known as theoretical poetics (Cf. e.g. M.R. Mayenowa, *Poetyka teoretyczna. Zagadnienia języka*, 1974 (*Theoretical Poetics. Problems of Language*) beside which appear examples of analyses (C.f. M.R. Mayenowa, *O sztuce czytania wierszy*, 1963, [*On the Art of Reading Poems*]). In as far as the “examples” in the 19th century poetics were connected with “theory” on the basis of illustration, the analyses in 20th century poetics, especially in contemporary works, have become so independent that more often than not, they lose contact with “theory” completely. They do not appear beside theoretical poetics but despite them, or independently of them. This takes place especially when those analyses change into analyses — interpretations. *Liryka polska. Interpretacje* (*Polish Lyric Poetry Interpretations*), 1st. ed., 1966, or *Nowela, opowiadanie, ga-*

węda (Short Story, Narrative, Tale), 1st. ed., 1974, are examples of works functioning in this independent manner in Poland. The distance between theoretical poetics and analysis (interpretation) has increased to such a degree that there is no longer any visual contact between them, and between works that would be representatives of them both. They lose sight of each other; they become independent.

A similar process of becoming independent can be found in the development of interpretation. This, according to Emil Staiger, for example, is also aiming towards total autonomy although it is not completely clear in relation to what interpretation is becoming independent and towards what it is becoming autonomous. One most often talks then about hermeneutics, exegesis, or philology which does not seem to be totally convincing as it omits, for example, the observations made by Plato in 'Protagoras' on the subject of interpretation. However, the coming together of both, i.e. interpretation and analysis, when they are already highly independent, quickens this process of gaining independence, and makes it more dynamic. This results in the already formed (or is it the still forming?) "practical" ("applied") field of knowledge on literature to not only break away from the ever more abstract thoughts within theoretical poetics but also, in a way, to begin once again to form a relationship with the theoretical field. It also attempts to dictate to the latter (and not only to it) its conditions of peace although it is still not always fully aware of them and is not always capable of articulating them in a clear and precise enough way.

In this situation, the following types of questions are especially actual, significant and probably also gain a new meaning. Can we continue to treat AI as the practical application of analytical conceptions, models and technique, worked out within theoretical poetics; do such theoretical conceptions always aim at practical application (in the form of analysis) or, generally, do they have this application in mind; and finally, does the analysis—interpretation of an individual work possess the values attributed to practice? Thus, does it check and verify the theses of theoretical poetics?

What points to the relation between theoretical poetics and what we have called AI is primarily the fact that the latter stops being solely a practical acquirement today and starts becoming more and more a theory that is independent of what has been suggested for its use by theoretical poetics. The best proof of this may be J. Hermand's book *Synthetisches Interpretieren* (1st. ed., 1968). But that is not all. It is worth keeping in mind that probably never has every theoretical conception had a corresponding model of analysis or interpretation that would be appropriate for it and only for it. It has also seldom happened that one literary theory has worked out for itself many analytical and interpre-

tative models and techniques; this could only apply to such experts in poetics as Plato, Aristotle and Horace. On principle, this relation gradually became multi-univocal, as logicians would call it. This meant that one type of analysis or interpretation "serve" many theoretical constructions/conceptions. In other words, there were more theoretical conceptions than analytical ones. Moreover, not every "theory" possessed its own "private" model of analysis, especially an analysis of a literary work.

It is quite probable that not every theory wanted to possess one and this was not only because, contrary to descriptive poetics, normative poetics, for example, were oriented more towards practical use in literary work itself than towards analytical or interpretative "practice". It was also because there appear such theoretical variants (constructions) (e.g. in the works of G. Lukacs, A. Jolles, P. Van Tieghem and, in Poland, in those of J. Trzynadlowski among others) for whom the literary work does not seem to suffice as it is not long ranging enough, it has too little independence, and the basic unit is only the literary genre. On the other hand, the work may seem to be too extensive, rich and complicated for any analysis or interpretation to be able to take it in as a whole. (Neoidealistic and existentialist conceptions, for example, tried to achieve this).

Thus it is possible to say that although "theory" in poetics usually suggests a certain analytical (or interpretative) horizon, not every horizon is of the best from the point of view of analysis or interpretation of a literary work; not every one is advantageous for its development.

This point of view may also serve as a criterion for assessing the theoretical conceptions (or poetics). Of course, this assessment will be meaningful only if it does not go further than the framework and competence of the principles appointed and accepted earlier, becoming universalistically ambitious on the way. This does not mean, however, that this criterion is optional or accidental. It is quite the opposite as it functions in the field of analysis as a basis for the choice of certain theoretical constructions (i.e. "theory").

The fact that both such a criterion and the right to select a „theory” appears seems to be of great importance for the relations between the analysis of a literary work and theoretical poetics, although the criterion itself cannot forejudge the nature of those relations. However, in the situation that has taken shape at present, this fact, together with other symptoms of change, seems to mean something more—in the sense that it does not only strongly limit the functioning of the principle that talks about the checking (verifying) nature of analysis (interpretation) towards the suggestions of theoretical poetics but it seems to question the very basis of this principle.

Another matter is whether AI belongs to poetics as a research discipline in the wide meaning of the word. The view that the beginnings of poetics are usually identified with the beginnings of theoretical poetics (Aristotle) and not with the beginnings of the analysis or interpretation of a literary work (Plato) seems to be characteristic here.

3. MUST AI OBJECTIFY?

The methodological situation in which the shaping of AI took place may be new. However the above question is not new in its deep structure. The romantics in the previous century, for example, were fully aware of this and were terrified of the objectifying of a literary work and of literature in general. Probably never before, though, has analysis or interpretation, the theory of literature or the methodology of literary research had such pangs of conscience due to objectifying as they have today. Never have they experienced the basic dilemma so deeply and intensely, even dramatically. This dilemma, generally speaking, is due on one hand to the fact that a literary work is in itself subjective while on the other, the whole tradition of thinking the result of which is the prevalent model of analysis, including the understanding of it itself, behaves in quite the opposite way. This means that it insists that everything it deals with is treated as an object (thing) and is changed into an object.

We have just used the phrase "probably never before" in order to express reservation: whether a certain recognition on the subject of the 20th century is appropriate, i.e. whether the belief expressed by H. G. Gadamer, for example, is right when he says that

the most deeply hidden, yet most powerful, basis of our century (in the two previous sentences he writes about our century as a century of contemporary learnedness and about the world being made totally scientific—added by E. Cz.) seems to me to be the scepticism towards every type of dogmatism, towards the dogmatism of science as well (*Die philosophischen Grundlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*)⁸.

Moreover, the dilemma that is part of AI is not something exceptional or unique but is one of the aspects of a much more general dilemma that characterizes all twentieth century thought.

When we speak about the subjective character of a literary work, we have in mind not only what happens in the situation: literary work — reader or reader — literary work, i.e. what Th. Lipps, for example, once called aesthetic understanding (*Einfühlung*), E. Staiger — disturbance

⁸ H. G. Gadamer, *Rozum, słowo, dzieje. Szkice wybrane* (*The Mind, Word, Works Selected Sketches*), selected (...) K. Michalski, trans. M. Łukasiewicz, K. Michalski, Warszawa 1979, p. 78.

(Berührung) and W. Kayser — being moved by the given work (Ergriffensein). We do not even have in mind what happens in the situation: Writer — literary work or literary work — writer, i.e. that the work is, for example, the expression of the writer's soul, feelings, psyche, consciousness, life, etc., (this was the opinion of the romantics, the representatives of psychological poetics, B. Croce, and of many others). Furthermore, every literary work, even every word, is written by somebody, and every truly creative text expresses and reveals the writer's personality (similar comments were made by M. Bakhtin). In actual fact, what is of more importance here is the special status of a literary work. At first glance, this status is exceptional: the literary work becomes surprisingly similar to the consciousness of the "second" ("strange") person and his world.

The matter then is not limited to the fact that every contact with a literary work is to see and understand in the latter the writer himself. It was psychological poetics — H. Roetteken and R. Müller-Freienfels — that defined the task and the meaning of reading as well as the task of literature itself. Getting to know any type of literary work, though, is treated in the same way — it is even sometimes stressed — as getting to know another live person. At the same time, specifically human features are taken on both by cognition, in which the basic role is played understanding and is the opposite of explanation here, as well as by the literary work itself in which certain specific phenomena appear (e.g. sense in contrast to meaning), available only to understanding and, primarily, not applicable to things. The opposition of sense and things (objects) is one of the issues often taken up by Bakhtin (Cf. *The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology and in the other Humanities*).⁹ Moreover, Bakhtin's thoughts on the subject of the close relationship between the sense of consciousness and the role of the "second person" are also frequent and seem to be of equal importance. It is also necessary to mention here that he made a deep subjective analysis of human consciousness as an ontological feature which is, according to Bakhtin in *On Altering the Book on Dostoevsky*, objective but not material in nature.¹⁰

In this situation, it is hardly surprising that AI trends, which stress the subjective character of a literary work, out of necessity either originate from a particular anthropology or consistently aim in that direction. AI is never on its own here. What is more, it is not really known where it starts and at which point it comes to an end. The works of people such as the above quoted Bakhtin, or the slightly earlier Gadamer, Sar-

⁹ М. М. Бахтин, *Эстетика словесного творчества*, Москва 1979, pp. 281—307.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

tre and E. Paci who have not yet been mentioned, of F. Nietzsche from among the earlier ones, strongly confirm this unusual and characteristic phenomenon that is a vivid contradiction of the tendency to specify and specialize as well as to systematize and classify. Generally speaking, they are goals and ideals of a scientific nature, propagated by the Aristotelian trend,¹¹ which is especially popular today in circles that are influenced by neopositivism. The anthropologically and, at the same time, subjectively oriented AI or, more widely speaking, the reflection on literature, erasing the borderlines the many different humanistic disciplines, or rather situating itself on those borders and concentrating on the problems of man in literature, actually suggests a different type of literary knowledge than that of the Aristotelian version. That is why it is so difficult to classify this type exactly: those who practice it most willingly call their activity philosophical analysis, hermeneutics or simply philosophizing in order to keep away from systematization that is foreign to them.

The difference of this type of knowledge seems to be based, among others, on the fact that the literary work is not "observed" or "described"; one does not conduct its "parsing" or "vivisection"; neither the longitudinal "sections" nor the "cross-sections", the layers, levels or sets are studied; it is not "taken apart" or "put together" again. This can only be done with an object (thing) on which one can use "tools", "instruments", "apparatus", etc., and towards man only in extreme situations (e.g. "tools of torture", "surgical instruments", "medical apparatus"). However, the result of the subjective approach is the attempt to bring about a conversation (dialogue) between the researcher and the writer by means of the literary work. In this conversation, just like in any other for that matter, the idea is not to create a language of ideas and categories serving the description of a literary work as such, as one's attention is, in a way, directed not so much from the work somewhere else but much deeper, in order to find out, by means of questions and answers, as much as possible concerning what the writer, reader and the research — worker himself think about the world. The studies then lose whatever likeness they may have had to what is usually ascribed to natural science. In a way, they stop being "a study" of a literary work and start being its (i.e. the literary work's as well as the writer's) development, formation and cocreation. This is because a literary work is never ready and always concerns the present. Gadamer says that a work of art is marked by timeless

¹¹ I discuss the differentiation between the Aristotelian and Platonic trends more widely in *Wstęp do poetyki pragmatycznej* (*An Introduction to Pragmatic Poetics*), Warszawa 1977, pp. 97—115 and *passim*.

contemporaneity (*Ästhetik und Hermeneutik*). A work has not been created but is continuously creating itself. It is not complete but is coming into being.

It seems that dialogue is especially predestined to play a central role in the building of the type of knowledge we are concerned with here. It is especially suitable in the field of the analysis — interpretation of a literary work if it wishes to consider the latter in a subjective way. It is not by chance that dialogue is exposed to such a degree both by Bakhtin as well as by certain trends of existential phenomenology (e.g. H. G. Gadamer and M. Merleau-Ponty). While reading their works it is possible to notice an extremely close relation between dialogue and the subjective approach to a word, to literature and to language. But will this be a univocal relationship? The matter is far from clear. First, this problem has not been sufficiently worked out by the theory of dialogue.¹² Secondly, both subjectivity as well as dialogue preserve an extremely shaky balance, showing a permanent readiness to change their character. It is enough to point to the developed knowledge on the narrator, lyrical ego and the literary subject in general, on the basis of structuralist poetics, which treats the subject in an objective way. There is also a much poorer knowledge, but present in the same poetics, on the subject of dialogue which is nothing more than a relatively simple combination of monologues (e.g. J. Mukařovský). The source of such behaviour is probably due to the fact that in the general consciousness of man, the still positivistic or the wider Aristotelian model of science holds a very important place and even enforces itself on us as being unique and pretending towards total exclusivity.

Even today, there often appears the conviction that the type of knowledge that is not in accordance with the positivistic model (and Aristotelian) is not scientific research at all. Because of this, it does not belong to the studies on literature as such but to literary criticism, for example, which is then placed in opposition to the history of literature and to the theory of literature. It even places itself somewhere on the edge of the theory of literature having a clear positivistic background. Also frequently, and recently even more so, there appear, though, doubts in this matter, inspired by certain philosophical trends. However, we are not concerned here with proportions and who happens to be right. There is probably no need for this anyway. Research practice (analytical and interpretative) most often takes a stand that is less radical and more compromising, if not to say eclectic. Not going to extremes, it also sel-

¹² I wrote on the subject of dialogics in *Dialogics and the Pragmatic Theory of Dialogue*, "Dialectics and Humanism", 1978, no. 1, and more widely in *Dialog w literaturze (Dialogue in Literature)*, ed. E. Czaplewicz and E. Kasperski, Warszawa 1978, pp. 11—47.

dom achieves only the minimum. Even less frequently, or rather never, does it reach perfection.

Maybe it was this that brought about its extensive development in the last decades?

Translated by *Aniela Korzeniowska*

CO SIĘ DZIEJE Z ANALIZĄ LITERACKĄ?

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł zawiera następujące tezy i konstatacje:

1. Analiza i interpretacja literacka były dotychczas pojmowane jako dwie przeciwstawne sobie metody, które powstały niezależnie od siebie, wywodzą się z odmiennych źródeł teoriopoznawczych i należą do różnych typów poznania. Rozwijały się niezależnie od siebie, jakby równolegle. W ostatnim okresie obserwujemy zmianę ich statusu: z metod stały się nie do końca może jeszcze wykrywalizowanymi dyscyplinami badawczymi, które spotkały się ze sobą na gruncie wspólnego przedmiotu wiedzy. Stopniowo zatraciły swój charakter przeciwstawny, a obecnie zwały się do tego stopnia ze sobą, że stały się nie do odróżnienia. W rezultacie stanowią — przejściowo lub na stałe — jedną gałąź wiedzy, którą można nazwać analizą-interpretacją (w skrócie: AI).

2. W wiekach poprzednich analiza literacka pozostawała w poetyce (i retoryce) na usługach rozważań teoretycznych. W XX wieku rozważania teoretyczne przekształciły się w tzw. poetykę teoretyczną, która jest wiedzą bardzo abstrakcyjną i hermetyczną. Zaś analiza odłączyła się jakby od niej i usamodzielniała, rozwijając się niezależnie i autonomicznie. Podobny proces dokonał się z interpretacją. Jednak po zjednoczeniu obu w AI powstaje problem relacji nowej dyscypliny (tj. AI) do poetyki teoretycznej. W stosunku do tej ostatniej, AI nie jest już więcej „praktyką”, „zastosowaniem” czy „sprawdzeniem”. Powstaje nawet pytanie, czy AI należy do poetyki jako takiej.

3. AI jest zorientowana antropologicznie i podmiotowo. Staje się nie tyle badaniem, co rozwijaniem, kształtowaniem, współtworzeniem. Zajmuje się nie tyle utworem, co autorem i interpretatorem. Proponuje w sumie zupełnie odmienny typ wiedzy o literaturze, aniżeli literaturoznawstwo wywodzące się od Arystotelesa.

4. W tej nowej wiedzy szczególnie predestynowany do odegrania centralnej roli wydaje się dialog. Dlatego jest eksponowany przez badaczy, którzy taką właśnie wiedzę tworzyli lub preferowali, zwłaszcza M. Bachtin, H. G. Gadamer, M. Merleau-Ponty. Jednakże pozytywistyczny (arystotelesowski) model nauki usiłuje przechwycić dialog i na swój sposób go uprzedmiotowić. Bitwa o dialog, a tym samym o AI, trwa.

Eugeniusz Czaplewicz