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OBLICZA WOJNY
TOM 10 • NARZĘDZIA WOJNY
ŁÓDŹ 2023 • ISBN 978-83-8331-461-7 • s. 77–95
https://doi.org/10.18778/8331-461-7.05

MONEY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD UNTIL THE END OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

Summary. Homer was convinced that peace between states promoted wealth. In Greece during the archaic period, people realised that financial resources were necessary to wage war. They knew that war had to be paid for, although in the 6th century BCE, a citizen of the polis was obliged to arm himself at his own expense. Over time, the idea that money was necessary to go to war became fully established.

In light of archaeological finds, we are entitled to believe that since the creation of the coin at the end of the 7th century BC in Asia Minor, money was quickly used to pay soldiers' wages – the coin was a practical means of payment, the quality of which was guaranteed by the issuer with his mark. It cannot be ruled out that the need to pay soldiers was one of the factors that influenced the production and distribution of coins, which may be confirmed by a find from Sardis, where a coin was found next to the body of a soldier. A text written by Alcaeus in the 6th century BC informs us that he was given 2000 Lydian staters for the army. The need to pay mercenaries encouraged the spread of coin production. Coin money became an excellent 'argument' when the enlistment of mercenaries was necessary. Thus, money and war became fused.

The opinion of Pericles (495–425) relating to the Peloponnesian War 495–429 BCE (as recorded by Thucydides) is symptomatic, testifying that in the 5th century BCE money was a 'natural' tool of war. In the 5th century BC, paying mercenary soldiers was commonplace, thus money was used to influence decisions relating to the number of troops and the timing of their use (mainly in relation to mercenaries). During the Peloponnesian War, an Athenian hoplite fighting at the Potidaea received one drachma per day (plus an allowance for 'servants' of one drachma).

The Peloponnesian War, fought between Athens and Sparta in the years 431–404, provides an example of another wartime custom, i.e., the issuing of replacement currency. The long-standing conflict between Athens and Sparta forced the Athenians to issue money to replace the well-reputed 'owls' when silver was in short supply.

In Demosthenes' speech from 351 BCE we find evidence that the idea of conscious accumulation of money for war purposes was commonly accepted. In order to pay the army, temples and their treasuries were plundered (in ancient Greece, temples conducted business). From the 4th century BC onwards, the confiscation of temples' resources to raise money for war became the norm. This change was brought about by an increase in the number of mercenary soldiers, which, in turn, was also associated with the need for longer war campaigns. These troops had to be paid for their service, indicating that money had become a tool of war. While Plato pointed

out that war and money are closely linked to each other, Aristotle developed this idea even further by stating that war was the art of earning money.

One particular example of when coins became a tool of war was the operations of the mint at Tarsus – it is believed that the money produced there was intended for Greek mercenaries in Persian service. It is worth recalling that, according to Arrian's account of Alexander III of Macedon (356–323) expedition to the East, Greek soldiers were worth the money they were paid for their service.

Alexander III of Macedon (336–323), following in Philip II's (357–336) footsteps, set off for Asia with scant, but well-calculated, funds at his disposal. When his general Parmenion (c. 400–330) captured the city of Damascus (where the Persian king Darius III (336–330) had established his quarters) and discovered a vast supply of bullion there, a mint was accordingly established. This mint operated from 330–320 BC and produced coins (at least in part) for military purposes. The quality of Alexander III's coins was one of the factors that determined their popularity.

During the Hellenistic period, the Ptolemaic army and the Seleucid army already had a 'professional' nature. Actions that were in line with the view that money had become a tool of war also involved establishing mints in places where none had previously existed.

Since Cretan mercenaries (mainly archers) were highly valued, they were used in battles in various regions of the Greek world. At the end of their contract they would return to Crete. Consequently, in the 5th century BC, coins from the Cyclades, Greece proper, western Asia Minor and, in the 4th century, also from Cyrenaica, were re-minted into coinage of the Cretan centres.

In this group, the situation of Rhodes coins minted in Crete is special. The presence of Rhodian soldiers on the island was associated with the economic expansion of Rhodes. The Rhodian money with which the mercenaries were paid became so popular that the island began to issue coins imitating Rhodian coins.

A tool of war thus became part of the local economy. A considerable amount of Seleucid bronze coins from the end of the 3rd century BC in Thrace is the result of the stay of a large army of Antiochus III the Great (241–187) in that area, which was paid with Seleucid money. Consequently, there were so many Seleucid coins in Thrace that they were accepted on the local money market. Once again, in a different situation, money became a tool of war. A large proportion of Ptolemaic bronze coins from the 3rd century BC minted in Alexandria and Cyprus and found in Greece proper are the result of the Ptolemaic soldiers' stay there and the Ptolemaic subsidies being transferred to Greece by the first three Ptolemies in connection with local armed conflicts.

However, with regard to Ptolemaic Egypt, we have epigraphic material proving that mercenaries from the Black Sea – soldiers of the armies of the Bosporan rulers – served in the Ptolemaic army. This may explain the presence of Ptolemaic coins on the Bosporus. Money earned in Egypt was spent on the Bosporus. This is an indication that paying mercenaries influenced the transfer of coins in various directions, sometimes even far from the place of their issuance. Money became a trans regional tool of war at that time.

Keywords: ancient Greece, war, money

In the *Odyssey* Homer expressed the opinion that peace between states promoted wealth.[1] For the Greeks of the archaic period the relationship between warfare and the resources available for it was evident,[2] which led to the conclusion that without adequate resources, including funds for the upkeep of the troops (even if the costs of maintenance were covered by the soldiers themselves), it was impossible to wage war.[3] Early estimates of the costs of war were based, at least in part, on an assessment of the value of the potential spoils (including seized territories) that could be acquired as a result of the war.[4] In the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, a citizen of the polis was obliged to arm himself and pay his own living expenses during the campaign. According to Heraclitus (c. 540–480), war was the father and king of all.[5]

As the duration of military operations, as well as the area covered by the conflict increased, there was a growing recognition of the need to gather resources to cover the costs of war, including money for soldiers. Initially, a major part of this was precious metals. However, we know of examples, primarily from the sphere of trade, that pieces of 'precious metal' (mainly silver) without the 'owner's mark', measured 'by weight', contained 'copper inclusions'.[6] Chopped pieces of silver (*hacksilver*[7]), regionally diverse,[8] popular in the ancient world before the

[1] Homer, *Odyssey*, 24.485–498. *Vide:* R. Seaford, *Money and the Early Greek Mind. Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy*, Cambridge 2004.

[2] It is worth recalling the often-cited response of Marshal Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, who, when asked by King Louis XII of France (1498–1515) what was required to defeat the Duchy of Milan, with whom he was at war, replied that three things were necessary – money, money, and yet more money. W. Kopaliński, *Słownik mitów i tradycji kultury*, Warszawa 1988, p. 860.

[3] C.M. Kraay, *Greek Coinage and War*, [in:] *Ancient Coins of the Graeco-Roman World. The Nickle Numismatic Papers*, eds. W. Heckel, R. Sullivan, Calgary 1984, pp. 3–18. However, it may be noted that Plato, *Politeia*, 371d and Aristotle, *Politics* 1257a, 19–40, pointed out the particular importance of coins for trade. Reference may be made here to the work *The Greek state at war, Parts I–V*, which was compiled and edited (Parts V) by W.K. Pritchett, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1971–1991.

[4] P. Brun, *Le financement des opérations militaires dans la guerre des cités (Ve-IVe siècles)*, [in:] *Guerres et societies dans les mondes grecs (490–322)*, Paris 1999, p. 266.

[5] Heraclitus, *De natura* 29 (B 53); K. Mrówka, *Heraklit. Fragmenty: nowy przekład i komentarz*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 167–169.

[6] M.S. Balmuth, *Hacksilber to Coinage. New Insights into the Monetary History of the Near East and Greek*, New York 2001; C.M. Thompson, *Sealed silver in Iron Age Cisjordan and the 'invention' of coinage*, "Oxford Journal of Archaeology" 2003, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 67–107.

[7] D.M. Schaps, *The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece*, Ann Arbor 2003.

[8] F. Duyrat, *Wealth and Warfare. The Archaeology of Money in Ancient Syria*, New York 2016, pp. 7–8.

7th century BC,[9] testify to the fact that suspicions that a 'piece of metal' often contained less precious metal than indicated by its weight were correct.

A fundamental change occurred with the introduction and spread of coins, which became both a means of payment and an object of hoarding.[10] In the light of the finds (including those made in the course of archaeological excavations), we are entitled to believe that from the time coins were created (which probably happened in the second half of the 7th century BC in the western part of Asia Minor, with particular reference to Lydia), coin money was quickly used to pay soldiers' wages. The coin was a practical means of payment, its quality guaranteed by its issuer's mark. It cannot be ruled out that the need to pay soldiers was one of the factors that influenced the production and distribution of coins. Finds of coins that can be considered to be the oldest, apart from the Ephesian Artemision,[11] such as those from Gordion[12] in Phrygia (at that time subordinated to Lydia), seem to confirm that the appearance of coins quickly influenced warfare. A particular testimony to this is the remains of a soldier who had with him a coin made of electrum (coin of the oldest emission),[13] discovered during excavations on the walls of Sardis. A payment of 2,000 Lydian staters to the army is reported in the oldest text relating to the use of coins – a fragment of a work by Alcaeus dating from the 6th century BC.[14] It is assumed that the need to pay mercenary soldiers,[15] and therefore war necessity, was one of the most significant factors that facilitated the dissemination process of coinage.[16] Although the introduction of coins did not immediately increase the number of Greek

[9] R. Seaford, *op. cit.*, p. 97

[10] C.M. Kraay, *op. cit*., pp. 3–18; also R. Seaford, *op. cit.*

[11] *Vide*: M. Kerschner, K. Konuk, *Electrum coins and their archaeological context: the case of the Artemision of Ephesus*, [in:] *White Gold. Studies in early electrum coinage*, eds. P. van Alfen, U. Wartenberg, Jerusalem 2020, pp. 83–191.

[12] A. Bellinger, *Electrum coins from Gordion*, [in:] *Essays in Greek coinage presented to Stanley Robinson*, eds. C. Kraay, G.K. Jenkins, Oxford 1968, pp. 10–15.

[13] J. De Rose Evans, *Coins from the Excavations at Sardis. Their Archaeological and Economic Contexts. Coins from the 1973 to 2013 Excavations*, Cambridge, Mass. 2018, p. 9.

[14] Alcaeus frg. 69. The use of early coins to pay soldiers seems to be confirmed by archaeological finds, including the discovery of Lydian electron coins in Gordion, Phrygia, where a Lydian garrison was stationed.

[15] *Vide*: H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers. From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Oxford 1973 (first ed. 1933).

[16] *Vide*: D.M. Cook, *Speculations on the Origin of Coinage*, "Historia" 1958, vol. 7, pp. 257–260; C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1976, p. 28.

mercenaries – many Greeks served Persian rulers[17] – the need to pay mercenaries encouraged the spread of coin production,[18] as coin money became an excellent 'argument' when the enlistment of mercenaries was necessary. Through the amount of payment – commanders received more money than ordinary soldiers – it was possible to 'regulate' relations with mercenary armies. Thus, money and war became fused.[19] The hoards discovered in the present day and linked to wartime events can be considered both as evidence of payment received and as spoils of war.[20] The validity of this opinion is proven by the content of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. The information contained in this work about the circumstances of the payment, the money used, and the amount of remuneration is exceptional, starting with the 10,000 darics (gold coins of Persian rulers) that Cyrus, the younger brother of the Persian king Artaxerxes II (404–358) gave to Clearchus (c. 450–401), a Lacedaemonian who served the Persians while in exile,[21] with which he was to raise an army.[22]

The opinion of Pericles (c. 495–429) on the Peloponnesian War[23] as mentioned in the work of Thucydides[24] is symptomatic of the military importance of coinage. Pericles is supposed to have remarked that Sparta, due to its lack of money, would not be able to withstand a long-lasting war.[25] These words demonstrate that awareness of the impact of the political and economic situation on the quality and quantity of money on the market developed quickly.[26] In Milos, during the Peloponnesian War, just before and during the siege of the town by

[17] D.M. Schaps, *op. cit*., pp. 146–147 – to a great degree these were mercenaries who served in the Persian army.

[18] The behaviour of the Greeks who were in the Egyptian army of Pharaoh Teos (Tachos) during the revolt against the Persian ruler Artaxerxes II (404–358) is a particular example. The Greeks refused to accept payment in bullion and demanded coins. M. Mielczarek, *Mennictwo starożytnej Grecji. Mennictwo okresów archaicznego i klasycznego*, Warszawa–Kraków 2006, p. 158.

[19] Y. Garlan, *Guerre et économie en Grèce ancienne*, Paris 1999, p. 56.

[20] F. Duyrat, *op. cit*., p. 9.

[21] T. Figueira, *The Power of Money. Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*, Philadelphia 1998.

[22] Xenophon, *Anabasis* I.1. Also I.3–VII.2.

[23] *Vide*: D.M. Schaps, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–149.

[24] *Vide* also L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford 1993; L. Kallet, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides. The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath*, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 2001.

[25] Thucydides, 1.141, 142.3.

[26] Inflation was not necessarily related solely to the effects of the war. D.M. Schaps, *op. cit*., pp. 121–122.

the Athenians[27] in 416 BC, coins were minted[28] from silver hoarded in the town (war reserve?).

In the 5th century BC, money constituted a tool of war that was used in various ways, but paying soldiers for their service was still its primary use. In the 5th century BC, paying mercenary soldiers by rulers or poleis was commonplace. Thus, money became a tool to influence decisions relating to the number of troops and the time of their use (mainly in relation to mercenaries). From Cyrus II (c. 600–530), the soldiers demanded more pay – instead of one daric, they received one and a half darics per head per month. The Thracian king Seuthes II (c. 405–387) paid Greek mercenaries with gold Cyzicene staters, i.e. Cyzicus coins,[29] which were very popular in Greece, Thrace, on the northern Black Sea coast, and in the centres of Asia Minor.[30] At that time they were the money used in many regions of the Greek world, including the centres of the northern Black Sea coast. In the absence of adequate resources, the war activities of one polis could be 'supported' with the money of one of its allies.[31] For the same reasons, some cities on the Chalkidiki peninsula started minting coins in the 5th century BC.[32] During the Peloponnesian War (431–404) an Athenian hoplite fighting at the Potidaea received one drachma per day, plus an allowance of one drachma for servants).[33]

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[27] O. Picard, *Guerre et économie dans l'alliance athénienne (490–322 av. J.-C.)*, Paris 2000.

[28] C.M. Kraay, *Greek Coinage and...*, p. 5; M. Mielczarek, *Wojenne monety Melos*, [in:] *Pieniądz i wojna, Białoruś – Litwa – Łotwa – Polska – Słowacja – Ukraina*, ed. K. Filipow, Warszawa 2004, pp. 25–29.

[29] *Vide*: A. Bresson, *Electrum coins, currency exchange and transaction costs in Archaic and Classical Greece*, "Revue Belge de Numismatique" 2009, no. 155, pp. 71–80; J.R. Melville Jones, *The value of electrum in Greece and Asia*, [in:] *Studies in Greek Numismatics in Memory of Martin Jessop Price*, eds. R. Ashton, S. Hurter et al., London 1998, pp. 259–268; S.K. Eddy, *The value of the cyzicene stater at Athens in the fifth century*, "Museum Notes. American Numismatic Society" 1970, vol. 16, pp. 13–22; W.E. Thompson, *The value of Kyzikene stater*, "Numismatic Chronicle" 1963, vol. 3, pp. 1–4.

[30] M. Laloux, *La circulation des monnaies d'électrum de Cyzique*, "Revue Belge de Numismatique" 1971, no. 117, pp. 31–69; C. Preda, *In legatura cu circulatia staterilor din Cyzic la Dunera de jos*, "Pontica" 1974, vol. 7, pp. 139–146; Т. Герасимовъ, *Находки отъ електронови монети на градъ Кизик отъ България*, "Годишникъ на Народния Археологически Музей" 1942, no. 8; A.M. Butyagin, D.E. Chistov, *The hoard of cyzicenes and shrine of Demeter at Myrmekion*, "Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia" 2006, vol. 12, issue 1–2, pp. 77–131; M.G. Abramzon, N.A. Frolova, *Le trésor de Myrmekion de statères cyzicènes*, "Revue Numismatique" 2007, vol. 163, pp. 15–44.

[31] For instance: Thucydides, I.31, that the Aeolians 'supplied' money to the Corinthians; alongside the money, the Aeolians also sent ships.

[32] O. Picard, *Monnaies et querre en Grèce classique*, [in:] *Guerres et societies dans les mondes grecs à l'époque classique, Pallas*, "Revue d'Etudes Antiques" 1999, vol. 51, pp. 211–212.

[33] C.T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, Chicago 1975 (repr. of 1935 ed.), p. 294.

Greeks acting as mercenaries in foreign armies (including those in the East) wanted to be paid in coins. The need to meet obligations towards their armies, especially mercenary troops,[34] was becoming a problem for the poleis, and therefore money could be used to influence warfare.[35]

On the other hand, Athens' long-standing conflict with Sparta forced the Athenians to issue money to replace their well-reputed 'owls' when silver was in short supply. Due to the blockade of Athens by the Spartans and the Athenians being cut off from silver deposits, gold coins were minted in Athens in 407–406 BC.[36] According to some scholars, gold coins were produced for 'outside' purposes – to pay mercenary soldiers[37] – although in the realities of late 5th century BC Athens, gold coins were considered substitute money.

Thus, a 'monetary' tool of war was becoming part of the local economy and politics of the *poleis* that created 'war funds.' This applies, *inter alia*, to Athens.[38] The custom of paying soldiers and sailors had developed in Athens already before the Peloponnesian War.[39] Further examples can also be named.

Silver-plated bronze coins the size of tetradrachms and drachmae appeared soon after.[40] A hoard of such coins has been discovered. It is possible that coins with lower denominations than drachmas were also minted.[41] The aim of this action taken in a crisis situation seems obvious – the objective was to draw as much silver from the market as possible and make it available for war needs. Silver-plated coins were directed primarily to the internal market. The fact that bronze money circulated in Athens was mentioned by Aristophanes in his comedy *The Frogs*, first staged in 405 BC. In one of the passages, a comparison of these bad coins with the

[34] On mercenaries of the Greek world *vide*: H.W. Parke, *op. cit.*; G. T. Griffith, *op. cit.*; M. Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries. From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander*, London–New York 2004.

[35] Most of the comments presented to date have focused on the infantry. *Vide*: I.G. Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece. A Social and Military History*, Oxford 1993.

[36] W.F. Fergusson, *The Treasurers of Athena*, Cambridge Mass. 1932, p. 91.

[37] W.E. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

[38] C. Howgego, *Ancient History from Coins*, London–New York 1995, pp. 18–19. *Vide* also for instance W.S. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–171.

[39] H.W. Parke, *op. cit*.

[40] C.M. Kraay, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–70; J. Kroll, *Aristophanes' πονηρα χαλκία*: a Reply, "Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies" 1976, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 329–341; D.T. Engen, *op. cit.*, p. 370, also V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy*, Oxford 1951.

[41] This may be supported by a passage from Aristophanes' comedy *Ecclesiazusae* (*The Assemblywomen*), 816–822.

older excellent silver coins valued by the Greeks and the Barbarians was used to voice the poor opinion about the Athenian politicians of the late 5th century BC, who did not match the excellent statesmen of the past.[42] Over time, the introduction of bronze coins into circulation as money 'in need' was treated as spoiling of money, although – as we can deduct from Aristophanes' text – it was previously agreed to. The restoration of the 'strength' of Athenian coinage became possible due to the Persian gold brought to Athens by Conon in 393 BC, when – before 392 BC (referring to the content of Aristophanes' comedy *The Assemblywomen*) – silver-plated bronze pieces were demonetised. Even low denominations of silver were minted, up to and including one-eighth of an obol.

In Demosthenes' speech from 351 BC we find evidence that the idea of conscious accumulation of money for war purposes was commonly accepted. It must be added, however, that at that time a fundamental change in the behaviour of the military took place. In order to pay the army, temples and their treasuries were being plundered (in ancient Greece, temples conducted 'business'). When the Phocians occupied Delphi in 356, they had no doubt that they could use the resources of the temple's treasury. The treasures taken from the temple – which was almost completely looted – not least those in monetary form, allowed the Phocians to continue to wage war.[43]

From the 4th century BC, raiding temple treasuries was commonplace – such a manner of raising money for war became the norm. This change was probably also brought by the increase in the number of mercenary soldiers, which in turn resulted from the need to extend the time of war campaigns. Long service had to be paid for – and for this, money was needed.

A similar assessment of the situation was made by Plato, who pointed out that war and money were closely related.[44] For Aristotle, war became the art of making money.[45] The costs of war varied, but they certainly put a strain on the finances of a city at war, despite the subsidies received, or loans from outside.[46]

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[42] Aristophanes, *The Frogs*, 718–737. *Vide*: V. Ehrenberg, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 297–317.

[43] P. Brun, *Le financement des opérations militaires dans la guerre des cités (Ve–IVe siècles)*, [in:] *Guerres et sociétés dans les mondes grecs (490–322)*, Paris 1999, pp. 265–289.

[44] Plato, *Politeia*, 4.422 a.

[45] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1256b. *Vide*: M.I. Finley, *Aristotle and economic analysis*, [in:] *Studies in Ancient Society*, ed. Idem, Boston 1974.

[46] L. Migeotte, *Les finances des cités grecques aux periods classique et hellénistique*, Paris 2014, pp. 381–388, 552–583.

One particular example of when and how money became a tool to steer the military was the mint at Tarsus, in Cilicia, Asia Minor – the capital of the local dynasties. In the 4th century BC, Tarsus was an administrative centre of the Persian state, a seat of satraps and often the place where Achaemenid forces were mobilised.[47] At that time, the local mint produced coins with a depiction of the Persian commanders' head (the commander depicted, as the issuer of the coins, confirmed the value of the coins), and also with a silhouette of a Greek hoplite (an indication for whom the coins were minted). It is believed that this was, at least in large part, money intended for Greek mercenaries in Persian service.[48] It is worth recalling that, according to Arrian's account of Alexander III's (336–323) expedition to the East, Greek soldiers were worth the money they were paid for their service.[49]

Alexander III (336–323), following in Philip II's (357–336) footsteps, set off for Asia with scant, but well-calculated, funds at his disposal.[50] We should also recall Plutarch's account, with reference to Aristobulus, that when crossing the Hellespont in 334 BC, Alexander had no more than 70 talents for the upkeep of the army.[51] According to Onesekritos (360–290), Alexander was said to have incurred a debt of 200 talents.[52] Provisions were calculated to last 30 days;[53] the missing funds were to be obtained through warfare.[54] Without money there would be no war.[55] On the other hand, however, as already mentioned and as Aristotle,[56] Alexander's teacher, put it, war is 'the art of earning money.'[57]

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[47] C.M. Kraay, *Greek Coinage and...*, pp. 7–8; M. Mielczarek, *Mennictwo...*, pp. 141–143.

[48] C. M. Kraay, *Greek Coinage and...*, p. 8.

[49] Arrian, *Anabasis*.

[50] From the extensive literature *vide*: H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, vol. 1, München 1926, pp. 302–303; N. Hammond, *Geniusz Aleksandra Wielkiego*, Poznań 2000, p.73.

[51] Plutarch, *Alexander*, 15.

[52] Plutarch, *Alexander*, 15. After Arrian, *Anabasis*, Alexander took out a loan of 800 talents.

[53] Plutarch, *Alexander*, 15.

[54] W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, Part 5, Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford 1991, pp. 457 ff.; P. Millet, *Warfare, Economy, and Democracy in Classical Athens*, [in:] *War and Society in the Greek World*, eds. J. Rich, G. Shipley, London 1995, p. 184.

[55] *Vide*: M. Price, *The coinage in the name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus. A British Museum Catalogue*, Zurich–London 1991.

[56] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1256b, cf. 1257a 31–41.

[57] *Vide*: P. Brun, R. Descat, *Le profit de la guerre dans la Grèce des cités*, [in:] *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques*, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000, pp. 211–230.

Therefore, wherever troops found loot[58] that allowed the production of coins, a mint was established. By the time of the Battle of Issus, Darius III (336–330) had established his quarters in Damascus. After capturing the city, Parmenion (c. 400–330), one of Alexander III's commanders, found in Damascus, among other things, a vast supply of bullion.[59] Accordingly, a mint was established there in 330 BC, which operated until 320 BC[60] and produced coins (at least in part) for military purposes. The quality of Alexander III's coins was one of the factors that determined their popularity.

The change came in the Hellenistic period,[61] when the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies already had a fully professional character. Money had become a tool of war.[62]

What applies to the minting of the Ptolemies and Seleucids also applies to other rulers. One example worth mentioning are the wars of Mithridates III.[63] Undoubtedly, cities created their own armies being aware of the war requirements.[64] A similar reference should be made to the actions of the Antigonids.[65]

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[58] They are calculated at around 180,000 talents, most likely silver. J. K. Davies, *Hellenistic Economies*, [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, ed. G.R. Bugh, Cambridge 2006, p. 80.

[59] N. Hammond, *op. cit*., p. 99.

[60] M.J. Price, *The Coinage*..., pp. 398–401.

[61] F. de Callataÿ, *Guerres et monnayages à l'époque hellénistique. Essai de mise en perspective suivi d'une d'une annexe sur le monnayage de Mithridate VI Eupatora*, [in:] *Economie antique. La guerre dans les economies antique*s, Saint-Bertrande-de-Commages 2000, pp. 337–364; G.T. Griffith, *op. cit.*; A. Chaniotis, *The impact of War on the Economy of Hellenistic Poleis: Demand Creation, Short Term Influences, Long Term Impacts*, [in:] *The Economies of Hellenistic Societes, Third to First Centuries BC*, eds. Z.H. Archibald, J.K. Davies, V. Gabrielsen, Oxford 2011, pp. 122–141.

[62] *Armées et fiscalite dans le monde antique*, Paris 1977; for example P. Leveque, *Monnaies et finances des cités italiotes engagés dans la guerre pyrhique*, [in:] *Armées et fiscalite dans le monde antique*, Paris 1977, pp. 455–473. *Vide* also G. Le Rider, F. de Callataÿ, *Les Séleucides et les Ptolémées. L'héritage monétaire et financier d'Alexandre le Grand*, 2006 [Éditions du Rocher].

[63] F. de Callataÿ, *L'histoire des guerres mithridatiques vue par les monnaies*, Louvain 1997.

[64] For instance P. Lévêque, *Monnaies et finances des cités italiotes engages dans la querre Pryrrehigue*, [in:] *Armés et fiscalitê dans le monde antique*, Paris 1977, pp. 455–473 [Colloques Nationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 936).

[65] P.R. Franke, *Zur Finanzpolitik des makedonischen Königs Perseus während des Krieges mit Rom 171–168 v. Chr.*, „Jahrbuch für Numismatic und Geldgeschichte" 1957, vol. 8, pp. 31–50.

Since Cretan mercenaries, mainly archers,[66] were highly valued, they were employed to fight in various regions of the Greek world. Following the end of their contract they would return to Crete. Consequently, in the 5th century BC, coins from the Cyclades, Greece proper, western Asia Minor and, in the 4th century, also from Cyrenaica, were re-minted into coinage of the Cretan centres.[67] Coins were re-punched with local stamps. In order to conform to the requirements of the local weight standard, the edges of coins created outside Crete were sometimes filed so as to reduce their weight.

In this group, the situation of Rhodes coins minted in Crete is special. The presence of Rhodian soldiers on the island was associated with the economic expansion of Rhodes. Rhodian money, with which mercenaries were paid, became so popular that the island began to issue coins imitating Rhodian coins.[68] In turn, imitations of Rhodian coins became so important that they were even minted in several cities in central Greece.[69]

The considerable amount of Seleucid bronze coins from the end of the 3rd century BC in Thrace is the result of the stay of a large army of Antiochus III the Great (241–187) in that area[70] – the soldiers were paid with Seleucid money. Consequently, there were so many Seleucid coins in Thrace that they were accepted on the local money market. Once again, in a different situation, money became a tool of war. This is particularly evidenced by the fact that some Greek cities on

[66] The best evidence of the value of these warriors is the provision of the Treaty of Apamea from 188 BC between Antiochus III the Great, ruler of Syria, and Rome, which forbade Seleucid to hire Cretan archers for his army.

[67] G. Le Rider, *Monnaies crétoises du V^e au I^er siècle av. J.-C.*, Paris 1966; D. MacDonald, *Mercenaries and the Movement of Silver to Crete in the Late Fourth Century B.C.*, "Numismatika Chronika" 1996, vol. 15, pp. 41–47 (English version); M. Mielczarek, *Mennictwo*..., pp. 65–66.

[68] T. Hackens, *L'influence Rhodienne en Crete aux III^e et II^e siècle av. J.-C. et le tresor de Gortyne 1966*, „Revue Belge de Numismatique" 1966, no. 116, pp. 37–58; A. Bresson, *Drachmes rhodiennes et imitation. Une politique économique dr Rhodes*, „Revue des Etudes Anciennes" 1996, vol. 98, pp. 65–77; R.H.J. Ashton, *Rhodian-type coinages from Crete*, „Schweizer Münzblätter" 1987, issue 146, pp. 29–36, also other works by this author: E. Apostolou, *Les drachmes rhodiennes et pseudorhodiennes de la fin du IIIe et du début du IIe siècle av. J.-C*, „Revue Numismatique" 1995, vol. 150, pp. 7–19; Μ.Ι. Στεφανακις, Β. Στεφανακι, *Ρόδος και Κρήτη. Νομισματκές Συναλλαγες, Επιρροες και Αντιδράσεις στις αρχες του 2ου αι*, „οβολός" 2006, vol. 8, pp. 165–175.

[69] R.H.J. Ashton, *Pseudo-Rhodian drachms from Central Greece*, "Numismatic Chronicle" 2000, vol. 160, pp. 93–116.

[70] B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army. Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns*, Cambridge 1976.

the western Black Sea coast affixed countermarks to at least some of their coins. If one agrees with the opinion that these were 'local' countermarks, they probably attested to the legitimacy of such coins' circulation on the local market.

A large proportion of Ptolemaic bronze coins from the 3rd century BC minted in Alexandria and Cyprus and found in Greece proper, are the result of the Ptolemaic soldiers' stay there and the Ptolemaic subsidies being transferred to Greece by the first three Ptolemies in connection with local armed conflicts.

With regard to Ptolemaic Egypt, we have interesting epigraphic material[71] showing that mercenaries from the Black Sea – soldiers of the armies of the Bosporan rulers – served in the Ptolemaic army. This is interesting because it may be one of several explanations for the finding of Ptolemaic coins on the Bosporus. Money earned in Egypt was spent on the Bosporus. This is a clue indicating that paying mercenaries influenced the transfer of coins in various directions, sometimes even far from the place of their issuance.[72] Coins were also used in victory propaganda[73] by showing the defeat of the conquered.[74]

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[71] The problem of the Bosporus-Rhodes relationship focused on ceramic material (J. Lund, *Rhodian transport amphorae as a source for economics ebbs and flows in the Eastern Mediterranean in the second century BC*, [in:] *The Economies of Hellenistic Societes, Third to First Centuries BC*, eds. Z.H. Archibald, J.K. Davies, V. Gabrielsen, Oxford 2011, pp. 280–295), amphorae, and tableware. Ю.С. Бадальяниц, *Торгово экономические связи Родоса с Северном Причерноморьем в эпоху эллинизма (По материалам керамической эпиграфики)*, "Вестник Древней Истории" 1986, vol. 1, pp. 87–99; M. Mielczarek, *Contribution numismatique a l'histoire des rapports de l'Égypte ptolémaique avec les villes greques du littoral Septentrional de la mer Noire au IIe siècle av.n.e.*, "Wiadomości Numizmatyczne" 1990, vol. 34, no. 3–4, pp. 113–119; idem, *Rhodes and the Bosporus. A contribution to the discussion*, in press; idem, *Cyzicene Electrum coinage and Black Sea Grain Trade*, [in:] *White Gold. Studies in Early Electrum Coinage*, eds. P. Van Alfen, U. Wartenberg, New York–Jerusalem [American Numismatic Society] 2020, pp. 665–688.

[72] An example of the long-distance transfer of coinage by soldiers, although outside the time frame of this study, is the discovery of a coin from Sparta from the 3rd century AD at Dura-Europos in Syria. H. Seyrig suggested that the coin arrived in the East in connection with the eastern campaign of Emperor Caracalla, who took a detachment of Spartiates on the expedition. Following the tradition of Classical Greece, this was supposed to ensure war success. A very interesting example of the effects of the carrying of coins by the military, later than the times covered by this article, is the discovery of Roman coins in Karlkriese, Germany. It is now uncontested that the Roman coins discovered there belonged to the legionary coffers of the Roman army that were defeated in 9 AD by the Germanic Chatti in the Teutoburg Forest.

[73] *Vide*: A. Kushnir-Stein, *Was late Hellenistic silver minted for propaganda purposes?*, "Numismatic Chronicle" 2001, vol. 161, pp. 41–51.

[74] E. Walczak, *Symbolika militarnego zwycięstwa w antycznym mennictwie greckim*, [in:] *Pieniądz a propaganda, wspólne dziedzictwo Europy*, ed. K. Filipow, Augustów–Warszawa 2015, pp. 18–23; A. Jankowska, *Pieniądz jako element ateńskiej propagandy. Kilka uwag*, [in:] *Pieniądz*

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PIENIĄDZ JAKO NARZĘDZIE WOJNY W ANTYCZNYM ŚWIECIE GRECKIM, DO KOŃCA OKRESU HELLENISTYCZNEGO

Streszczenie. Homer był przekonany, że pokój między „państwami" sprzyja zamożności. W Grecji okresu archaicznego zdawano sobie sprawę, że aby prowadzić wojnę niezbędne są środki finansowe. Wiedziano, że za wojnę trzeba płacić, chociaż w VI w. p.n.e. obywatel polis zobowiązany był do uzbrojenia się na swój koszt. Z czasem ugruntowane zostało przekonanie, że aby prowadzić wojnę niezbędne są pieniądze.

W świetle znalezisk mamy prawo sądzić, że od czasu wykreowania monety, co stało się w końcu VII w. p.n.e. na terenie Azji Mniejszej, szybko wykorzystywano je do płacenia

żołnierskiego żołdu – moneta była praktycznym środkiem płatniczym, którego jakość gwarantował swoim znakiem emitent. Nie da się wykluczyć, że potrzeba płacenia żołnierzom, była jednym z czynników wpływających na produkcję i rozpowszechnienie monet. Może to potwierdzać znalezisko z Sardes, gdzie monetę przy zwłokach żołnierza. O przekazaniu wojsku 2000 lidyjskich staterów informuje tekst Alkaiosa z VI w. p.n.e. Konieczność opłaty najemników sprzyjała jednak rozpowszechnieniu produkcji monet. Pieniądz monetarny stał się znakomitym „argumentem" w sytuacji, gdy niezbędny był zaciąg najemników. Pieniądze i wojna zostały ze sobą „połączone".

Znamienna jest opinia Peryklesa (ok. 495–429) przekazana w dziele Tukidydesa, odnosząca się do wojny peloponeskiej (431–404 p.n.e.) świadcząca że w V w. p.n.e. pieniądz był „naturalnym" narzędziem wojny – narzędziem różnie wykorzystywany. W V w. p.n.e. płacenie żołnierzom najemnym było działaniem codziennym, tym samym pieniądz stał się narzędziem pozwalającym wpływać na decyzje odnoszące się do liczebności wojska i czasu jego wykorzystania (głównie w odniesieniu do najemników). W okresie wojny peloponeskiej ateński hoplita walczący pod Potideą otrzymywał jedną drachmę dziennie (plus dodatek na „służących" w wysokości 1 drachmy).

Wojna peloponeska, toczona między Atenami i Spartą w latach 431–404 dostarcza przykładu kolejnego wojennego zwyczaju. Emisji pieniądza zastępczego. Długoletni konflikt Aten ze Spartą zmusił Ateńczyków do emisji pieniądza, który w sytuacji niedoboru srebra zastąpił cieszące się dobrą opinią „sówki".

Dowody akceptacji idei świadomego gromadzenia pieniądza na cele wojenne znajdujemy w mowie Demostenesa z 351 r. p.n.e. W celu opłacenia wojska zaczęto plądrować świątynie i ich skarbce (w starożytnej Grecji świątynie prowadziły „działalność gospodarczą"). Od IV w. p.n.e. sięganie siłą do zasobów świątyń, aby zdobyć pieniądze na wojnę stało się „normalnością". Na zmianę tę wpłynął wzrost liczby żołnierzy najemnych, co wynikało również z konieczności wydłużenia czasu kampanii wojennych. Trzeba było płacić za służbę. Jest to wskazówka, że pieniądz stał się narzędziem wojny. Platon zwrócił uwagę na to, że wojna i pieniądze pozostają w ścisłej zależności od siebie. Dla Arystotelesa wojna stała się sztuką zarabiania.

Jednym ze szczególnych przykładów tego, kiedy monety stawały się narzędziem pozwalającym na kierowanie wojskiem, była działalność mennicy w Tarsos – uważa się, że były to pieniądze przeznaczone dla greckich najemników w służbie perskiej. Warto przypomnieć, że w świetle opinii Arriana, który opisał wyprawę Aleksandra III (356–323) na Wschód, żołnierze greccy warci byli pieniędzy, które płacono im za służbę.

Aleksander III Wielki (336–323) kontynuując kroki podjęte przez Filipa II (357–336), wyruszył do Azji mając do dyspozycji znikome, ale dobrze obliczone środki finansowe. Dariusz III (336–330) założył w Damaszku swoją kwaterę. Po opanowaniu miasta Parmenion (c. 400–330) znalazł w Damaszku, między innymi ogromne zasoby kruszcu. W związku z tym w 330 r. p.n.e. założono mennicę; działała do 320 r. p.n.e. Jej produkcja, przynajmniej w części, przeznaczona była na potrzeby wojska. Jakość monet Aleksandra III była jednym z czynników, który zadecydował o ich popularności.

W okresie hellenistycznym, armia ptolemejska oraz armia Seleukidów miały już charakter „zawodowy". Działania pozostające w zgodzie z opinią, iż pieniądze stały się narzędziem wojny, można wzbogacić o zakładanie mennic tam, gdzie ich wcześniej nie było.

Wysoka ocena kreteńskich najemników, głównie łuczników, skutkowała tym, że wykorzystywano ich w walkach w różnych regionach greckiego świata. „Po kontrakcie" wracali na Kretę. W konsekwencji, w V w. p.n.e. na monety ośrodków kreteńskich przebijane były pieniądze pochodzące z Wysp Cykladzkich, Grecji Właściwej, zachodniej Azji Mniejszej, a w wieku IV z Cyrenajki.

Szczególna jest sytuacja z monetami Rodos bitymi na Krecie. Obecność żołnierzy rodyjskich na wyspie wynikała z ekonomicznej ekspansji Rodos. Pieniądz rodyjski, którym płacono najemnikom, stał się tak popularny, że na wyspie zaczęto emisję monet naśladujących pieniądz rodyjski.

Narzędzie wojny stawało się więc elementem lokalnej gospodarki. Znaczna ilość brązowych monet Seleukidów z końca III w. p.n.e. na terenie Tracji, to efekt pobytu tam dużej armii Aniocha III Wielkiego (241–187), opłacanych pieniędzmi Seleukidów. W efekcie w Tracji było tak wiele monet Seleukidów, iż zostały one zaakceptowane na miejscowym rynku pieniężnym. Po raz kolejny, w odmiennej sytuacji, pieniądz uwidaczniał się jako narzędzie wojny. Duża część brązowych monet Ptolemeuszy z III w. p.n.e., wybitych w Aleksandrii i na Cyprze, znalezionych w Grecji właściwej, to efekt pobytu tutaj żołnierzy ptolemejskich oraz ptolemejskich subsydiów przekazanych do Grecji przez pierwszych trzech Ptolemeuszy w związku z lokalnymi konfliktami zbrojnymi.

W odniesieniu do ptolemejskiego Egiptu dysponujemy jednak materiałem epigraficznym, świadczącym, że w armii ptolemejskiej służyli najemnicy znad Morza Czarnego, żołnierze armii władców bosporańskich. Może to tłumaczyć obecność monet ptolemejskich na Bosporze. Pieniądz „zarobiony" w Egipcie wydawano na Bosporze. To wskazówka, że płacenie najemnikom wpłynęło na przenoszenie monet w rozmaite strony, niekiedy nawet daleko od miejsca ich emisji. Pieniądz stał się w tym czasie ponadregionalnym narzędziem wojny.

Słowa kluczowe: starożytna Grecja, wojna, pieniądze