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<title>Power Shifts in East Asia and Their Implications for Asia-Europe Relations</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29199</link>
<description>ed. by Karol Żakowski, Bartosz Kowalski</description>
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<dc:date>2026-04-17T23:51:35Z</dc:date>
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<title>Values or Interests? Japan’s Relations with European Countries under the Abe Administration</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29310</link>
<description>Values or Interests? Japan’s Relations with European Countries under the Abe Administration
Zakowski, Karol
Żakowski, Karol; Kowalski, Bartosz
Both during his first (2006–2007) and second administrations (since 2012) Prime Minister Abe Shinzō emphasized the gravity of value-oriented diplomacy based on promotion of democracy, free-market economy, human rights, and rule of law. At the same time, however, his foreign policy has been very pragmatic and focused on hard-power-like measures, such as an increase in the deterrence capacity of the Self-Defense Forces. On the one hand, the Japanese government declared its attachment to universal values on the international scene, but on the other hand there were doubts whether it lived up to those values on domestic ground. For that reason, Tokyo has been accused by neighboring countries of treating value-oriented diplomacy as an empty slogan in order to realize national interests.&#13;
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role of this dichotomy in relations with Europe. It is examined to what extent Abe declared his adherence to the universal values, and to what extent he really promoted them in Europe. Special emphasis is placed on the discrepancy between Tokyo’s narrative on values in relations with the European Union (EU) on the one side and with Moscow and other undemocratic regimes in Europe on the other.
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29298">
<title>The Man with a Dream and a Plan: Xi Jinping, the “Chinese Dream” and the Belt and Road Initiative</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29298</link>
<description>The Man with a Dream and a Plan: Xi Jinping, the “Chinese Dream” and the Belt and Road Initiative
Musabelliu, Marsela
Żakowski, Karol; Kowalski, Bartosz
The purpose of this paper is to seek the organizing principle of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in terms of the People’s Republic of China’s overall foreign policy objectives, and, in order to do this, an understanding of the leadership of the Mid¬dle Kingdom becomes imperative. There are five generations of Chinese leaders since the proclamation of the PRC and obviously each of them has had distinct attitudes when it comes to foreign policy and the decision making process, since their actions have been the outcome of specific historical, social and geopolitical conditions.&#13;
Notwithstanding, we see a continuity of grand strategies and application of the same principles of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, inherited from one establishment by the other. The current leader Xi Jinping, soon after getting to be General Secretary of the Communist Party in late 2012, expressed what might turn into the hallmark of his administration: “The Chinese Dream – the great re¬juvenation of the Chinese nation.” Some months later the New Silk Road Strategy was proclaimed; the proposed revival of a great trade route which, two thousand years ago, bridged Eastern and Western cultures across the Eurasian continent, becomes in the 21st century the fulcrum of the Belt and Road Initiative and the blueprint of the actual Chinese foreign policy.
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29297">
<title>Can Asymmetric Relationships Work Together? A Quantitative Approach of “16+1” Cooperation Mechanism</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29297</link>
<description>Can Asymmetric Relationships Work Together? A Quantitative Approach of “16+1” Cooperation Mechanism
Gu, Hongfei
Żakowski, Karol; Kowalski, Bartosz
Is there a possibility that there will be cooperation between two sides with a big gap? If so, could this cooperation be sustainable development? This question has always been a hot issue in international cooperation research. The “16+1” framework is a relatively new cooperation format initiated by China with 16 CEE countries in 2012. Since its formation, the “16+1” has made some progress in strengthening dialogue and cooperation between China and CEE countries. The heads of state of the member countries meet annually and each meeting results in a list of agreements. During the 5th and most recent summit, held in Riga, Chinese premier Li Keqiang formally launched a 10 billion euro investment fund to finance infrastructure and production capacity projects (“The Riga Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries,” n.d.). While the above initiatives have been made so far, it is not difficult to trace that in China and the CEE countries, the significant differences in the countries among the CEE made for a complexity of interaction. &#13;
First of all, the CEE countries are not only a strictly strategic entity, but not a political or economic entity, and the two sides are now facing the problem of “one to sixteen.” Moreover, for the relationship between China and the EU, Chi¬na cannot be a member state or even a power to arrange the sixteen countries as a political group. Secondly, despite the continuous warming of economic and trade cooperation between the two sides, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Serbia and other countries with China, in terms of bilateral trade, there are still huge differences for both exports and imports, and bilateral ties show an asymmetric pattern from the political and economic perspectives. Thirdly, while the CEE countries are developing economic and trade relations with China, there are big differences regarding foreign policy toward China among the CEE countries: sixteen states are not consistent with their foreign policies toward China, and at the same time, there is still a disagreement between the two sides on political, economic, and human rights; Tibet and Taiwan issues; the arms embargo and other relevant issues. &#13;
Therefore, the development of China’s relations with CEE countries is now facing opportunities and challenges simultaneously. The asymmetry of bilateral cooperation requires China to optimize its policies on CEE countries for further development. This paper will analyze the CEE countries’ foreign policy toward China via a 15 language database among all CEE countries since the two sides established diplomatic ties. Using big data, the development of small countries’ foreign policies will be analyzed while confronting big powers through game theory, then it will be tested if it is possible for such asymmetric relationships to work.
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29296">
<title>Multilateral Development Banks as Instruments of EU-Asian Relations</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/29296</link>
<description>Multilateral Development Banks as Instruments of EU-Asian Relations
Smolaga, Mateusz
Żakowski, Karol; Kowalski, Bartosz
In January 2016, the People’s Republic of China became the 65th member country of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: a multinational financial institution created by the European Union and the European Investment Bank “to promote entrepreneurship and change lives” across the Mediterranean region, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Perhaps Chinese involvement in this European institution could be considered a surprising development, until we realize both the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are generally seen as the major players, are constituted of over a dozen EU members. This complexity of relations is also evident throughout the rest of the multilateral development banks active in Asia. &#13;
The aim of the article is to test the hypothesis that the cooperation between multilateral development banks not only provides the opportunity for the funding of various investment projects crucial to the world economy, but can also facilitate the achievement of the individual political goals of their members. The text offers a brief comparative analysis of the multilateral development banks that operate and interact in Asia, presenting the common ground for their financial cooperation, while attempting to identify ways of avoiding serious conflicts of interest. The real test of this hypothesis must take into account the political context in which these interactions take place.
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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