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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica nr 188/2005</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5756</link>
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<dc:date>2026-04-05T20:36:05Z</dc:date>
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<title>Dyscyplina rynkowa – czyli czy prywatny monitoring zwiększa bezpieczeństwo systemu bankowego</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/5753</link>
<description>Dyscyplina rynkowa – czyli czy prywatny monitoring zwiększa bezpieczeństwo systemu bankowego
Marcinkowska, Monika
The article outlines the issues of market discipline - that is the private monitoring and&#13;
oversight over banks. Market discipline is considered to be an important component of the&#13;
supervisory system, which can significantly influence the stability of individual institutions, as well&#13;
as the whole banking system. The paper presents the theoretical considerations about private&#13;
monitoring and the possibilities of its widespread application. The recommendations of Basel&#13;
Committee on Banking Supervision are discussed. The discussion of conditions for the limits and&#13;
the conditions for effective market discipline is the complement for those considerations.
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<dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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