http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11745 Tue, 07 Apr 2026 09:36:42 GMT 2026-04-07T09:36:42Z https://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:443/bitstream/id/481de0b5-aa2b-409e-bf21-b9c8670499e9/ http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11745 http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11779 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a wtórne prawo europejskie w świetle zasady nadrzędności Konstytucji Chmielarz, Anna The Polish Constitution indicates the place of all sources of law in Polish law system, but does not precise the place of the European law, which is applied by public authorities. The Polish Constitution does not enumerate European legislative acts as a source of universally binding law. The legal status of this law is not clear according to constitutional norms. This is a reason of the discussion between the constitutionalists and the Europeanists about relations between European norms and constitutional ones. Furthermore, the problem is the lack of the system of constitutional control for the secondary European law. On the other hand the Polish Constitution forms a legal base for applying the European law, its relations with acts made by Polish authorities and it has a priority in the event of conflict with Polish legislative acts. The Constitution emphasizes the principle of its superiority (article 8, article 91, article 188) and this principle should indicate its relations with the European law. The Constitution should be treated as the most important source of law, including a system of guarantees for applying the European law in conformity to constitutional rules and with acceptation of legal principles of the European Union. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11779 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11778 Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Senat Republiki Czeskiej. Analiza porównawczo-prawna Skotnicki, Krzysztof Creation of the second Chambers of Parliament in Poland and in the Czech Republic wasn’t the result of well-thought vision of these organs, but was made to deal with immediate problems. Their constitutional model is different. In Poland it’s term is connected with Sejm’s term whereas in the Czech Republic there is no connection between them. In Poland it lasts 4 years and in the Czech Republic 6 years and it can’t be dissolved. Moreover, the frame of Czech’s Senate is renewed in 1/3 of it’s frame every 2 years, which makes it more representative. Candidates for senators besides the traditional requirements such as citizenship, full active capacity and full public rights, have to be at least: 30 years old in Poland and 40 in the Czech Republic at the day of poll. There are majority elections, but in Poland constituencies are plurinominal (from 2 to 4), whereas in the Republic of Czech uninominal. In Poland the candidate with the highest number of votes gets the mandate whereas in the Czech Republic there is the requirement of the absolute majority of votes which is why the second round takes place that often. Both Senates work permanently but the Czech one may be put on hold. In both countries the model of asimetrical bicameralism was introduced. Second Chambers take part mainly in the legislative procedure but the main role is being played by the first Chambers. The most important right of the Senate of the Czech Republic is the possibility to create (when the Chamber of Parlament is dissolved) the decree-law. The creative competences of both Chambers are very random and it’s hard to find any particular idea in it. Similar situation takes place when we discuss other rights even though there is not many of them. Generally speaking, Czech construction seems to let the Senate run it’s duties in a better way. Disconnection of the Chamber’s commision and temporary ability to renew the frame of Senate are these ideas which should be taken into account when discussing the reform of the second Chamber. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11778 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11777 Blokowanie list jako instytucja prawa wyborczego Rulka, Marcin In initial part of the article the author affirms that the multitude of construction of blocking authorizes to put the thesis, that the apparentment deserves on name the institution of electoral law. The first part of the article presents a comparative overview about solutions applying in France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium, which provide arguments to prove aforementioned thesis about multitude of solutions concerning apparentment. The second part of the paper presents a short history of legal regulation of the issue of joint lists of candidates and much more wider considerations about present solutions. Author put thesis that PiS introducing apparentment to self-governmental election law before elections in 2006 wanted to cause additional mandates. Author points out that electoral failure of this party was caused by the incorrect expectations concerning political rival behavior as well as by the unpredictability of mathematical apparatus of blocking. Article also refers to proposal of introduction examined institution to parliamentarian elections and possible this consequences. Next part of the article discusses conformity describing institution with Polish Constitution. The author comes to conclusion that this institution in construction with self-govermental electoral law violates the principle of generality and the equality of electoral right, additional if blocking would introduce to Sejm’s elections, then this also would be discordant with principle of proportionality. In conclusion author affirms that the most important postulate concerning apparentment is fuel and effective informing the electors about created electoral blocks and consequences of their creation for party being in block. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11777 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11776 Kontrasygnata i prerogatywy Prezydenta w dyskusji ustrojowej poprzedzającej uchwalenie Konstytucji kwietniowej Rakowska, Anna This article presents the discussion about the institution of countersignature in Poland, which preceded the resolution of Polish Constitution in 1935. The author shows the opinions of major political parties and distinguished scientists about this institution. The discussion, which had been held before the Constitution was passed, seems to be very interesting for modern science. During the discussion was presented the great variety of conceptions of understanding the institution of countersignature. Some scientists understood, that this is the institution according to which the head of state always follows the advice of government and without which the decisions of the president would be invalid. Others were the opinion, that the countersignature is the institution by which the member of government only accepts the political responsibility for the countersigned act, but the real decision is taken by the head of state. Finally, the discussion and controversies caused a very important change in the way of understanding the institution of countersignature and its constitutional and political meaning, which helped to create the strong presidency in the Polish Constitution of 1935. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/11089/11776 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z