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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica 2008, nr 83</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13831</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 02:45:53 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-04-07T02:45:53Z</dc:date>
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<title>Stanowisko Hiszpanii wobec NATO w świetle doniesień dziennika „El Pais” z lat 1975-1996</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13897</link>
<description>Stanowisko Hiszpanii wobec NATO w świetle doniesień dziennika „El Pais” z lat 1975-1996
Domejko-Kozera, Patrycja
When NATO was created in 1949 Spain could not join the organization because of the&#13;
authoritarian nature of general Francisco Franco regime and its cooperation with fascist Germany&#13;
and Italy during the II World War. However, the USA recognized the strategic importance of&#13;
Spanish territory in the period of cold war confrontation and initiated bilateral relations with Madrid&#13;
in the security policy sphere in 1953. The informal cooperation of Spanish military forces with&#13;
NATO followed. It was the end of the dictatorship and democratic transformation of the country&#13;
that enabled Spain’s integration with the organizations of Western world. Once integration with&#13;
NATO was possible, this issue sharply divided political elites of democratic Spain with the left&#13;
generally opposing the accession to NATO and the right supporting it. Spain officially became&#13;
a member of NATO in 1982 but in the same year the socialists came to power with a promise&#13;
of referendum on the question of Spanish membership in NATO. The socialist government of&#13;
Felipe González „froze" Spanish integration with this organization but finally pragmatic approach&#13;
won: it did not lead Spain out of NATO but defined specific conditions of its membership (mainly&#13;
not joining the integrated military structure). The end of the cold war confrontation and collapse&#13;
of the USSR resulted in the necessity for NATO to adjust its character and tasks to the new&#13;
circumstances. González’s government supported this transformation and Spanish forces actively&#13;
participated in the new missions of NATO, which built Spanish reputation as a credible ally, the&#13;
symbol of which was the election of Spanish ministry of foreign affairs Javier Solana for the post&#13;
of Secretary General of the organization.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Paryska „Kultura” wobec wybranych wydarzeń z historii stosunków polsko-ukraińskich z lat 1919-1947</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13896</link>
<description>Paryska „Kultura” wobec wybranych wydarzeń z historii stosunków polsko-ukraińskich z lat 1919-1947
Komoński, Ernest
Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000) was an editor of the Polish emigré monthly “Kultura" (1947-2000).&#13;
He created interesting and influential periodical presently regarded as an only independent centre&#13;
of Polish political thought after the Second World Was.&#13;
Within activity of the monthly there were initiatives and ideas how Poland should develop&#13;
the relationships with its neighbours, especially with Ukraine. In the view of “Kultura” Ukraine&#13;
as a future independent country should be strongly related with Poland. Owing to this Poland&#13;
could depend on partner relations with Russia.&#13;
Both Polish and Ukrainian publicists of “Kultura” showed the ways how to create the&#13;
future agreement between Poland and Ukraine. The one of its crucial links could be honest&#13;
and free of communist or nationalist rhetoric explanation of the events from common twentiethcentury&#13;
history. Jerzy Giedroyc’s circle considered it as an element of bilateral conciliation.&#13;
Publicists of “Kultura” wrote several articles on the Polish policy towards the Ukrainians in&#13;
interward Poland. In this topic there was emphasized unequal treatment of Ukrainian allies by&#13;
Poles during Polish-Bolshevik war (1919-1921) and proved discrimination against the Ukrainian&#13;
minority by the Polish government in the 30s.&#13;
The Second World War (1939-1945) brought especially many dramatic events in Polish-&#13;
Ukrainian history. Paris “Kultura wished to explicate a few problems. The first one was a question of political and practical responsibility for the death of Polish professors from Lvov in 1941. The&#13;
second one was an issue of mass murder of Polish inhabitants of Volhynia and East Galicia&#13;
committed by a part of Ukrainian nationalises in 1942-1944. In “Kultura” very important were&#13;
articles on widespread stereotypes of military supporting German Nazis by Ukrainian nationalists&#13;
during the putting down of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. Other crucial topic was a problem of&#13;
cooperation of Polish and Ukrainian underground troops against the communist regime shortly after&#13;
the Second World War in the area of contemporary Poland.&#13;
The subject of twentieth-century Polish-Ukrainian history was relatively often presented in&#13;
“Kultura” and its “Zeszyty Historycznc". The specific of it among other things has consisted in&#13;
describing historical events according to Anglo-Saxon terminology in the humanities. The informative&#13;
purpose of “Kultura” in explaining problems from common history in several cases was&#13;
eclipsed by the didactic purpose - Paris “Kultura” consciously hyperbolized the examples of&#13;
Polish-Ukrainian cooperation because in Giedroyc’s conviction such a tactics would facilitate&#13;
neighbourly conciliation.&#13;
Other, definitely less controversial Giedroyc’s publicists’ work was created to Polish and&#13;
Ukrainian historians a platform of understanding and friendly climate for research into mutual&#13;
history.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Niemiecka propaganda rewizjonistyczna w świetle „Gazety Warszawskiej” z lat 1926-1930</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13895</link>
<description>Niemiecka propaganda rewizjonistyczna w świetle „Gazety Warszawskiej” z lat 1926-1930
Węclewska, Marta
One of the most difficult problems regarding the relationship between Poland and Germany&#13;
 during the interwar period was the German’s revanchist propaganda which was made in the Weimar&#13;
 Republic. The general situation was as a result of the dissatisfaction the German nation had with&#13;
 the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. This was seen by&#13;
 Germany as both shameful and unjust, especially concerning blame for the outbreak of the First&#13;
 World War, Germany being disarmed and some of their provinces being given directly to Poland,&#13;
 amongst others.&#13;
 The political atmosphere in Europe in the twenties was not conducive to raising these issues.&#13;
 The Weimar Republic wanted to be regarded as a new democratic country. The policy of friendship&#13;
 with France and Great Britain did not let Germany speak aggressively about their demands.&#13;
 Therefore, German revanchism was turned mainly against Poland due to it being safer and not&#13;
 involving the western Allies. Meanwhile it was a convenient way to expressing the German people’s&#13;
 dissatisfaction and frustration.&#13;
 The Polish National Democratic Party thought that the most important subject in olish foreign&#13;
 policy should have been keeping to the principle of the Treaty of Versailles. The party was&#13;
 interested in recognising even the slightest traces of German revanchism. The Polish nationalists&#13;
 newspaper “The Warsaw Gazette” constantly showed examples of The Weimar Republic s propaganda.&#13;
 The evidence came from many different sources, in an attempt to make the Polish nation&#13;
 aware of how frequently revanchist demands were made in German society.&#13;
 The revanchist campaigning was popular not only among politicians and political parties,&#13;
 organizations and associations but also with scientific institutions, the press, cinema and educational&#13;
 establishment. Besides showing popularity of the revanchism, “The Warsaw Gazette gave countless&#13;
 examples of German propaganda claiming rights to these areas of, what was then, Poland. These&#13;
 claims included historical justification to them remaining German and questionable quality scientific&#13;
 papers concerning the detrimental economic and cultural consequence of loosing, what they regarded,&#13;
 “indigenous” territory.&#13;
 Naturally, besides informing its readership, “The Gazette analysed the Polish government's policy regarding anti-Polish propaganda in The Weimar Republic. The nationalist press proposed&#13;
 a solution which might have proved Polish rights to the disputable territories. “The Gazette” also&#13;
 emphasized that Poland would never agree to any territorial change.&#13;
 policy regarding anti-Polish propaganda in The Weimar Republic. The nationalist press proposed&#13;
 a solution which might have proved Polish rights to the disputable territories. “The Gazette” also&#13;
 emphasized that Poland would never agree to any territorial change.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Z badań nad inteligencją Łodzi przełomu XIX i XX wieku</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13890</link>
<description>Z badań nad inteligencją Łodzi przełomu XIX i XX wieku
Jurek, Lidia
The development of Łódź had been a unique phenomenon in Polish lands. The main reason&#13;
for this was the distinctiveness of the growth of the city and its social structure. Unlike other&#13;
Polish urban centres, such as Kraków, Lwów or Warsaw, Łódź emerged as a modern industrial&#13;
metropolis only in the second half of the nineteenth century. The city’s industrial trait had a very&#13;
strong influence on its inhabitants, the straight majority of whom, were mostly physical workers,&#13;
who were growing in number as fast as the fortunes of the factories’ owners did. What is more,&#13;
the multiethnic nature of the city contributed to the complexity of social relations within its confines. Given these circumstances, examining the shape, place, tasks and social attitudes of the&#13;
intelligentsia proves to be highly engrossing. Although there is a broad literature concerning the&#13;
issue of the 19th century Polish intelligentsia, no extended monograph of this subject matter was&#13;
published with reference to Łódź so far. The article presents some of the issues which have to&#13;
be taken into consideration while working on this stratum in tódź. It also implies that as for&#13;
the social attitude of the local intelligents, there were two common paths to follow: aiming at&#13;
a private success or working as a philanthropist and social activist. Undoubtedly, the character of&#13;
the city would have encouraged adopting the former and, at die same lime, forced to agree to&#13;
the latter.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/11089/13890</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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