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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica 26/2013</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4368</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 19:03:10 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-04-13T19:03:10Z</dc:date>
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<title>Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica 26/2013</title>
<url>https://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:443/bitstream/id/fd8cddf4-19a1-496c-83cc-e8c54e240140/</url>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4368</link>
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<title>Konsekwencje eksternalistycznego sposobu rozumienia znaczeń wyrażeń językowych oraz treści stanów mentalnych</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4541</link>
<description>Konsekwencje eksternalistycznego sposobu rozumienia znaczeń wyrażeń językowych oraz treści stanów mentalnych
Markiewicz, Alicja
Semantic externalism is one of the most popular and thoroughly discussed standpoints in the&#13;
contemporary philosophy of language. Briefly speaking, it is a position which claimes that the&#13;
meanings of linguistic expressions or contents of mental states depend on the nature of beings that&#13;
exist in the real world and on the language practices of the community. In the paper I present&#13;
briefly views of the most famous representatives of externalism: Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and&#13;
Tyler Burge, and present typical objections against semantic externalism. Opponents of this&#13;
position pay attention not only to the limitation of Kripke's and Putnam's causal theory of&#13;
reference, but also attempt to prove that the meanings of linguistic expressions or the contents of&#13;
mental states depend on the biological and psychological characteristics of the individual. I point&#13;
out the ontological and epistemological consequences of externalism resulting from the adoption&#13;
of this standpoint, and also try to identify the main merits and difficulties of this position.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>"Ściana jest niema, a drzwi przemawiają" (G. Simmel). Kilka uwag o topografii spotkania</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4538</link>
<description>"Ściana jest niema, a drzwi przemawiają" (G. Simmel). Kilka uwag o topografii spotkania
Podstawski, Michał
"Meeting" is one of these concepts, which in the most recent philosophy have received significant&#13;
meaning. In some interpretations it is the instruction to "meet" – so to establish the unmediated&#13;
relation with the Other – is the factor, which allows to break free from the pressure of the&#13;
"Hegelian bite" and problems resulting from it. It turns out that the ennoblement of the subject&#13;
made by the German idealism in fact limited the reality only to its exteriorisation – and thus put&#13;
into question the possibility of reaching the reality, including the reality of other people. "Meeting"&#13;
would be the bridge thanks to which this reach (again) becomes possible.&#13;
However, it seems that speaking about the "meeting" we still too rarely think about the prerequisites,&#13;
which must be met, so that the subject can open itself to accept the Other. This is an&#13;
important analysis because, first of all, it allows to judge whether the whole project of the postphenomenological&#13;
philosophy can be defended in the practical perspective, and secondly – it is&#13;
a key indicator that allows the further development of the human thought. It turns out that for the&#13;
elementary human experience the "meeting" is not an excess, and the opening to what is unusual is&#13;
the natural element of the existence of human cultures. And this instruction should be used in&#13;
today's philosophizing – in order to overcome the basic aporias of modernity with its edge.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Deformacja i pozorność dialogu w kontekście quasi-relacji społecznych</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4536</link>
<description>Deformacja i pozorność dialogu w kontekście quasi-relacji społecznych
Brzozowski, Tomasz Tadeusz
This text covers a wide range of problems in social relationships. In the Author's opinion,&#13;
a present social reality doesn't allow deeper contacts between people. Current understanding of the&#13;
concept of the dialogue, reduces it to negotiations or communication acts. But none of them isn't&#13;
a suitable substitute of the dialogue with its richness of a sense. The present time is characterized&#13;
by superficiality of relationships in societies. Instead of the dialogue, we deal with only quasirelationship.&#13;
People haven't lost ability of reflective and critical reception of their life and they can't feel&#13;
existence of others as someone important, unique and indispensable for a proper and authentic&#13;
meeting. In the dialogue, everybody shapes a meeting as momentous event.&#13;
Different understanding of the depth this concept, can lead up to reduction of relationships in&#13;
modern society. Misinterpretation of the dialogue concept makes our life common, mediocre,&#13;
trashy. The article analyzes a moral condition of modern society and points at possible and&#13;
existing threats in a field range of people's relationships.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Heideggerowski zwrot: jedność bycia i nieantropocentryczna filozofia człowieka</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/4532</link>
<description>Heideggerowski zwrot: jedność bycia i nieantropocentryczna filozofia człowieka
Hoły-Łuczaj, Magdalena
The article aims to show that one of the most important manifestations of Turn in the philosophy&#13;
of Martin Heidegger is a change of the ontological status of beings other than human.&#13;
Transformation of Dasein into Da-sein (which takes place in Heidegger's works written between&#13;
year 1930 and 1936) is accompanied by the recognition of being of other beings, "things"&#13;
(concrete individuals, animate and non-animated). While in "Being and Time", other entities are&#13;
considered "lower" than the man, and unlike him, not "are", but only "are-handy" or "mere-live",&#13;
"What is a Thing?" (and even already "Introduction to the Metaphysics") indicates the unity of being.&#13;
This does not mean the rejection of the specificity of the human being as Da-sein. Only thanks to&#13;
human being – not just his own, but also of other beings – is no longer hidden. The specific nature&#13;
of man according to Heidegger, however, does not entitle him to dominate other beings and treated&#13;
as a subordinate. Thus I consider late philosophy of Heidegger as non-anthropocentric.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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