Philosophizing Without the In-Itself: Philology, Genealogy, and the Question of Method in Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

This thesis explores the status and relations of the two original philosophical methods developed by Nietzsche. The first is the philological one, which no longer aims at an objective and exhaustive adequation with a reality in-itself, but – in an attempt to be economical in its axioms – tries to think of our relation to the world solely according to experience. The second method adds a whole new problem to philosophy, which is not concerned with knowledge anymore but with the way we live, questioning the value for life of each interpretation. Thus, Nietzsche elaborates genealogy as the way to appraise the value of our values, promoting those that are most conducive to life. Nevertheless, what is the relation between these two methods and criteria? Are they always consistent with one another or can they clash? In the strict context of Nietzsche’s philosophy, this question is hard to elucidate and almost never explicitly asked. This is the reason why I chose to use Merleau-Ponty as a comparative prism to check whether the philological method can be granted an autonomy, for he adopted purely a philological method without ever attempting the genealogical one. This comparison will show that turning philology into the servant of genealogy prevents Nietzsche from obtaining important insights (epistemological, ontological and maybe even axiological) that philology could provide if it was followed radically and for its own sake. This should lead to recognize the autonomy and legitimacy of each method and task, that can crisscross but should not eliminate one another.