

## *Russian Mentality*

# *Ideas in Russia*

## *Editorial*

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INTERDISCIPLINARY TEAM OF SOVIET STUDIES  
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LODZ

# The Russian Mentality

*Lexicon*

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#### A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In transliterating Russian words the Library of Congress system for transliteration of modern Russian with most diacritical marks omitted has been used. However, in any multiauthored book that draws from many sources some arbitrariness of rules is inevitable. The titles of some contemporary periodicals have been retained in their popular form, while others were transliterated according to the rules. For technical reasons, the apostrophe was used to transliterate the Cyrillic soft sign.

## INTRODUCTION

The Interdisciplinary Team of Soviet Studies at the University of Lodz has begun work on the Polish-Russian-English encyclopedic dictionary entitled *Ideas in Russia*. It is to contain over 600 headings, names, terms and concepts concerning the philosophical, social, religious and political thought, as well as a comprehensive bibliography. The dictionary entitled *The Russian Mentality* which is being offered to the Polish reader is a form of introduction to the broader work, which is to be *Ideas in Russia*.

In trying to grasp Russia one must be aware of the fact that many phenomena, concepts and categories of Russian culture either have no proper equivalents in other languages, or, which is worse, they only appear to have such equivalents. Hence, the necessity for explanatory elaboration and/or the need for referral, in some cases, to particular historical contexts. We would like to point out that the proposed descriptions and approaches should be treated strictly from the point of view of its authors, and as preliminary. Therefore they can and are expected to spark some controversy and raise some doubts. This should facilitate the future delineation of a picture of the 'Russian mentality' which will be more clear and objective. In our approach of this work the 'Russophil' aspect of the 'Russian mentality' will be focused upon rather than its 'occidental', westernizing aspect which in the opinion of the adherents of things Russian, is not regarded as Russian.

With the hope that this first edition of *The Russian Mentality* will stimulate interest among the Readers, we would appreciate some critical opinions, as well as proposals for additional headings, and entries, which may lead to further, more complete and enlarged editions.

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## A

### **Алфавит социализма**

#### *THE ALPHABET OF SOCIALISM*

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, both a new world or rather a socialist calendar and a new socialist alphabet were devised and introduced in the USSR. The calendar was to herald the beginning of the new epoch, year one dating back from the 7th of November 1917 – the date of the declaration of the Bolshevik Revolution; the months were divided into five-day weeks, and new names were given. At the beginning of 1930, three versions of the ‘socialist alphabet’ were worked out by a special state committee. The drafts of the proposed alphabet were even published. The greatest contribution to this work came from N. Iakovlev of the N. Marr’s school, a renowned linguist and phonologist who up through the middle of the 1930s devised seventy-one new alphabets, mainly for the languages of preliterate societies of nations of the Soviet Union. All the alphabets, including the ‘alphabet of socialism’ were established on the basis of the Latin alphabet. This Latin version was to apply also to the Russian language.

Ideologically speaking, the point of the alphabet was not the integration with the Western world at all, on the contrary, this universal alphabet was to be the medium for carrying the ideals of Socialism throughout the rest of the world, as well as to unite the proletariat of all lands. It was decided that the traditional Cyrillic Russian alphabet should be substituted by the Latin version also for ideological considerations; since in its current form it was regarded as the bearer of Tsarism and the Russian Orthodox Church, which was the testimony to the subjugation of the people, the working masses.

The new calendar was in force for barely eight months, from October 1929 to June 1930, and was revoked at the command of Stalin, while the ‘alphabet of socialism’ was never introduced at all.

Both the ambition of establishing a new chronology, as well as a new alphabet were only in part the expression of utopian thinking of the communists. In reality, at the basis of these and many similar acts and intentions, there lay a more archaic and more persistent conviction in the Russian culture and its mentality, that of the identity of both the expression plane and the semantics plane. Today one might say that it is a matter of de-ideologizing the expression plane and treating it as the message, cf: the relation to Latin or law in the appropriate entries. The acts carried out under the Soviet system merely repeat similar acts of the past history of the Russian culture, though in a different version. The modern reforms of perestroika with its radicalization of ideological attitudes, and its

struggle for emblems, flags and terminology, or even ‘uniforms’, are of the same nature as, and clearly resemble the acts of the introduction of Christianity into Russia, the persecution of Old Believers and the pro-European reforms of Peter I. Cf: **Календарь**.

*JF*

## **Америка**

### *AMERICA*

The first news of America reached Russia in the 17th century. At the beginning of the 19th century the idea of America is associated in Russia with values of a republican system and the rights of the individual. In literature (A. Polezhaev, Y. Lermontov) America symbolizes a country of noble savages living in conditions of raw nature and exotic culture. Russian translations of the works by T. M. Reid, J. F. Cooper, and J. London aided in establishing the idea of America as the embodiment of strong characters, of spontaneity, and of behaviour unfettered by social conventions.

From the middle of the 19th century the idea of America begins to take on a dual character. On the one hand, America is traditionally perceived as a romantic symbol of the rights of man and of unspoilt human nature. The New World is seen as free from prejudices, biases and restrictions of the Old World, creating unlimited opportunities for human energy and initiative. On the other hand, America is seen as an example of vulgar pragmatism, spiritual desolation, and the lack of spiritual aspiration. Duality of this idea in Russia is reflected in the debate between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers.

Pro- and anti-American tendencies – from idealization to discredibility – co-exist permanently from this time on in the Russian mentality and culture. This ambivalent relationship to America occurs also in Marxism and Soviet propaganda. Both Lenin and Stalin emphasise the ‘American practicality and down-to-earthness’ – *delovitost*, the efficiency of labour organization, pragmatism in daily life, and the highest level of industrial civilization. In the 1920s, in the period of the NEP – the New Economic Policy, America meant technological advancement and perfectionism. The ideas of F. W. Taylor the ‘efficiency expert’ who developed the concept of rational principles underlying engineering management, as well as those of H. Ford the automobile manufacturer who pioneered the modern ‘assembly line’ mass-production techniques for his famous Model-T, and whose Russian language autobiography was printed in four editions in 1924, gained popularity. The slogan of ‘catching up with and surpassing’ America in the areas of economy and technology remains popular in the times of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. At the same time the idea of America is also played upon

in an ideological context. The USA means the leader of Capitalism – the system which is permanently in the state of crisis and unavoidably doomed to extinction. In official propaganda America is the imperialistic superpower, aggressor on an international scale, exploiter of the working masses and restrictor of human rights. America is often referred to by the majority of Soviet writers. For V. Mayakovsky it means both a miracle of technology and a nightmare for the common man; for Gorky – a realm of predators of the market economy and pursuit for money; for other writers it is a collection of stereotypes such as ‘Uncle Sam’ portrayed as a banker with a big cigar, tycoon of war industry and warmonger.

From the middle of the 1980s the idea of America illustrates some contradictory tendencies of a society going through a system transformation. America is beginning to signify democracy, the rule-of-law state, high tech and science, organizational efficiency, ergonomics, but also the embodiment of a technological utopia, ‘degrading acquisitiveness’, and primitiveness of passively submitting to the most vulgar tastes of mass culture and the opium of commercials (the American Way). For the neo-Slavophile defenders of Russia’s ‘own way’ America is a country created by immigrants, uprooted people, alien to the Russian character and Russian history. It is a civilization in pursuit of reshaping the whole world – both material and spiritual – into a wilderness similar to a moonscape.

JS

## **Афон**

### *MOUNT ATHOS*

Mountain in NE Greece, near Salonica. From the 10th century the site of the famous monastic community now including numerous Orthodox Churches and twenty monasteries with a population of about 3,000 monks. The monasteries, richly decorated with frescos and mosaics, include invaluable collections of books and manuscripts. The mountain and peninsula surrounding Athos constitute the semi-independent theocratic republic of Mount Athos, which was granted autonomy by Greece in 1927. It is considered a centre of monasticism and theological thought, as well as a place of continuous prayer and pilgrimage. ‘You can sleep’, say the monks on Mount Athos, ‘for we are praying for the whole world’. One of the icons of Mount Athos represents the monastic state in the form of a crucified monk, which symbolizes the Cross and everlasting prayer. According to a tradition, it was to Mount Athos that the ship with the Holy Mother of God was driven by a storm. She is thought to have disembarked on land and blessed the mountain. She is held in great adoration among the Orthodox communities as the God-bearer. As in the case of the Orthodox church altar, access to the Holy Mountain of Athos is only permitted to males. No women or female animals are allowed to enter the area, since the Immaculate

Mary personifies all the females. There are no hegumens – the elected heads of monasteries corresponding to abbots in the Roman Catholic Church – on Mount Athos. The community's spiritual head, *hegumenia* or mother superior is the Mother of God. On a daily basis the Holy Mountain is governed by a Council of Monks – the *Holy Kinot*, a body elected by representatives of all the monasteries.

*SR*

## Б

### Белая и красная идеи

#### *THE 'WHITE' AND THE 'RED' IDEA*

According to A. Prokhanov, the Russians are guided by two concepts at once co-existing and competing with each other. The first concept which might be called the 'red' is that of earthly excellence and creation, the idea of fraternity and social justice, *where the strong protect the weak, and the rich share with the poor, where the community in total agreement creates the kingdom of heaven on earth.* Cf: **Община; Единомыслие.** The other concept is one of 'the great Russian destiny, the Russian faith, mysterious fate'. It is this idea that has created a *unique nation upon the uniquely vast spaces, where for a thousand years the mysterious workings of God were being carried out, and the word of God was uttered... about the approaching miracle, love, national beauty, the Word in which the whole truth and all the knowledge of earth and heaven is contained.* These two ideas most dramatically clashed with each other during the Civil War in Russia, when the 'white' was downtrodden and Russia was clad in the 'red mantle' of the USSR. However, after seventy years, the 'red' Russia fell apart, and now the Russians have no state, they are occupied by a 'foreign element' which impose their 'alien, foreign insulting idea and will' so that the Russians are made outcasts of history. Supposedly, by design and with impunity, Russians are being annihilated. It is America at the hands of its mercenaries that is taking revenge on Russia for its former greatness and for its lack of submissiveness. In Prokhanov's opinion, the time has come to unite the two ideas – the 'red' and the 'white' in an ideology of national reconciliation and salvation, in opposition to the 'alien occupiers'. *The social truth and the national beauty shall unite patriots who will bring back the Imperium to the Russians.*

Such opinions are usually defined by the term **National Bolshevism – Communism.**

AL

### Благодать

#### *GRACE! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

One of the most important eschatological categories of the Russian conscience. According to the tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church, *grace* is understood to be the redemptive influence of the Holy Spirit upon people. The

emphasis is placed on the fact that *grace* is undeserved divine favour or goodwill, God's loving mercy displayed to man for the salvation of his soul. Traditionally it stands in opposition to *law* because *grace*, being by itself a category above the law, revokes all the juristic relationships. The first original Old Russian work of literature, *The Word of Law and Grace* by the metropolitan Ilarion in the 11th century, was completely created on the basis of the negation of *legal*, i.e. formal conception of life. This opposition, which was first introduced by the Apostle Paul, has always been experienced in the Russian mentality with great intensity; hence prejudice towards jurisprudence, 'legal nihilism', admiration for the victims of law, such as convicts sentenced to hard labour, as well as the general dominance of *grace* over the *administering of justice*. Cf: **Закон; Право.**

*IJ*

### **Богоискательство**

#### ***GOD-SEEKING* Błqd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.**

Philosophical-religious trend (P. Struve, S. Frank, N. Berdyaev, S. Bulgakov, V. Rozanov, and others) that originated in Russia under the influence of such thinkers as L. Tolstoy – historical-religious moralism, F. Dostoevsky – the idea of God and immortality, V. Solov'ev – the idea of the oneness of being which reveals itself as the voluntary spiritual union of people, as well as that of God/man, the earlier Slavophiles, and the German philosophy and theosophy (F. Schelling, F. Baader, J. Boehme, and others). The purpose of *God-seeking* was to find an eternal basis of existence, history and man in Eastern Christianity as the guarantee of spiritual rebirth in the spirit of Dostoevsky's mysticism which was to be the alternative to anarchism, nihilism, narodism, and especially to the idea of revolution and socialism; concepts that were perceived as heaven without freedom. This gnosiological subject matter gained an ethical tinge, as well as a historical and cultural dimension, which allowed the understanding of history as a process of the deepening of the gulf between good and evil due to man's departing from God's commandments from the earliest beginnings of Paradise. The way to reforming the world was doomed to be produced through rational action, supported by the will of the individual and feelings. *God-seeking* became the remedy for nihilism and ethical relativism through the recognition of transcendental values which served the purpose of christianising culture and determining future perspectives of the era of the Holy Ghost. Simultaneously, *God-seeking* rejected material values and achievements of science, without placing foundations under spiritual improvement. The ideas were developed by numerous emigre Russian philosophers expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922, as well as

writers and artists inspired by *God-seeking* and the entire background of Christianity (V. Ivanov, A. Akhmatova, O. Mandelshtam, B. Pasternak, I. Shmelov, M. Bulgakov, D. Andreev, and others).

JK

### **Богостроительство**

#### *GOD-BUILDING* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

Is the pseudo-religious-philosophical trend linked with the social philosophy of A. Bogdanov (empiriomonism) and propagated at the beginning of the 20th century by literary men and thinkers of Marxist orientation (M. Gorky, A. Lunacharsky, and others). The ideological groundwork of *god-building* is the conviction of the need for substituting religion, seen as a collection of superstitions, false prophesies and false hopes, for the supposedly true faith of the 'great and creative feeling' in an 'innumerable nation of the world' (M. Gorky). Thus, *god-building* rejects transcendence of God, replacing it with a kind of immanence of God, i.e. recognising His existence in the human community which, in this way, can create a wonder-working energy, and reveal extraordinary creative potential. By gaining this divine character and simultaneously by ignoring the existence of external causative force, the first cause of all things, the 'judge and master of the earth', humanity is called to create 'a new God...the God of Beauty and Reason, of justice and love' (M. Gorky). *God-building* was a particular type of apologia for collectivism, cf: **КОЛЛЕКТИВИЗМ**, which utilized collective emotions, similar to collective emotions experienced in religious faith, for the creation of the proletarian myth of *supermankind* (influence of F. Nietzsche).

JK

### **Богочеловечество**

#### *GODMANHOOD* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

A symbiotic, mutual relationship between divine and human elements. Christ combines two natures – divine and human (God/man), different and perfect, united, but still not merged, or blended together, indivisible and inseparable in one Person of God the Word. Cf: **Λόγος**. Christ-God/man is without any human sin, including original sin, free of all passions, and incapable of sinning. The Word – Son of God, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-seeing, in the body of man, is an indivisible unity. God does not cease to be God, and man does not become God, but through this union Man ascends to heights of deification most accessible to him. The human nature of Christ is the human aspect of His divinity. An icon of Christ is the image of God-man and the revelation of the mystery of the union. *Godmanhood* is the dual unity of two kinds of will and two freedoms in

one energy – human will freely following the will of God. The one who desires is one, therefore the object of desire is one (John of Damascus).

SR

## Будущее

### *THE FUTURE*

As expressed by G. Nivat in his paper (1994), the concept of ‘futurity’ in the Russian culture might be best conveyed by the term *ukhronya*, patterned on the term ‘utopia’.

The basic characteristics of this concept of the future are as follows: 1. it is placed somewhere in an indefinite future time; 2. it should be a goal that must be aspired to; 3. most often it is something that is awaited for, since it is the future/something that will be forthcoming; 4. depending on the orientation, it may have an apocalyptic, redeeming character, or that of an ideally ordered world, or the ‘bright future’.

In contrast to the concept of the future in Western cultures, this future is not contiguous to the present, its distance cannot be determined in chronological terms. The ‘ways of approaching’ it are also different from those practised in the West. One cannot get to it at all through systematic work, but rather by dreaming of it, possibly with a sudden superhuman effort. A systematic effort spread out over time is not the ‘effort’, not the ‘act’. And as suggested by such literary characters as Manilov, Oblomov, as well as those of Chekhov, it is best not to move at all, and do nothing. It is like magic wishes in the traditional Russian fairy tales, full of self-propelled sleighs, and tables laid out by merely wishing for them.

The Soviet system drew upon such concepts of a magical future. The manipulations of the calendar, the desire to bypass or deceive time are a significant proof of such a concept of the future. It is a well-known fact that during the 1920s and 1930s, several calendars were introduced and withdrawn, at least one of them having a week made up of four working days. Apart from the intention of doing away with some old tradition and putting into practice the new Soviet ideology, the objective was also to speed up time itself. Similarly the five-year plans were announced with the specific intention of carrying them out in four or even three years. Even Khrushchev’s establishing definite dates of the oncoming of Communism, namely the Age of Plenty, can be interpreted in terms of this concept of the future.

The rational future of the Western cultures is determined by the practices which are being undertaken in the present (behaviour, conduct, enterprise). The idealized future of the Russians, and in particular of the Soviet culture is determined not by any real actions, but by the ‘attitude’ which is to stimulate ideological fervour, enthusiastic devotion to the Cause. Such an indestructable Future



– *ukhronya* is employed in the Soviet discourse, sometimes seemingly closer at hand, at other times seemingly more distant, with a purpose of building, or recreating a New Man. And at the same time the measurable chronological future of this world is pushed further from the field of sight, as if it did not exist at all. And even if it is sometimes perceived, in the light of the Future – *ukhronya*, it takes the form of a temporary obstacle to be removed ‘on the way towards...’

On the spacial plane, such concept of the Future – *ukhronya* can be expressed, as in Chekhov, by an indefinite ‘over there’, which is also not achievable through the normal translocation. The Soviet ‘over there’ has always meant ‘far away from Moscow’. Hence, there is the tendency to convert into myths and glorification of gigantic developments in the most distant provinces, as well as Russia’s traditional commitment to the territorial expansion of the Russian state; incidentally, the new territorial possessions are generally poorly administered and badly exploited.

*JF*

### **Бюрократия**

#### *BUREAUCRACY*

The state bureaucracy began to appear in Russia along with the centralization of state administration in the 16-17th centuries, and reached pathological dimensions in the 19th century when it became the main instrument of the autocratic state machinery. Bureaucracy of the state led to the unlimited power of state officials – *chinovniki*. In the minds of the public, bureaucracy was associated with arbitrariness, bribery, formal soulless treatment and incompetency, which made the tsar the sole guarantor of justice.

The Soviet apparatus of power broadened the sphere of bureaucracy and ‘perfected’ its form, making it the basis of the state monopoly in all the areas of life. Periodic anti-bureaucracy campaigns connected with particular populist political aims of successive party leaders were expediently organized and publicized.

*VR*

### **Внутренний-Внешний**

*INTERNAL – EXTERNAL* *Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki. Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

These are terms used to describe the differences between prevailing differences between Russian culture or attitudes and those of Western culture. In essence, two various semiotics or two different attitudes towards a sign come into

play. In all phenomena qualified by the Russians negatively as being 'external', both the expression and content planes are said to be conventionally bound together, whereas the phenomena which are positively qualified as 'internal' are supposed to be characterized by the relation of the identity of both the planes (motivated sign). Russian criticism of Western culture is based on the foundation of this presumption; this explains the Russian critical attitudes towards western institutions, social behaviour, including social etiquette regarded as 'phoney' and 'insincere', as well as Russian disapproval of Western systems of jurisprudence. In Russian culture, on the other hand, this may lead to the identification of a function with the performer of the function, of official function with private function, formality with informality, and treatment of law as a question of the 'right' conviction, or a matter of 'conscience', etc.

In this light one must also consider the Russian point of viewing the 'Western Man' as being alienated, disassociated, incomplete, in opposition to the concept of Man supposedly cultivated and fulfilled in Russian culture: a man who is 'soulful', 'harmonious', and retaining his 'integrity', 'completeness', more 'profound' in his faith, and more 'spontaneous', more 'open' in his interpersonal relationships. The Russian man stands in contrast to the 'shallow' Western Man who is under conventional restraints, who is obliged to follow accepted customs and standards, and who is directed by social contract, or detached from 'content'.

A closer look into a semiotic attitude which is dominant in Russian culture, or into the need for the identity of 'content – medium', as well as the inter-cultural relation of 'internal – external' enables one to observe a perceptible tendency in support of the first element of this opposition, i.e. in favour of the content plane at the expense of the expression plane. In numerous manifestations of this culture a complete disappearance, or even elimination of the expression plane is preferred, or even expressly declared. Most valued is 'noumenal', 'mental', pure thought not connected with sense perception, wordless, inward prayer, or an icon which is 'transparent' in its texture, of the kind characteristic of the early Christian tradition as represented in Florensky's *Iconostasis*. Thus, on the one hand, one can observe a Russian attitude – sometimes difficult to grasp by the Western man – to the phenomenal, materialistic, and sensuous world of Western culture which could be characterised by such terms as distrustful, indifferent, a devil-may-care attitude; from a neglectful personal appearance considered as comfort for a Russian, but discomfort in the eyes of Westerners, to a general standard of material life, and generally standard of economy, which from the Western perspective is associated with poor management of personal affairs; on the other hand, aversion or actual hostility towards reflection such as logic which allows one to see things from a distant perspective, rational understanding of phenomena, reason, analytical sciences.

### **Возвращение к почве**

#### *THE RETURN TO THE SOIL*

Anti-occidental idea propagated by F. Dostoevsky and other Russian thinkers collaborating with him (A. Grigor'ev, N. Strakhov), has recently been elaborated upon, among other things, by the so called Village writers (V. Rasputin, V. Belov, and others), as well as by A. Solzhenitsyn. The soil, here, symbolizes the Russianness – Russian people. In the opinion of the 19th century *pochvenniki* – men of the soil the Russian intelligentsia was separated from the soil in the period of the pro-western reforms of Peter I, and thus lost their Russian roots. They ceased to be a part of the Russian nation in contrast to the Russian peasantry, and the bourgeoisie/middle class. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 closes the 'Petrine era' – the era of the division; hence the intelligentsia should return to the soil and blend, merge again with the Russian nation. Modern 'men of the soil' consider Communism a western idea, and the Soviet Union contradictory to Russianness. The demise of Communism and the Soviet Union sets the scene for the intelligentsia to return to Russian values which have still been retained in the consciousness of the common people. Cf: **Классовость; Интеллигенция.**

AL

### **Воля**

#### *THE WILL*

The term 'will' is comprised of several concepts, one of these can be explained by the indefinable 'I will, desire, wish for, have mind to' expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention directed to the doing of something. Often this concept is conveyed best as two words 'free will' meaning spontaneous will, unconstrained choice (to do or act). In Dostoevsky's novels 'free will' functions as a fundamental quality of Man. In religious discourse it has been given to Man to observe the Commandments, redemption being dependent on the manner of making use of the gift of 'free will'.

Various social systems and all forms of oppression behave similarly in the face of 'the will'- desired choice is to be made, be treated, or accepted, as a choice of one's own free will. Totalitarian systems try to reconstruct the volitional 'I will'... into 'it must be', 'I am obliged to', in Russian *nado; ya dolzhen* and integrate it with an abstract will WE; hence the concept of *volevoy* – the man of the will, is developed according to which the subjective 'I will' is to be entirely subdued and subordinated to the collective 'We will'. Such understand-

ing of *volevoy* comes close to the idea of a concept of 'loyal', 'disposed, or willing to consent to'.

There is still another concept, signifying 'freedom from the law' or from 'external principles'. Cf: **Свобода**. In Russian tradition such a WILL is often mythologised and glorified as a particular quality of the Russian man. This may be translated into English, though not exactly, as 'licence', and is manifested in the form of a total rebellion, unbridledness, destruction and devastation. On the basis of literature, for example, of peasant revolts or conventional motifs of the rebellion of the will in the literature of the nineteen-twenties, one can assume that this 'will' is not based on any voluntary action, or conscious intention that is directing or organising behaviour, but it is a pure energetic expression of negation 'no', or 'I will not'. It is not by accident that it has been associated with 'free space' as in Dostoevsky, or Kruchonykh.

WILL in a spatial sense (Russian *prostor*) suggests in turn, that what matters is freeing oneself from all forms of organization, and all sensual-perceptual-motor restraints or order. The ideal of such a will would most certainly be a complete *apophysis*. It is probably not by accident that Raskolnikov's dreams, and his readiness to reform is expressed by Dostoevsky against the background of vast sweeping spaces, initially on the Neva and then on the outskirts of St Petersburg, and finally, in the hard labour camp.

*JF & AL*

## **Восток**

### *THE EAST*

Like in other cultures 'the east = the orient'- the orient as that region of the heavens in which the sun rises, or the corresponding region of the world, or quarter of the compass, has a positive value in Russian culture. Therefore, by juxtaposing herself to the western civilization, Russia, without any objection, calls herself the East, though reluctantly accepts this name in Western discourse.

In contrast to the concept of the West, the Russian notion of the East is more complex and less precise.

In its acceptance of the definition of Russia = the East, historical connotations become a reality – the legacy and cultivation of the heritage of the Eastern Roman Imperium – Byzantine Empire, which connotes untainted spiritual values of true Christianity.

From the point of view of geography and civilization the East appears as an uncivilized and dangerous element; but on the other hand, as an area of Russia's civilizing and religious mission, or during the Soviet regime – the ideological mission.

In contrast to the western provinces of the Imperium, the role of the East = the guardian of spiritual values and Russianness is prescribed to Moscow.

In opposition to the European part of the Imperium similar functions are prescribed to the Asian part, especially to Siberia: it is from the Russian people in Asia that rebirth of spirituality is to come. According to Soviet mythology it was there that the spirit of the revolutionary, the communist, and the Comsomol youth was tempered.

There is still another East – the East of the Russian cultural studies; above all, the Holy Land, Syria, Iran, and India. It is in Iran and India as the cradle of the Indo-European languages and cultures, and as the first source of the archetypal conventional themes of Russian folklore, where the folklore of Eastern Slavs had originated and which find there expression in literature and art of the twentieth century.

*JF*

### **Враг народа**

#### *ENEMY OF THE NATION*

In the People's Democracies, such as the Polish People's Republic- the country of the 'working people of cities and villages' 'enemies of the people' were created. However, in the Soviet Union after a classless communist state/society of the 'Soviet nation' was established, the 'enemy of the people' as a 'class enemy' was replaced by the 'enemy of the (Soviet) nation'. Cf: **Советский народ**. Enemies of the nation were comprised of millions of people, entire social strata, for instance, peasants during the period of forced collectivization, engineers, doctors, whole nations: the Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Balkars, and Chechens, and as a particular situation required, the enemies became the 'cosmopolitans', the 'nationalists', etc. It is significant that in the period of perestroika there even appeared the 'enemies of perestroika'. Even today attempts are being made to create enemies of the nation, but this time the enemies of the Russian nation. Most often this role is fulfilled by 'Jews and Masons'.

*AL*

### **Вручение себя – Преданность**

#### *HANDING OVER – YIELDING ONESELF*

In contrast to a *pact*, agreement which stems from magic, *at the basis of religious act lies not a mutual exchange, but unconditional surrender of oneself to control*. This is characterized by 1. one-sidedness, the one yielding can count on being cared for, though this does not necessarily have to take place, the lack of

reciprocation cannot be the basis for breaking the relationship; 2. the receiving party is not obliged to anything, it has a free will and may or may not take advantage of an act of grace, whereas the yielding party hands over everything without reservation; 3. there is no 'exchange' or the 'equivalence' = 'conventionality'; the act, according to Lotman, being based on symbols rather than signs; 4. the relations of this type have a character of not a pact, but an unconditional 'gift or offering'.

This model is thought to play a dominant role due to simultaneous acceptance of Christianity and the formation of the statehood in Russia. This was also caused by the sacralization of the ruler – the tsar. This is best conveyed in the idea of *Domostroy* with its model of ordering the world: God in the universe, the tsar in the state, the father in the family, which is interpreted as a three-tiered unconditional Yielding of Man.

The Petrine Age by reconstructing Russia on western patterns shaped it, however, according to a religious pattern, where both the state contract and monarchy were sanctified, which led to the establishment of a peculiar form of secular religion of statehood. This demand of faith in the monarchy and a complete blending of its subjects in themselves, their total yielding of themselves, was again activated quite quickly, as early as during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855). This was also adopted by Soviet Russia – based on the eternal idea of 'yielding oneself' for the 'common cause', for 'nation', for 'freedom', for the 'Party', etc.

*JF*

### **Всечеловек-Всечеловечность**

#### *THE EVERYMAN – ALL-MANKIND*

This notion was first introduced by F. Dostoevsky and has gained popularity today. It describes the nature of the Russian man 'who is said to be particularly open to the influence of other cultures. *What else is the strength of spirit of the Russian nationality, if not the striving for universality, and all-humanity, every-manness.* Cf: **Общечеловек.**

*AL*

## Г

### Гамлет и Дон Кихот

#### *HAMLET and DON QUIXOTE*

Literary types personifying often contradictory mental structures which are characteristic of the general European consciousness were transplanted on to Russian ground from the beginning of the 18th century. Even cursory analysis of Russian culture shows, however, that 'hamletism' and 'quixotism' express qualities of pure Russian mentality and have achieved symbolic dimensions through which Russian mentality has entered the European paradigm of culture. Initially Hamlet and Don Quixote were interpreted as negative types in Russia. At the beginning of the 19th century the character of Don Quixote was identified with political doctrinairism. (N. Karamzin).

The publishing of Belinsky's article "*Hamlet*", *Shakespeare's drama itself, and Mochalov's role of Hamlet* in 1838, and especially the article written by Turgenev in 1860 entitled *Hamlet and Don Quixote* begin in Russia a long period of reflection on the two types of personalities. For V. Belinsky, Hamlet is *every one of us, in a more or less solemn or ridiculous form, but always in a pitiable and pathetic meaning*. Turgenev saw the 'pitiable and pathetic' sense of 'hamletism', and the rehabilitation of 'quixotism'. For him the heroes of Shakespeare and Cervantes symbolise correspondingly the egoism and altruism, which for the character of Hamlet is a goal in itself- within himself, whereas for Don Quixote the goal is beyond him.

Russian critique of Hamlet and Don Quixote encompassed various facts and events of reality. The terms 'Hamlet' and 'Don Quixote' became to have some derogatory undertones, for example, they called 'Hamlets' 'expendable people'; The Slavophiles were defined as 'Russian Don Quixotes'; V. Solov'ev calls the 'Russian quixotry' *any solution to a contradiction between an ideal and foolish reality*. Hamlet and Don Quixote constitute here as if two opposite poles – that of reason and that of emotion, between which Man has been vacillating for centuries, cf: F. Dostoevsky's remark: *Hamlet, Don Quixote? – a cursed question... I do not know what is, or what is not the truth*.

The new wave of interest in the problems of Hamlet and Don Quixote came over Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, which found its expression in the articles of M. Voloshin, I. Annensky, P. Florensky, L. Vigotzky, who combined the problems with a problem of Russian religious philosophy and with the philosophical culture of the 20th century in general, cf: Florensky's remark: *Hamlet must possess a dual religious consciousness – he has two gods who*

*contradict each other.* Both these types can also be found in the twentieth century Russian literature, in the poetry of: A. Blok, A. Akhmatova, M. Tsvetaeva, B. Pasternak, N. Zabolotsky, and others, up to V. Vysotsky, together with the ambivalence of symbolism so characteristic of art of the twentieth century.

*RM*

### **Гонор**

#### *HONOUR*

In contrast to the notions of *chest'* – 'dignity', 'virtue' it has a pejorative tinge. Honour means proud and lofty, the 'Western' I, which in Russian tradition stands in contrast to the collective. Cf: **Я, мы, они; Гордыня.**

*AL*

### **Гордыня**

#### *VAIN PRIDE*

In Russian tradition the proud, haughty I is attributed to the West, cf: **Я, мы, они; Гонор**, whereas a Russian is believed to be characterized by his submissiveness to God, the world and people.

*AL*

### **Город**

#### *THE CITY*

Often the symbol of progress which is destructive to culture, in contrast to the village which preserves national culture. In socialist realism such opposition between the good village and the bad city was not allowed. Socialism was built as an expression of progress and the positive heroes became cement, the electric power plant, and the locomotive. No wonder, therefore, that during the period of the early 1960s, the attempts which were made mainly by the so called Village writers represented by V. Astaf'ev, V. Belov, B. Mozhaev, V. Rasputin, V. Soloukhin, V. Shukshin, and others, to appeal to 'Russian values' preserved in the Russian village, met with a decided opposition among the Soviet ideologists. A new, interesting juxtaposition appeared among the Village writers: the cosmopolitan city, that of the party members – the Russian national village. Later, during the period of perestroika, after the lifting of censorship, some writers of literary works, by identifying the communist party membership with cosmopolitanism, will stress at the same time the non-Russian origin of many of the Soviet leaders. However, initially, which is understandable, the opposition between the party membership and Russianness could only be read between the lines. Another image of the city came to the foreground, one of drunkenness, concrete, deprived through western bourgeoisie culture, pornography, and chewing gum – and the



Russian village preserving the tradition of their forefathers. In a village commune, everybody can count on everyone else. The city is ruled by egoism: *The city with its crowds and rat race, always provides a false excuse for not thinking of one's neighbour* states V. Belov, who also adds: *And thus triumphs in the soul the kingdom of the Devil...*

*AL*

## Д

### **Двуглавый орел**

#### *THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE*

An ancient Sumerian symbol imported by the Europeans from the Arabs during the Crusades. It became common in Western Europe towards the end of the 12th century, it was also adopted by the Holy Roman Empire. It also became a symbol of God the Father. Although not possessing any heraldic significance in the Byzantine Empire, it did appear as a symbol of religious and secular authority in the former lands of Turkey and Greece. However, it was employed as a coat of arms in Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Romania. In Russia it first appeared in 1497, on the state seal of Ivan III. From that time on, although with modifications of its form, it survived until 24th July 1918, when it was abolished by the Bolsheviks to be reinstated in 1991. Not much is known how it reached Russia, however, there are several versions of its origins, of which the most popular, at least in nationalist and Orthodox Church circles, is the one which was mentioned by N. Karamzin (in his *History of the Russian State*) that the double-headed eagle was brought by Sofia of the Palaeologus dynasty, the niece of the last ruler of the Byzantine Empire, and the second wife of Ivan III (1472). This version reinforces the rights of Russia's legacy to the heritage of Byzantium. The eagle itself is interpreted as a symbol of the union of secular and religious authority, as a symbol of both the struggle for the truth of Orthodoxy in the West and the carrying of the light of Christian faith to the pagan peoples of the East, and a symbol of the everlasting struggle with the Antichrist. In its right, western claw the eagle held a sword, while in its left, eastern claw it held a cross, but through later modifications a coat of arms of Moscow was placed on the eagle's breast. The coat of arms represented St George, who according to the Russian interpretation, is in the process of killing the dragon, rather than as in the Western representation, where the Saint has supposedly already defeated the dragon. Therefore, this battling St George is to symbolize the perpetual duty to be performed by Russia.

*JF & AL*

### **Демократия**

#### *DEMOCRACY*

In the West, the concept is understood as political freedom, while in Russia it is treated as an opposition to the aristocracy. The word 'democracy' in Russia

did not have a meaning in the sense of ‘political’, but rather in the sense of ‘social’. Even today, one speaks in Russia of the ‘democratic classes’, or the ‘democratic element’; the word ‘democratic’ occurs here as a synonym for the word ‘people’s’, and ‘democratic element’ could be taken for an element with the most anti-democratic views in the Polish or European sense of the word (a form of power officially proclaiming subjection of the minority to the will of the majority). Even the concept of ‘reactionary democracy’ is used (A. Walicki). It was only at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the concept of democracy in a context of a more political meaning, understood as a system in the opposition to autocracy, was introduced to the Russian language.

Today, for many Russian nationalists ‘democracy’ has become a particular synonym of the ‘Jewish-Masonry’. The journal *Den* gives the following definitions of ‘democracy’: *Democracy is amoebiasis* (infestation with amoebas in the intestines); *democracy means the European yoke*; *democracy means the closing of the press of the opposition plus breakdowns in nuclear power stations*.

AG

## **Державность**

### *1. HOLDING BACK*

In the interpretation of the ideology of Orthodoxy the ‘state self-awareness’ of the Russian people who took upon themselves the task of holding back – *uderzhat*’ the coming of the Antichrist; the awareness of the responsibility of each and everyone for all, as well as the responsibility for the state-power.

### *2. POWER STATUS*

AL

## **Доброта**

### *GOODNESS*

In the consciousness of the Russian people goodness, grace, compassion and love often appear as synonymous notions which are equated with the doing of good. Goodness is a manifestation of ‘living according to one’s heart’, and not living according to rules; its main aspect is unawareness, lack of self-interest and lack of ulterior motives. The Russian values goodness more than any other qualities of character.

The manifestation of goodness is a lack of vindictiveness. *Russian people are not capable of genuine hatred for long periods of time* (F. Dostoevsky). A Russian man wishes to forgive as quickly as possible, since he is tormented by the very thought of evil. He bears easily – in the name of the divine commandments – insults and affronts and rarely pays back in the same coin. When a Russian evaluates the character of another person, he always points to the per-

son's goodness, or condemns the lack of it. In the Russian fairy tales, goodness invariably triumphs. Goodness in its fullest form is embodied in the Russian woman. Her goodness is devoid of hypocrisy and maudlin sentimentality. The goodness of woman is inseparable with the image of the Mother of God.

AZ

### **Договор**

#### ***PACT****Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

One of the oldest and the most elementary of socio-cultural forms. In contrast to the notion of *yielding* which is considered as a religious form, cultural studies qualify *pact* as being associated with magic. The concept of pact is based on 1. reciprocity of acts of the agreeing parties; 2. obligation – acts of one party carry with them the duty of performing relevant acts agreed upon of the second party; 3. equivalency of the exchange of acts, corresponding to a conventional exchange, for instance that of signs; 4. the pact – implemented in various ways – may be variously interpreted by either of the parties, and sometimes even broken.

Historical coincidence of the formation of the statehood of Kievan Russia with that of the adoption of Christianity caused the forms which were based on pact to be treated as pagan and connected with the power of the Devil; hence the possibility of utilizing pacts with the intention of deception and defeating the powers of evil, the possibility of breaking them and general attitude of distrust and suspicion. This made it impossible to develop in the Russian culture a permanent concept of the 'word of honour'.

The ambitious plans of transforming Russia into a monarchy under the rule of law during the 18th century, from the time of Peter I did not change much the general attitudes towards pacts. The poorly educated Russian people still tended to identify the act of agreement, or generally a conventional sign, with a devilish deception. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that in supporting these attitudes no small role is played by literature which presents pacts, judges or lawyers, not without evidence in Russian practice, in an almost exclusively negative light, i.e. a well-known formula of F. Dostoevsky that a lawyer is a 'corrupt conscience', and even in Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*, the profession of lawyer is given to the extremely cynical character Komorowsky.

JF

### **Доносительство**

#### ***INFORMING*** *against other people*

One of the features of the mentality of Soviet-Russian people. The Soviet Union was probably the only 'civilized' country in the world where a statue was erected to Pavlik Morozov – the boy who informed on his own father, and on

whose example whole generations of its citizens were 'brought up'. Informing on people became an ethical 'value' as an 'assistance to the maintaining of the Soviet nation'. Children informed on their parents, pupils on their teachers, wives on their husbands, neighbours on neighbours, subordinates on their superiors, and so on and so forth. Denunciations were made out of fear, hunger, envy, but also in the name of the 'idea', and a 'duty of a citizen'. What is more, in the practice of the Soviet apparatus of repression, those who did not inform were severely punished.

Historically, the Soviet denunciatory activities have precedences in the *ukaz* of Ivan the Terrible concerning universal obligation of denunciation, and that of Peter I, which lifted the secrecy of the confessional and obliged the clergy to disclose the secret to appropriate authorities. It seems that none of these *ukazes* were ever officially annulled by any legal act. By the verdict of a court martial Dostoevsky was to be shot *for not informing on the propagating of a letter written by the writer V. Belinsky, hostile to religion and authorities, as well as on the scandalous work of literature of lieutenant Grigor'ev.*

The concept of privacy did not exist in Russia, either.

*JF & AL*

### **Дорога-Путь**

#### *THE ROAD – THE WAY*

There are two equivalents in the Russian language which express a similar concept *doroga – put'*. In a spatial context they generally both have the same meaning, the differences being in collocations and stylistic usage. In time relations, however, the word *put'* is used, as in the expression *zhiznennyi put'* – 'way of life'. In its most general sense *put'* denotes manner in which something is done or takes place, method of performing an action, method of achieving a goal or aim, a course of action; hence the negative and sinister connotations of such negatives as *besput'e, besputnyi – neputevyi*, 'wayless', 'stray', etc. In brief, *put'* has moral, ethical, ideological and confessional associations and it is in these meanings that it is used in ideological discourse. The famous slogan *Put' k kommunizmu* 'The way to communism' was to suggest more than just 'the way = the manner of achieving a goal', for it was to have, at the same time, the meaning of 'ideological attitude, non-vitiated, requiring sacrifices, in other words full of devotion to the cause', and at the same time 'leading to moral perfection'.

This, already Soviet ideological concept of *put'* has its basis in the history of culture. The closest – the medieval metaphor for the 'way' as well as the medieval world view, according to which areas of perfection, including paradise, are localised not in a vertical hierarchy, hence the alienness of the Gothic style in the Russian culture, but in a horizontal plane – so heaven could be reached, and spiritual perfection achieved through wandering. Cf: **Странничество**.

This stereotype still maintained its validity into the 20th century. Probably it was most fully presented in the works of B. Pasternak: movements in space bring with them transformations of the hero and an increase in 'revelations' such as in *Doctor Zhivago*. Pasternak also makes it possible to delve more deeply into the differences between the concepts of *put'* and *doroga*: he systematically doubles the ways in the world presented in his novels by creating a parallel way to the one along which his hero progresses. One of these is always merely a transportation route, the other one – the 'true' way is always linked with spiritual transformations.

The Russian news media often complain of the state of the roads in Russia, of their bad state of repair, or of their complete lack altogether. Those justifying this state of affairs make the argument of vast spaces and distances. Conversely, considering that in North America those same vast spaces and distances led to the construction of communication lines, then the cause of the Russian 'roadlessness, waylessness' should be searched for in the mechanisms of the Russian culture, among other things, in the concepts of *put'* – *doroga*. In order to make the concepts more precise and show their relevance to practical aspects of life, it is necessary to do research into the history of road engineering in Russia not only from the point of view of technology, but also in cultural terms. Notwithstanding, the example of the Soviet period suggests that 'ways' were constructed rather than 'roads'; *put'*, as well as the whole ideologized industry had the 'rebuilding of man' as its main objective, the practical efficiency of the industry taking a secondary role.

JF

#### THE WAY – WAY OF LIFE

The term 'way' in its evangelical aspect has a symbolic meaning and denotes a temporal existence of man on earth: *Agree with thine adversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him...* (Mat.5:25). The 'way' so understood means 'way of life'; man achieves through it freedom and full independence. Through this way of life, a Russian finds himself in the hands of God, not in the power of man (A. Grigor'ev). Such a perception of the world is manifested in Christianity where life is conceived as a temporary earthly wandering: *I am a stranger in the earth...* (Ps.119:19).

The ideal of a pilgrim, a wayfarer, cf: **Странник**, and a wanderer, a roamer, is to be constantly in search of God in this life. Such wandering manifests a particular relationship of the Russian towards life, as well as expresses his eschatology; hence, his unwillingness to 'put down roots' in the world which has put aside God (The Orthodox Church does not accept this position).

A Christian has a free will to choose his way of life. One of the aspects of this conception of freedom was for the Russians going on pilgrimages and roaming, going from one place to another, understood as seeking Christian ideals in life. Cf: N. Nekrasov's *For whom is life good in Russia?* and *A Spell-bound Pilgrim*

by N. Leskov. Wandering and going on pilgrimages over the uncharted vastness of Russia is an indispensable element of Russian culture, and a way of attaining, at least momentary, personal freedom. Cf: **Воля; Свобода**. All this has lasted until the present time, manifesting itself in a totalitarian reality as an internal and external immigration.

AZ

### Дума

*DUMA – (Boyars', zemstvo assembly)*

An advisory body made up of top-rank noblemen and boyars of the Russian princes and tsars with whom the most important matters of the state were 'brooded upon'. The first of the Romanov dynasty to become tsar was elected to that office by a specially assembled *zemskii sobor* in Moscow in 1613. The *zemskii sobor* which was assembled from the middle of the 16th century till the end of the 17th century consisted of the higher clergy, the Boyars' Duma (Council), and the representatives of the lower estates. The fact that the tsars of Russia co-ruled with the Duma was treated in the 19th century – among others by the Decembrists – as a parliamentary precedent, a model of a Russian representative body politic.

The Duma was abolished after the establishment of the Senate in 1711, and re-established by tsarist decree of 17th of October 1905 as the State Duma. The four pre-Revolution Dumas elected between 1906–1917 passed bills which were sanctioned by the tsar. After the elections of 12th of December 1993 a Duma was established as a lower chamber of the Parliament of the Russian Federation with complete legislative power.

JS

### Духовный – Душевный

*SPIRITUAL – SOULFUL* *!qd! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki. !qd! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki.*

The two words constitute an expression of the self-consciousness of the Russian culture. From its perspective Western culture appears as 'soulless', 'rational', 'materialistic', as well as 'cold', 'conventional', 'egoistic', lacking in 'heart-felt warmth'. 'Spirituality and soulfulness' has been preserved only in the Russian culture, and it is the Russian culture which can offer it to the world, since the Western culture has lost this 'spirituality'.

*Dushevnost'* is not only 'warmth, kindness, goodness of the heart', but also 'love towards fellow man', 'sympathy', 'selfless offering oneself for another', 'humility', 'a sense of guilt'. This virtue which is most worthy of cultivation is

seemingly best fulfilled through the Russian literature. Its essence can be best understood only in the ideal situation, when all and everyone or just two parties, demonstrate this 'spirituality' to each other: this should lead to a 'psychic union' or a 'communion of souls', to the point of losing one's own individuality, to the point of freeing one's self for the sake of the other ('the two become one'). From another point of view one can speak of eliminating the distance 'the subject – object', or rather a complete invalidation of the status of subjectivity – objectivity'.

But so much as *dushevnost'* remains still 'restricted' as being contiguous to the phenomenal sphere, its higher state is to be transcendence of the phenomenal entity, going beyond oneself, ecstasy, achieving the state which could be described by the word 'spirituality'. This is already a concept of a religious nature. In this sense *dushevnyi* means 'freedom from the burdens of early life, freedom from this world'. In the ideal 'optimal' fulfilment it should lead to the overdeification and the complete communion with God, or in its non-religious version – with the cosmos, the universe. Cf: **Святой; Святость**. In literature this very concept of 'spirituality' is most fully articulated in the form and contents of the Russian avant-garde, in particular in the works of M.Tsvetaeva. Cf: her poems *Magdalin* or *Poema vozdukha*, and others.

One might add that both *dukhovnyi* and *dushevnyi*, if their contents have been directed properly, far from being paradoxical, they contain within themselves the possibility of totalitarian, aggressive, possessive attitudes such as in maternal love: they assume the incapacitation, depriving the subjectivity of the 'other'; for it is necessary not only to be lost within him, but also it requires that he be lost within me, as well as the expansion throughout the whole world; this is rather the attitude of a child who has not yet developed its own separate Ego, either corporal or mental. Cf: **Я, мы, они**.

*JF*



## Е

### Евразия

*EURASIA* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

The concept created by 'Eurasians', one of the trends of the Russian anti-occidentalism. Some find roots of the Euroasiatism in the writings of Dostoevsky – *Russia is found not only in Europe, but in Asia as well; a Russian is not only a European, but also an Asiatic*; those of V. Solov'ev – *Pan-Mongolism! Although a wild word/ It is a delight to my ear*, and even in some folk sayings, i.e. *Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tatar*.

*The Russian culture – declare the creators of Eurasiatism – is neither European nor any one of these Asiatic cultures, nor is it the sum or mechanical combination of elements of various cultures. It is a culture which is unique and specific, possessing no less value, and no less historical meaning than European culture and Asiatic culture. It should be contrasted with the culture of Europe and of Asia – as the middle-of-the-road culture – Eurasiatic culture. The term does not negate the right of the Russian people to leadership [...] We have to be aware of our Eurasiatism in order to find in ourselves our Russianess. Freeing ourselves from the Tatar yoke we must also throw off the European yoke* (N. Trubetskoy).

Euroasiatism became a fashionable term in contemporary Russian ideological thought.

AL

### Евреи

*JEWS*

Originally they did not constitute a large percentage of the Russian population. By decree of the Empress of Russia Elizabeth Petrovna, issued in 1742, they were banished from Russia. As a result of the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century, Russia found itself in possession of territories that, to a great degree, were inhabited by the Jewish populace. In the Russian mentality the idea of Jewry meant a status of the minority in diaspora deserving isolation and alien to the 'native' people. The Jews underwent discrimination, and were limited in rights of the choice of where they could settle. In the years 1791–1917 they were confined to a 'specific area' of settlement – a Pale of Settlement in 15 provinces; Jews were to be barred from the senior ranks of the army and bureaucracy, and

from buying land; they were to be given only limited access to secondary and higher education, to the professions, or to posts in local government.

Treatment of Jews as ‘aliens’ was the consequence of the multi-national character of the Russian state which promoted inter-ethnic conflicts arising in the moments of crises. According to the public opinion after the assassination of tsar Alexander II in 1881, Jews became the main cause of internal destabilisation. At the turn of the 19th-20th century, anti-Jewish pogroms took place, followed by further restriction of rights of minorities. The negative attitude of the Orthodox Church hierarchy was conducive to the negative feelings toward the Jews (K. Pobedonostsev).

Alongside the condemnation of discriminatory practices by the intellectual elite (V. Solov’ev, M. Gorky, V. Korolenko) there coexists in the contemporary culture, the idea of Jews as wandering messianic people (S. Bulgakov). This idea becomes questioned, when from the mid-19th century, the role of the so called ‘Godbearers’ is assumed by the Russians (F. Dostoevsky). This traditional feature of Jews as being ‘aliens’ is complimented by the image of a parasite nation, and in a great degree is the cause of two competing messianisms.

After 1917, the negative relation toward Jews is usually motivated by the common man’s exaggeration of the role of Jews in the Bolshevik movement. The return to, legally non-sanctioned, discrimination takes place in the Stalinist period. Campaigns carried out against the Jewish mafia during the nineteen-twenties, and then against cosmopolitanism during the post-war period, and then again in the 1960s and 1980s are a sign of the escalation of discriminatory practices. The question of ‘settlement area’, territorial isolation of Jews from the rest of society are raised periodically.

After the fall of the USSR, in the Russian Federation these practices are officially abandoned, however, the traditional, negative steretotype of a Jew appears among the ethnocentrists as well as among the opponents of the western road to development. In this version, Jews are an ethnic minority inclined to carrying out some risky systemic experiments on the land which is foreign to them, who tend to put into practice some utopian schemes regardless of their costs. Scheming with the Masons they are instigators of the anti-Russian international attempting to destroy the state and exterminate the Russian nation. Cf: **Жид**.

*JS*

## **Европа**

### *EUROPE*

Generally treated as synonymous with the West – a civilization which is alien to the Russian culture. Cf: **Запад; Евразия; Культура – Цивилизация**. This

attitude was most significantly expressed by the work of N. Danilevsky *Russia and Europe*, 1869, today disseminated by all Russophil factions.

*AL*

### **Единомыслие**

#### *UNANIMITY OF THOUGHT*

The Slavic principle which from time immemorial to the present day has been solemnly observed by the Russian people (K. Aksakov). The principle most vividly found its manifestation in the Soviet reality, when all political acts and the elections of the representatives of political power were carried out by unanimous vote. In contrast to the ‘principle of majority rule’, applied in the West, and perceived by Russians as dominance of the most powerful (the majority dominates the minority / the subjection of the minority to the will of the majority), the idea of unanimity is thought to be a principle of peace and accord.

The Soviet-Russian principle of unanimity was adopted by People’s Poland. Even today, we sometimes hear of a community making an unanimous decision, whereas the members of the community were of different opinion, but voted with one voice anyway.

*AL*

### **Еретическая мысль**

#### *HERETICAL THOUGHT*

Non-orthodox religious movements appeared in the old Russian lands already at the time of the introduction of Christianity. As early as during the lifetime of the Russian Grand Duke of Kiev – Vladimir I (ca. 956–1015), the monk Adrian came out against the dogmas and the authority of the Orthodox hierarchy. The sources of heterodoxy in Russian lands were usually thought to have arisen from outside of Russia: the inspirations are believed to have come from rapidly growing sectarian movements in the East and West, those of the Bogomils, and then later from Protestantism. The programmes of the earliest movements, (especially those of the monk Martin, the Strigolniks, the Judaist heresy, etc.) although not presented in the form of explications of their authors, but only reconstructed on the basis of the treatises of such antagonists as archbishop Genadii and Joseph Volotsky and Zeno of Otnsk, reflect the Bogomils’ ideas of rejecting the Church hierarchy, secular interpretation of the Church faith during the Age of the Renaissance, as well as the events in the Church at the time; some of the most significant of these events were comprised of theological disputes on appropriateness of landholding by the monasteries and *cathedras* of the bishops, and disputes over the dogmatic correctness of simony vis-a-vis the established laws

of the Church. The traditional conception of the official Orthodox Church with its dogmas, the sacraments, rites, rituals and forms of cult was rejected by the adherents of heresies who set out to establish their own Orthodox church patterned on the Early Christian Church, with newly created rites and liturgy (confessing one's sins to the 'mother-soil', 'inner' prayer, i.e., raising one's eyes upwards without uttering any words). In the 16th century heterodoxy, especially in the teachings of Theodosius Kosoy, there appeared revolutionary slogans of equality among people of different nationalities and creeds, negation of all authority, and protest against war.

The later Russian heterodoxy thought developed generally in two directions: rationalistic with an evangelical basis, and mystical – spiritual. Such rationalist sects as the *Molokanes*, the *Stundists*, the *Pashkovtsy*, and others, which drew their inspirations from Protestantism, but also absorbed some general elements of the earlier non-orthodox teachings, based their doctrine on the conviction that the Bible is the only source of truth, although sometimes freely interpreted; thus some fragments of the Holy Scripture were interpreted allegorically, giving symbolic meanings to the characters and concepts, for example, the Resurrection being the symbol of personal conversion – salvation; Adam meaning reason, Eve – the soul; a serpent – lust; the Garden of Eden – the faithful; the Tree of Knowledge – God's people. By rejecting the traditional teaching of the Orthodox Church as having been contaminated from the 4th century onwards by the oecumenical councils and Fathers of the Christian Church, and by the non-acceptance of the clergy as being mediators between God and Man, the sects preached their own true Orthodoxy which they claimed that they had preserved, and that salvation was only theirs.

In the second half of the 19th century, the teachings of the Mennonites and Baptists were absorbed by Evangelical Christians who laid the groundwork for the new sectarian trend – Stundism-Baptism.

Some old Russian sects such as: *Khlysts* = *Khristovery*, *Skoptsy*, and *Doukhobors* (Fighters for the Spirit) in which asceticism and mysticism assumed an extreme form, those related to the *Bogomils*, *Manichaens*, *Flagellants*, *Adamites*, and *Quakers*, rejected the traditional religious dogmas, negating the divinity of Jesus Christ, and perceiving Him as merely a Man-Master – a mortal teacher endowed with special grace, or propagating the 'inner readiness' as the substitute of the sacraments, which suffices for salvation. The teachings of the sects were based on a belief in the truth of the 'Dove Book', in other words the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, or in the 'Book of Life' – a collection of psalms compiled by the heretics themselves and passed down orally from generation to generation – the truth of the soul preserved in the memory of its members. By holding a belief that God and the Son of God can be incarnated in Man through the descent of the Divine Being into the chosen person, or a belief in people being born of earlier 'christs' and 'mothers of God', they pronounced themselves

the 'living gods', and surrounded themselves with apostles to help them spread their teaching, and 'deadly angels' to help them fight the dissenters; they poured their divine spirit into their disciples. The sects recognized the invisible Orthodox Church, as the church to which all the righteous ones belong, those endowed with God's wisdom, irrespective of their religion or persuasion. They rejected any external manifestations of religious feelings. Their clandestine prayer gatherings – *radeniya* in *Khlysts* took the form of either ecstatic rituals, collective dances as they 'moved with the Spirit', self-flagellation, glossolalia and prophecies, or the form of conducting services in private homes (*Doukhobors*), the singing of psalms and hymns, as well as exchanging the kiss of peace.

Their secret conspiratorial communities were referred to as 'vessels', colonies headed by 'helmsmen' or 'helmswomen', or by thirty elders holding the office of the apostle. Initially the sect would form one family holding their possessions in common (*Khlysts*), and in time, after they were forcibly resettled from the central provinces of Russia to Crimea on the banks of the Molochnaya River, they established their own 'State of Doukhobors' with its own administration and self-government.

The religious concepts of the *Doukhobors* reflected the utopian hopes of the peasants for the establishment of a just social order, which they tried to put into practice by making their property communal and basing their day-to-day activity on the principles of collectivity.

Persecuted in the 18th and 19th centuries they were spread out throughout all Russia. Towards the end of the 19th century very strong social and philosophical tendencies appeared in both trends.

*UW*

## Ж

### Жид

#### *YID*

A derogatory and offensive term. Cf: **Евреи** in Russia. It connoted a trader-speculator, a miser, a deceitful hypocrite. Tsarina Catharine II prohibited the use of this word in official documents. It appears in the prose of T. Bulharin, in a humorous context in short stories by N. Gogol, most often in Dosto'evsky's prose and letters in connection with the anti-semitic attitude of the writer. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century *Yid* is a symbol of a surreptitious enemy of the state and the Russian nation. The term is used in the propaganda of the Black Hundreds, the Union of the Russian People, the Union of the Archangel Michael. Under the slogan 'Russia for Russians' pogroms were organised.

From 1917, *Yid* is not present in the official language, it occurs in the spoken language in its traditional pejorative meaning. The idea of *Yid* makes its return after the breakup of the USSR. The term has become common in journalism and propaganda of conservative elements. *Yid* is considered an arch-enemy of Russia, initiator of internal and external forces intending to annihilate the Russian nation.

*JS*

### **Закон**

#### *LAWBład! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

An act, principle of law. Cf: **Право**. In the Russian tradition the category of law was held from the earliest of times in opposition to ‘grace’, cf: **Благодать**, and therefore law generally has a negative connotation. Upholding the principle of law is understood as slavery and subordination to necessity; as commandments which do not come from God, but are thought up by man, such as for example ‘Roman law’; as the limits of an abstract ‘norm’ which is unable to be predicted and conflicts with diversity of practical life; as a ‘dead letter’ that destroys life and stands in the way of spiritual redemption; as something contradictory to the Kingdom of God. The principles of law are eschatologically alien to the Orthodox faith. Freeing oneself from the ties of formal law is seen as an ideal direction for Russia.

*IJ*

### **Запад**

#### *OCCIDENT – THE WEST*

As in many cultures, ‘setting’, ‘sunset’, ‘west’ denotes a point of the compass. It is characterised in the Russian culture by negative connotation. This archetype has retained its viability and currency up to the present day, especially in art and literature, as well as in ideological discourse.

Partly due to a weak differentiation of lexemes *zapad, zakat*, as well as the term the ‘West’ – Western countries, the countries of Western Europe, or of Europe as opposed to Asia and the Orient; also, now, America – and that quarter of the sky in which the sun sets, or the corresponding region of the earth – and partly owing to the noticeable foreignness of the western culture and the need of articulating of ones own identity, the connotations of this archetype interfere with the West as a concept connected with culture and civilization.

To many Russians the Russian culture from its very origins has nothing in common with Western culture. The West means the heritage of the Roman civilization, rationalism, liberalism, shallow faith, social contract and external law. Russia, on the other hand, is the eternal stronghold of the true faith. The political and economic liberalism of Western Europe and America is contradictory to its nature, and all attempt at transplanting it to Russia is to lead merely to the distortion of Russianness and the severing of it from its origins. At

one time the West attempted to destroy Russia through socialism and the use of revolution – ideas seemingly completely alien to the Russian culture. Currently it is the anti-Russian propaganda of liberalism and the western idea of the rule-of-law state which attempt to achieve the same end.

From the point of view of geography and ethnicity, Russia sees herself as a non-Western country, or actually as ‘Russia’. The West proper begins for Russia beyond the Slavic territories, from the Franco-Germanic lands; hence the ambivalent relation towards the Western Slavs and competing for the ‘westernized’ Poland. In various historical periods, and especially in the post-war period of the Soviet Imperium, Russia was in possession of its own ‘West’, it considered itself therefore as something of the ‘whole world’. Therefore the present breakdown of the Imperium is experienced by the Russians as the loss of its own ‘West’, and thus as the loss of the ‘entirety’; hence among other things, the feeling of humiliation and the sense of finding itself at the edge of the political-civilized world. These feelings are explicitly expressed throughout the whole ideological spectrum, including by the former opposition.

*JF & AL*

### **Западничество**

#### *OCCIDENTALISM*

Pro-Western trend in Russian thought which began to develop in the 1840s as the antithesis of Slavophilism. Russians, who take as their model Western democracies in their attempt to reform their country are generally called *zapadniki* or ‘Westerners’. In the minds of Russophiles this term has a pejorative meaning.

*AL*

### **Земля**

#### *The LAND – SOIL*

‘The land is everything [...] I make no distinction between the land and its children; human children should be born on the land not on the pavement. Later, one can live on the pavement, but a nation should be born and brought up, above all, on the soil where the grain and trees grow,’ wrote Dostoevsky. In this writer’s opinion, this idea could be realized only in Russia with its great rolling expanses and where the Russian people are so unusually attached to the soil. Today, the same notion has been developed by, among others, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and the so-called Village writers (V. Rasputin, V. Belov, and others). Cf: **Город; Возвращение к почве.**

*AL*



## И

### **Идея – Русская идея – Идейный**

#### *IDEA, RUSSIAN IDEA, IDEOLOGICAL*

Taken from the Greek ἰδέα- look, semblance, form, kind, nature. Dictionaries give several meanings: 1. a general conception of an object or phenomenon; more widely: any product of mental apprehension or activity, existing in the mind as an object of knowledge or thought; 2. concept on which is based some logical, theoretical system or world view; 3. a thought, conception, notion, an item of knowledge or belief; 4. guiding thought of some order, or work not necessarily in written form; the conception of a standard or principle to be realized or aimed at.

Plato defines an idea as an accessible to the mind, perfect and eternal pattern of which reality is an imperfect copy, a preconception of the perceived world. According to Fichte – immanent designs or aims, consistent with which the subjective *Ego* creates the world. In Hegelianism: the absolute truth of which all phenomenal existence is the expression; objective truth which crowns the whole evolutionary process.

Marx and Engels see ideas as the reflections of reality based on experience. Lenin subsequently treats the idea as something higher than the concept of *der Begriff* of Hegel: as a unity of *der Begriff* with reality. This complete agreement of the contents with objective reality, as well as the practical designs which result from it, are to define the peculiar character of the concept of idea expressed in Marxism. Idea becomes then, in a certain way, both the promoter and motor force in the realisation of practical goals. Returning to the dictionary meaning 2., whereby idea is the base guaranteeing the cohesiveness of a theoretical world view system, while taking into account its 'promotional' character, it is not difficult to observe that such an understanding of idea serves totality and eliminates the difference between a mental process and reality, which may lead to utopia or to totalitarianism.

For Leninist, and in general, for the Russian Marxist, identification of idea as both concept and reality betrays a certain similarity with the understanding of man and the world as 'icon' and with the concept of transformation of the world and man into the divine. Thus, it could be stated that the 'Soviet idea' while in the employment of the other complex patterns or elements has shown itself to be another version of the 'Russian idea'.

For basically the 'Russian idea' is not merely a conception or image of Russia, of its fate or of its destiny, but a conception of Russia as the bearer of the true

Divine idea – icon with the mission entrusted to her of making this icon a reality throughout the world.

Russia did make this ‘icon’ a de facto reality during the Soviet period. Although it was not in a form of a religious version, not divine, but still embodying the essential characteristics of the religious. Everything became ‘leninized’, ‘stalinized’: streets, cities, factories, actions, etc. took on the stamp of Lenin-Stalin. Parties and organizations, in other words, collective and individual people also were manifested as ‘Leninist – Stalinist – Soviet’.

The concept of ‘idea’ became deeply identified with the Leninist-Marxist, communist idea. An adherent of any other idea could no longer be associated with the concept of idea, nor could he be a ‘patriot’. In other words, the concept ‘idea’ was the equivalent in another system as ‘faithful’ or ‘believer’. Cf: **Человек; Русская идея.**

JF

### **Икона**

#### ***ICONBład! Nie zdefiniowano zakładek.***

The religiousness of a Russian manifests itself most completely in his relation to the icon. An icon is normally understood to be the likeness of the faces of Christ, the Mother of God, the Holy Apostles or the Lord’s Saints. It serves as a spiritual contact between them and their image. In the Russian language along with the Greek *eikon*, the word ‘image’, ‘picture’ is commonly used. The spiritual experience of a Russian in the presence of an icon belongs to among his deepest emotions releasing in him a spiritual rapture or ecstasy. In a Russian home, an icon is located in a place of honour – *krasnyi ugol*, it is decorated with jewellery and embroidery. During a fire or other natural catastrophies, a Russian will save the icon first before anything else. The icon is with him in sadness and joy, on a battlefield, at a wedding, or at a funeral.

An icon is not a portrait, it is a revelation, a symbol and precursor of the future world. It is held in the same reverence as the Cross or the Gospels. A small icon of the Virgin Mother in the form of a medal placed on one’s breast symbolises the profession of faith ‘with one’s whole heart’. In the consciousness of a Russian, the icon is a source of God’s omnipotence. In standing before the icon of the Saviour, we are standing before Christ himself, hence prayer in front of an icon is most often silent prayer. The presence of the Lord creates in the soul of the one who prays a sense of redemptive fear combined with a state of adoration and silence which is the beginning of the cleansing of the soul. The kissing of the icon and the burning of candles before it also are part of the ritual.

The object of particular adoration in the lands of Rus were the icons of the Mother of God – the Interceder, the Consolater, Comforter and the Mediatrix – which exerted such great influence on the formation of Russian religiousness,

and also awakened and strengthened the conviction of her exceptional favourable relationship with the lands of Rus; hence the great number of stories and legends connected with the name of the Mother of God and the commonness of icons to Holy Mary, the most well-known being the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God, the Holy Mother of Smolensk, the Holy Mother of Kazan.

This adoration for the icon of the Mother of God was presented in the short story *The Peasants* by A. Chekhov: *...everyone desired to touch the icon, in religious ecstasy they fixed their gaze on her and weeping they called out: Our Interceder, little Mother, Interceder. Suddenly it was as if they had understood that between heaven and earth there was no emptiness, that the rich and powerful had not yet grabbed everything, that they could protect themselves from harm, oppression, harsh privation and that terrible vodka...*

The cult of the Mother of God – Patroness of Marriage was common in Russia. Village girls brought requests to the icon of the Mother of God for fertility and for happy marriages; on the Annunciation, tubfuls of grain meant for sowing were placed before the icon.

The educated classes of society became aware of the religious and ethical meaning of icons only at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. In the era of totalitarianism, icons were massively destroyed. Today, there is again a renewal of the deep interest in icons both among the intelligentsia as well as among the common Russian people.

AZ

## **Империя**

### ***IMPERIUM* Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.**

A great power arose as a result of the expansion of the metropolis beyond its original national borders. Russia was declared an empire in 1721 with Peter the Great as its first emperor.

The idea of an Imperium was formulated at the same time of its practical realisation. Since the end of the Mongol-Tatar subjection in 1480, and throughout the next four centuries, the Russian Imperium expanded thirty-six times. The beginning of this expansion was to be the concentration of the central Great Russian principalities around the hub of Moscow. At the end of the 15th century, the city-states of Novgorod and Pskov were annexed. During the reign of Ivan IV, both Western Siberia and the territories along the Volga – *Povolzh'e* lost their independence. By the middle of the 17th century, the Eastern Ukraine – the left bank of the Dnieper River, Eastern Siberia and the Far East all were included within the boundaries of the Empire. Towards the end of the 18th century, the Black Sea coast, the southern Ukraine, the Crimea, the Baltic coastal territories and as the result of the partitions, part of Poland were also included in the Russian Imperium. The beginning of the 19th century brought the annexation of Trans-

Caucasus and Finland while during the second half of the 19th century, Central Asia was included in the Empire.

Among the processes of the empire building, the political concept of practical Darwinism predominated; which is the conviction that it is the obligation of the stronger to defeat the weaker. The logic of autocratic power espouses principles of prestige, tendencies of concentrating the greatest amount of land under the rule of the tsar. The concept of 'safeguarding the border' is the self-propelling element in the enlargement of the Imperium. The guarantee of security is the conquest of one's neighbour, from which follows an escalation of successive conquests. The actual partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century bears fruit a century later with the proposal of a scheme for the partition of Turkey. The latest example of 'safeguarding the borders' was the intervention in Afganistan (1979–1988).

The theory of 'Moscow as the Third Rome' and pan-Slavism in the second half of the 19th century, is the fundamental idea of the Imperium. Russia as the heir to the true Orthodox Christian religion secures the right to Byzantium and the garnering together of all Slavs under the wings of the Russian eagle.

After 1917, the idea of the Imperium gains an ideological motivation – the Marxist theory of the international solidarity of the proletariat, the obliteration of all patriotisms and state boundaries. Since the end of the 1930s, a transformation takes place from communist internationalism to Great Russian nationalism. The rehabilitation of the imperial attainments of the past (the non-Russian nations 'themselves wanted' to be with Russia) coexists with the legitimization of the USSR 'in a new historical commonwealth, the Soviet nation'. Since 1945, the basis of Russia as a superpower has been the 'internal' and 'external' Imperium, made possible by the creation of vassal protectorates of Central Europe as well as by attaining footholds in Asia, Africa and America. The cohesiveness of the external Imperium has been justified by the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty of the countries of the socialist commonwealth' since the 1960s.

The idea of Imperium was built on the priorities of the interest of the state at the expense of the individual (V. Klyuchevsky: *The state became swollen while the people shrivelled up*). The rapacious wars and colonisations depleted the power of Russia, destroying the possibilities of Russia's modernization.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the idea of Imperium still has adherents and opponents. The adherents emphasise the necessity of safeguarding the territories of the former fourteen republics closest to the Russian borders as in the particular geopolitical interests of Russia. It is said that the Imperium is essential to the non-Russian nations which are unable to maintain a status of independent statehood. The Imperium is also necessary for the 'protection of the white race' (V. Zhirinovsky). The idea of Imperium is based on the theory of 'passionate and unrestrained' nations (L. Gumilov), directing their aggressive energy towards new state organisms.

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According to A. Solzhenitsyn, the Imperium ‘crushes and drains out, it accelerates our destruction’. Solzhenitsyn condemns the Russian national consciousness which ‘cannot free itself of the concept of the all expansive state power, from the imperial intoxication’.

*JS*

### **Интеллигенция**

#### *INTELLIGENTSIA*

It is considered as the ‘educated stratum’ of society which was established by Peter I. Having been developed on the basis of western examples such as Dutch, English, French and German, the intelligentsia lost its Russian roots, *it became severed from the soil*, cf: **Возвращение к почве**, it ceased to be a part of the Russian nation. During the 19th century various terms were used to differentiate the intelligentsia from the Russian nation which consisted of the peasantry, and the middle classes. For example, by the Slavophiles, the proponents of the return to the soil, or the *narodniks*, the intelligentsia was called *obshchestvo* – the ‘society’. In modern times, a new term for the intelligentsia has come into vogue *obrazovanshchina* – the ‘educated ones’, a concept that was introduced by A. Solzhenitsyn. The intelligentsia has been accused and still is being accused of all the so called foreign sins perpetrated on the Russian culture, above all, the sins of liberalism, revolutionism and atheism.

*AL*

## К

### Календарь

#### *THE CALENDAR*

Until 1492, the beginning of the new year in Old Russia was reckoned from the 1st March. It was on that day, according to the Orthodox Church calendars that the creation of the world was to have taken place; this day was to have been on a Friday. In 1492 the beginning of the new year was officially changed and moved up to 1st September, still reckoning, however, from the beginning of the creation of the world. In 1700, the New Year was celebrated twice; first on 1st September as the year 7208 since the creation of the world, and then on 1st January as the year 1700 after the birth of Christ; this date of 1st January as the New Year was according to the system of the Julian calendar and was introduced into Russia by the *ukaz* of Peter I. Russia did not convert to the Gregorian calendar system until 14th February 1918 under the Soviet regime. Both the calendar reforms of Peter I and that of the Soviets carried with them a strong ideological significance. In as much as the Julian calendar reform was interpreted as being anti-Western and anti-Catholic (since between the years 1582 and 1725 all countries of Western Europe converted to the Gregorian calendar), the use of the Gregorian system was considered as pro-Western, anti-Orthodoxy and in the Soviet context, atheistic. At present the Julian calendar continues to be observed in the Orthodox Church, known commonly as the 'old style', it is considered to be genuinely Russian, more proper and, in a way, more 'national'.

However, a fully atheistic and a completely 'Soviet' calendar was introduced in the nineteen-thirties. Between the years 1929 and 1940, calendar reforms were carried out in the USSR three times. Aside from any motives concerning 'production necessities', there was also the intention of eliminating 'Sunday' (In Russian *voskresen'e* which connotes the resurrection of Christ), the establishing of a new order of 'holy days', as well as the establishment of a new era. This meant the reckoning of the day and year of the October Revolution as the first day of the new year and the new era. One of these new calendars was in force for a few months, from October 1929 to June 1930. According to it, a week consisted of five days in which four were work days. Another calendar with a six-day-week lasted almost nine years until 26th June 1940, at which time the traditional week, and the traditional names of the days were re-instituted. Cf: **Алфавит социализма.**

*JF*

### **Капитализм**

#### *CAPITALISM* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładek.*

In the non-Occidental tradition it is treated as completely foreign to the Russian culture, belonging totally to the West since it was engendered by individualism, egoism, as well as political and economic liberalism. Cf: **Классовость; Я, мы, они.**

*AL*

### **Катастрофизм**

#### *CATASTROPHISM*

Russians, in taking the pains of interpreting history, most often have predicted a great historical catastrophe or have stated that such a catastrophe had already taken place in the past; more frequently, they have linked together both positions into one. Catastrophism was already a well defined concept of the 16th century monk Filotei who understood the annals of mankind as the rise and fall of a series of universal imperiums; after the fall of the Roman and Byzantine imperiums, Moscow was to become one similar to its predecessors. The doctrine of the Old Believers clearly had a catastrophic character, the features of an apocalyptic sect which identified the state and official Orthodoxy with the kingdom of the Antichrist. During the middle of the last century, certain catastrophic trends appear in Slavophil thought; among them were the presentation of the reforms of Peter I as the annihilation of the Old Russian culture, a culture that was recognised by some as an ideal, another trend was the thesis of the fall of the 'individualistic' West. Somewhat later, the brilliant conservatists, K. Leont'ev and N. Danilevsky create a systematised catastrophic historiosophy; the thesis of the birth, maturity and death of cultures as being specific organisms. With an unusual vitality, catastrophic inclinations appear at the turn of the century in the thought and literature of the so called Silver Age, among the works of A. Blok, A. Belyi, V. Rozanov, and D. Merezhkovsky, while after the Revolution, such ideas appeared in the works of the Russian emigree philosophers and ideologues. The origins of these inclinations can be found in both historical events, as well as the influence of the catastrophic-apocalyptic vision of the later works of V. Solovyev which preceded actual historical events. Catastrophism, however, did not have to be equated with pessimism. Many thinkers, among them M. Berdyaev, D. Merezhkovsky, V. Ivanov and S. Frank, who in ascertaining the crisis of Christian culture, indicated that this crisis might very well turn out to be the experience opening up a new era of Christianity. On the other hand, revolution was often seen, for instance in the notion, of Eurasians, as a divine retribution in preparation for the rebirth of a Russia which in the past had betrayed its own destiny.

*SM*

## **Католицизм**

### *CATHOLICISM*

Similarly to Orthodoxy, Catholicism had its origins in the early Christianity which still functioned as one universal Church. The division between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church as yet did not exist. However, the struggle over the primacy of the bishops of Rome and Constantinople, deepened by their ritual and doctrinal disagreements, brought about a break between both Churches, known as the Eastern Schism, which continued until the ultimate fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453. From that time on, the followers of Orthodoxy were to indiscriminately remain faithful to the inherited Byzantine tradition, always treating Catholicism as a more 'inferior' religion and finding only words of condemnation for the so called 'Latins'. The ideological manifestation of the superiority of Orthodoxy over Catholicism was the 'theory of the three Romes' originating in the 16th century, which lent legitimacy to the aspirations of Moscow to hegemony in the Christian world. Anti-Catholic tendencies among Russians also spread doctrines of a historical philosophical nature, such as the theory of the 'official nationality', Slavophilism, and the 'return to the soil movement'. These doctrines emphasised the messianic role of Orthodoxy in the annals of the redemption of mankind. The centuries old antagonisms between the two religions also found their origins in the politics of the Apostolic See toward Russia. On many occasions, Russia was forced to accept the mediation of the missions of the Roman Curia in exchange for concessions of the tsars to the benefit of Catholics living in Russia: during the Mongol invasion, the Polish-Russian war in the reign of Ivan the Terrible, and the Great Northern War in the time of Peter I. Another factor that had a destructive influence on mutual religious relations was the activities of the Jesuits in Russia. The Jesuits, not without success, managed to exert influence not only on the educational system of the country but also on the policy of the tsars in the spirit of religious toleration. The relations of Russians which were characterized by suspicion and enmity towards Catholics were reflected in journalism, Orthodox religious treatises, as well as in belles-lettres, promoting negative stereotypes of Catholics as drawing Orthodox believers away from the Orthodox Church, especially since in reality, incidents of conversions of Russians to Catholicism happened quite often. Catholics constituted a serious problem for the tsar, especially since their numbers constantly were on the increase, which in consequence led to the Union of Brest in 1596, in accordance to which the members of the Orthodox Church on Polish lands who were converted to Catholicism kept their Slavonic rite. Much later as a result of the partitions the eastern lands of the Respublica, the Catholic population, which had been living there, were incorporated into the Romanov Empire. Generally, it is estimated that towards the end of the 19th century, the number of Catholics in Russia amounted to over 10.5 million, collected into twelve dioceses. Their superior was the metropolitan of Mohyl with his seat in St Petersburg. Although the policy of the tsars was not very advantageous to the development of Catholicism,



the Russian authorities still had to consider the influence of the Apostolic See with which they had signed a concordat in 1848. The tragic ‘levelling’ of both faiths took place after the Bolshevik takeover which began a long period of communist terror directed against Orthodoxy and other religious dissenters. The situation changed after the demise of the totalitarian system. Catholics regained the privilege of practising their religion, as well as the rebuilding and constructing their places of worship. However, the Orthodox Church still maintains an attitude of hostility and suspicion to the Catholics and ‘alien’ evangelization in the lands of the former USSR. Therefore, the reconciliation and mutual cooperation between the two faiths – the Orthodox and the Catholic in the spirit of ecumenism still seem to be a utopian dream.

*BM*

### **Классовость**

#### *CLASS DISTINCTION*

The 19th century Russophil thought generally treated the division of society into classes as a concept belonging to the West: Western countries were formed by way of conquest – the conquerors thereby becoming the privileged class. In Russia, however, the ‘authority of state was summoned up by free will’, therefore there was never any basis for the creation of social classes that would be antagonistic to the authority – there existed only one Russian nation. It was Peter I who brought about divisions in the nation by ‘tearing the intelligentsia away from the soil’ and developing it on Western European models. It was a commonly accepted opinion, even among Marxists, that no Russian middle class existed. Marxists referred to the working class as the leading force in theory as the justification for the revolution, but capitalism in Russia was still in its infancy. After the revolution, the idea of class was replaced by the idea of nation; it was at this time that the concept of the ‘class enemy’ began to appear. The ‘class struggle’ ended in Soviet society in 1934, at the 17th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks); moreover, in the Stalinist constitution of 1936, the proletariat was replaced by the classless ‘soviet nation’. In the same vein, ‘enemy of the nation’ replaced the ‘class enemy’. Therefore class distinction again became a concept belonging to the West.

*AL*

### **Коллективизм**

#### *COLLECTIVISM*

It is one of the basic categories of Russianness expressed as *obshchina*, *sobornost*, nation, class, Soviet nation, etc., which is diametrically opposed to Western individualism. Cf: **Я, мы, они; Классовость; Народ; Община;**

**Соборность.** *We declare*, writes a group of contemporary Russian nationalists solemnly, *that the foundation for building a state can only be the NATION (. . .) Nationalism understood as the consciousness of the spiritual and material unity of the national 'We' (. . .) is the natural and noble emotion of an individual identifying himself with the nation, as well as one of the most powerful integrating socio-national factors (. . .) In Orthodoxy and in the collectivist traditions of Russian culture there is no place for the 'primacy of the laws of Man'. The attempt to implant this idea by force into the Russian soil will invariably lead to the loss of Russian cultural-historical roots, to war of everyone with everyone (. . .). The Russian Way is a new Russian communism!, a new Russian national traditionalism, a native, Russian, nonatheistic, non-liberalist humanism!* (S. Kurginyan, A. Balakirev, J. Byalyi, and others).

*Our nation has still managed to maintain itself through community, sobornost', and collectivism. In a civilization where the principle 'everyone for himself' rules there is no place for the Russian nation* (A. Nevzorov).

AL

### **Красная идея**

*RED IDEA*

Cf: **Белая и красная идеи**

### **Красота**

*BEAUTY*

In the Russian mentality beauty is not generally considered as an aesthetic category. Aesthetic beauty is thought to be only 'external' beauty, believed to be 'false' and 'phony', 'depraving' and 'sinful', 'illusory and tempting' (the word *iskusstvo* meaning art is eagerly associated with *iskus, iskusheniye* = temptation). 'True' beauty is a combination of good and truth – *istina*, which is 'inner' beauty. When A. Solzhenitsyn declares after Dostoevsky that it is 'beauty that will redeem the world' he has in mind, of course, 'inner' beauty. For Dostoevsky the most unattainable ideal of beauty is that of Christ, while at the same time 'the ideal of the beauty of mankind is that of the Russian nation' as a nation of Godbearers.

This formulation of 'beauty' has its basis in the history of ideas. The Greek word 'cosmos' which means 'ordered world', 'world' was translated into *krasa, krasota*, while the word *khudozhnik* – artist comes from the Greek *epistemon, episteme* meaning 'knowledge'. It is not without significance that the legend of Old Rus adopting the belief of the Orthodox rite for its particular beauty is so often and gladly repeated. In the Russian translation of *Proverbs of Salomon*,

Wisdom assists at the act of creation of the world and calls itself *khudozhnitsa* – mistress which leads *po puti pravdy, po stiezyam pravosudiya* – *I lead in the way of righteousness, / In the midst of the paths of judgment* (Proverbs, 8:20-30), and warns *sogreshayushchii protiv menya nanosit vred dushe svoei: vse nenavidyashchie menya lyubyat smert'* – *But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul: / All they that hate me love death* (Proverbs, 8:36). Theology identifies this Wisdom with Sophia as well as with the prefiguration of the Son of God. Therefore he who loves beauty loves God. But genuine love can be experienced on the basis of true faith, which is Orthodoxy; hence a particular requirement to meet for an 'artist' – an icon-painter, as described in *Iconostasis* by P. Florensky, and distrustfulness towards secular beauty, especially towards Western art including sacral art, for such art, similarly to Latin, distorts the divine icon which manifests itself in beauty. It is only Beauty-Sophia which can lead to the understanding of Truth and the union with God. In the Russian culture this thread became particularly popular at the turn of the nineteenth century, not only in sophiology but in art and literature as well.

*JF & AL*

## **Крест**

*The CROSS*




Fig. 1



Fig. 2

It is composed of two pieces of wood of various length criss-crossing with each other in the form of the letter T and X – a pillar of infamy and torment. Its known forms are the Greco-Roman (fig. 1), as well as the Slavic-Orthodox (fig. 2). The Slavic-Orthodox cross is eight-pointed, at the top of the cross is located the tetragram of Pilate which was written in Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The cross bar at the place of Christ's feet is raised up on the left side, symbol of the opening of the heavenly gates; on the right side the cross bar is lowered as a sign of the shattering of the gates of hell. In some examples of the cross, a crescent moon is located on the back side of the centre of the cross. This is a symbol

of the victory of Christianity over the Tatar infidel and is found on examples of crosses where Tatar invasions swept over the land.

The cross – the implement of Christ’s torment is for Christians an exalted symbol of salvation, of life, of victory, of joy, of life’s hardships, of the trials and tribulations each Christian must be put through, of the necessary means of cleansing the soul, of the fulfillment of the work of Redemption, of the giving witness of Christ, the loving offering of God which aids us to attain life everlasting, of the willingness to accept torment which even as a sign over graves bears witness to life and resurrection in the name of Christ.

The theological lesson of the Cross: with the blood on the Cross, God – Jesus Christ, united everything with Himself, that which is on earth and that which is in heaven. The Orthodox mysticism of the sealed Tomb of the Lord radiating with Life Everlasting and with the Resurrection corresponds to the very prominent Western mysticism of the Cross. The stigmata and dolorosa are unknown to Orthodoxy. In Christ, Orthodoxy contemplates its Archetype, but does not imitate Christ and attempts itself to be the God-bearer, not through a passive expectation but through direct experience. A priest always makes the sign of the cross with his hand during the officiating at worship, the Holy Sacraments, at personal prayers and during the Day of the Raising of the Holy Cross on 14th of September, in remembrance of the discovering of the True Cross of Our Lord by the Saints Constantine and Helen. It is on this day that the priest solemnly raises the cross to the four corners of the world in adoration. A Christian builds churches in the form of a Cross, crowns the House of God with the Cross, places crosses over the graves of the dead, and unto eternity extends the arms of God (and those of men who bear the cross on their breast) embracing everything and everyone with love.

SR

### **Критичность**

#### ***CRITICISM* Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.**

*The Russian consciousness manifests itself with a particular criticism, which does not permit it to be completely subordinated to any individual idea. Thanks to this, we cannot be forced to remain for any length of time enamoured of any idol whatsoever, even if such an idol were made of the most costly metal or marble. . . (A. Grigor’ev).* In the context of Russian history of the 20th century, this characteristic should be revised without a doubt, since the idol of totalitarianism is still very much alive. The Russian nation demoralized by tens of years of abnormal life has still maintained the ability to treat everything in a critical manner (expressing itself even in its sense of humour). Currently the criticism of the Russian consciousness reveals itself in the particular manner of

evaluating the fast paced changes in leadership and political events, as well as in the gamut of moods, from sympathy to hostility, from approbation to negation.

AZ

## **Кротость**

### *MEEKNESS OF HEART*

An attitude of a positive openness towards God and people full of kindness and humility, an expression of a free man who is conscious of divine love and who constantly radiates this love. The matchless paragon of this is Jesus Christ – soft and tender-hearted the Lamb of God *obedient unto death, even the death of the cross* (Philippians), 2:8. God favours tender-hearted people with wisdom, fills them with the Holy Ghost and leads them, extols, saves, rewards them with power and peace. A meek man can bear persecutions and poverty. Being poor in spirit he displays his heart of hearts before God. A *krotkoe* – meek heart is filled with love, therefore Christ's *yoke is easy, and [His] burden light* (Mat. 11:30). The man with magnanimous service to God, of pure heart is a leading principle of the Orthodox anthropology. (The West uses such terms as: reason, will, will-power). *Krotost'* means patience towards all: *Then put on the garments that suit God's chosen people, his own, his beloved: compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness, patience. Be forbearing with one another, and forgiving, where any of you has cause for complaint* (Colossians, 3:12-13). Cf: **Святой; Святость; Чистота; Кротость; Молитва; Целомудрие; Сострадание; Стрдание; Юродство;** and others.

SR

## **Культура/Цивилизация**

### *CULTURE/CIVILIZATION*

From the middle of the 19th century, one of the principle themes of Russian thought has been the contrast between the notions of culture and civilization. Although for a long time no delineation between the specific terms was actually made, the existence of two basic, and at the same time contradictory, variant forms of social being was perceived. These variants corresponded approximately with what O. Spengler was to later distinguish as culture and civilization. It was only in the works of N. Berdyaev and V. Ern that the words culture and civilization were to become antonyms of each other and from that time on were almost never to be used interchangeably with one another. In Russian thought the opposition between culture and civilization is quite frequently identified with the opposition of Russia and the West, in which the West is connoted with the term civilization, a subject of sharp criticism. Among Slavophiles civilization and culture corresponded to different types of social ties. Relations based on the

'souless' written law lead to the disintegration of the personality and characterize the state of civilization. In contrast to this is the informal tie based on tradition, which allows for both the maintainance of the integrity of personality and the accessibility to religious truths. For K. Leont'ev the accepted form of a social entity was a 'culture in the phase of flourishing complexity'; a society that was ruled despotically, a soul with extreme stratification and rigorously in keeping with tradition; essentially a society resembling a well developed unique organism. Its antithesis is a degenerate form of society, egalitarian, homogeneous, rejecting despotism in the name of humanitarian slogans, in one word an amorphic form. On the other hand Berdyaev brings to attention the belief in the possibility of reshaping the world through the artistic and philosophic creativity, which is typical of culture and in opposition to the attempt of harnessing the matter through technological means typical of civilization. In a similar vein, other thinkers such as: V. Rozanov, V. Ern, V. Ivanov maintained similar criticism of civilization. However, their views were in variance, they always depicted civilization as a world in which rationalization, mechanization and uniformity of life led to the depravity of the person, as well as the disappearance of spiritual values which are created by culture. Today a similar stand is maintained by thinkers described as the modern Slavophiles or *pochvenniki*, among others Solzhenitsyn and the Village writers. Cf: **Город; Возвращение к почве**, etc.

*SM*

## Л

### **Либерал**

#### *A LIBERAL – FREE THINKER*

Originally, at the beginning of the 19th century this was the term applied to the adherents of democratic liberties. In the middle of the 19th century there appeared two distinct negative connotations of the term, not found in the West. The first aversion towards liberalism appears in the late 1830s in Slavophiles and then in their followers: F. Dostoevsky, K. Leont'ev, N. Danilevsky, and in our times in A. Solzhenitsyn and other adherents of the national orientation for whom a liberal as an adherent of rational progress within the range of law carries with itself a threat to traditional values both religious and moral. It became the main culprit of the process of the 'rottening' of the West. According to the Russophiles, the process could be suppressed through turning towards the 'inner truth of the nation' for which the sins of the Western liberals are alien. Such sins as individualism and strict compliance to the letter of the law which tolerates the leftist movements and promotes the ruling of the world by communism. Another manifestation of such aversion towards liberalism is an interpretation of this term in the circles of the radical democratic and socialist Left, beginning in the 1860s. For the Leftists – a Liberal is one who is unable to make the radical steps which lead to the overthrow of the existing system: he is a proponent of only gradual reforms, thus betraying the interests of the people – the nation. The Bolsheviks vulgarize this stereotype to an even greater extent, the result of which in Soviet propaganda there appears an image of the liberal as an agent of Imperialism who conceals his reactionary nature under the cloak of fondness for moderate progress.

VS

### **Личность**

#### *PERSONALITY*

Proper to the Russophil tradition is the ideal of the 'integral personality', which was to constitute a comprehensive structure of spiritual powers of the individual, their harmonious cooperation as well their inner unity of the soul. The Western hypertrophy of rationalism – the one-sided development of the ability to think abstractly leads, according to the Russians, to disintegration and conflict among particular spiritual powers. Integrity can be ensured only by Orthodox faith which in contrast to Western Christianity is free from rationalist contami-

nation. Therefore it was actually the Orthodox Russians who have preserved their ability to reconstruct the original integrity of human personality.

The integrity of personality is to be a prerequisite and correlate of the 'integral society' and 'integral life' in general in opposition to the disintegrated and rational, arbitrary social ties, which gives birth to particularism and conflicts in the West. In contrast to Western individualism which is directed towards the individual and society in name only, in Russia the notion of personality is stressed, which also refers to the common wealth of the nation. Cf: **Народность**. It is not history that creates nations but nations (personalities of nations) are fulfilled in history realizing the thought of God about them. Cf: **Разум и рассудок; Рационализм**.

MB

### Логос

#### LOGOS

It is a Greek term meaning *discourse, reason*. The Word – To speak is to act, as God creates through the assistance of the Word, *And God said . . .* (Genesis, 1). Logos – The Word and the Son of God – Jesus Christ are all used interchangeably to mean the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. In the Old Testament Logos embodies the Wisdom of God in his creating of the world in His own image, the instrument and the ultimate purpose of creation. In the New Testament according to St John, Logos represents the Everlasting Word of God through which 'everything became that became' and by which the 'word became flesh and dwelt amongst us'. The fact was determined not by the world but by God Himself, although a human being – the Mother of God – expressed her own free will. Logos relinquishes His heavenly abode in order to fulfill the unification of the divine with the human, the synthesis both already having been conceived beforehand and in existence from time immemorial. In this way, Christ-Logos-God becomes mortal on earth so that mortal man can become immortal in heaven. Christ coexisting with the Father is perfect in His divinity and perfect in His humanity, He is both authentic God and authentic man. Cf: **Богочеловечество** – Godmankind. The Prologue of the Gospel according to St John (1:1-17) is read as part of the liturgical rite of the Orthodox Church during the Easter ceremonies – the Resurrection which according to tradition is performed in several languages.

SR



## M

### **Масонство**

*MASONRY* *Błqd! Nie zdefiniowano załadki.*

In the opinion of Russian nationalists *it is a secret, international, world-wide revolutionary organization whose purpose is to combat God, the Orthodox Church, and the national state, particularly to combat the Christian nation* in the name of building a so called ‘common home’ and a ‘uniform world-wide society’. It was supposedly Masonry or rather ‘Jewish-Masonry’ in particular which brought about the revolution in Russia and the devastation of the Russian nation. The ‘architects’ of Masonry were also the cause of the disintegration of the USSR, and at the present time are the rulers of Russia. (This is the opinion of the metropolitan of St Petersburg – Ioann, 1993).

AL

### **Мат**

*VULGAR LANGUAGE*

It is maintained by some that the ‘secret of the Russian nation is contained in Russian profanity’. The usage of swear words in the Russian language is practically unlimited, which correlates with the openness of word formation paradigms in the Russian language (*khui – khuevyi – khuyarit’ – okhuet’ – na khui*, etc. ) with the possibility of the expression of a multitude of meanings and shades of meanings. There are certain circles of society, for example the army, where swear words constitute the elementary lexical units, the base for the formation of all types of words and expressions. The lexicon of profanity has a long tradition in literature. Even though in Old Russian times these words were not taken to go beyond the bounds of decency, in the 18th century there appeared a series of works (I. Barkov and his school) which constituted a sort of opposition in relation to the official writings. Today, taboo language (foul language, dirty words, and profanity) appears in the writings of such authors as E. Limonov and others.

RM

### **Менталитет**

*MENTALITY* *Błqd! Nie zdefiniowano załadki.*

The word ‘mentality’ is derived from Latin *mentalis, mens*, of or pertaining to the mind; that which is of the nature of mind or of mental action. The nineteenth

century concept of the 'spirit of a given language', or more generally, the 'spirit of a given nation' has been substituted by the term 'mentality'. Indirectly it is expressed through linguistic conceptualizations, behaviour, conduct, prejudices or preferences, ways of thinking or carrying on discourse, etc. More rarely it assumes the form of explicit propositions which may be treated as manifestations of a specific mentality rather than its content: for their form and content are as if guided to the point of being 'imposed' by a given mentality. That is why up till now, it has been most effectively revealed by semiology, or in particular, by the conceptual linguistics or ethnology in its *ethno-science* version. Mentality cannot be learned, it can only be acquired, 'absorbed'. In some cases one can be 'converted' to it as if to a particular religion or faith, by acquiring a given language with the whole conceptualization of the world which is inherent in it as well as all the cultural codes with their differentiations and their restraints of behaviours, conducts and attitudes. This is why the study of history is so important to the research into mentality, the history of words-concepts (etymology), history of ideas, beliefs, customs (ethnography), behaviours, pursuit of the arts, discourses, ideas, demands, expectations, inspirations, attitudes, and upbringing, etc. A smaller role is played by the traditional approach to the study of the annals of history; the qualification of the historical events will be more significantly revealing in terms of mentality, the manner of the interpretation of the events, or on the speculation of their causes which makes it possible to select or reject certain specific historical acts or deeds. It is this type of history that is cultivated by the so called French *La Nouvelle Histoire* – the New History, or the *Annales School*; the closest to this approach in Russia are such scholars as the medieval specialist Aron J. Gurevitch, with the exception that he deals mainly with the Western world, as well as such cultural semiologists as J. Lotman, B. Uspensky, W. Zhi-vov, in other words the School of Tartu, and also in a certain sense D. Likhachev. In turn, close to the research on mentality are collective works published in a volume entitled *Logicheskii analiz yazyka. Kul'turnye kontsepty* (*Logical analysis of language. The cultural concepts*), Moscow 1991.

Mentality which is unconsciously absorbed from various aspects of culture (from semiosphere) is intuitively performed further on as if independently of the explicitly expressed content. So then, all new concepts become more convincing and fixed the closer they are to the concepts which have already been historically established. The Western concepts which have not been properly adopted in the Russian culture must of their nature lead to an automatic disapproval among Russians; even if from the commonsense point of view they can be frequently accepted. On the other hand, many ideas or slogans of various ideologies and propaganda fall on fertile ground, common sense notwithstanding, as long as they are in accord, or at least are not in conflict with a given mentality, and harmonize with a set of concepts which create such a mentality and which are formed and duplicated by it.

In this sense a certain image of a definite mentality can already emerge on the basis of superficial discourse – on the basis of what it has to ‘offer’, of negations and omissions.

*JF*

### **Мессиянизм – миссионизм**

#### *MESSIANISM – MISSIONISM*

When Russians speak of the mission of the Russian nation as the ‘Godbearers’ – we are dealing with the concept of messianism; whereas when they speak of the mission of the Russian, Soviet or ‘Euroasiatic’ mission, this does not necessarily identify it with the mission of Orthodoxy – we are dealing with *missionism*. Cf: **Русская идея; Москва – Третий Рим; Народ – богоносец; Евразия.**

*AL*

### **Мир – Мировой – Все-**

#### *WORLD – WORLDLY – WORLD-WIDE*

The Russian discourse more than any other makes use of the term *mirovoi* – ‘worldly’, in the meaning of ‘as wide as the world’; ‘extending over or covering the whole world’, etc. in reference to Russian achievements. Partly responsible for this is the tradition of the Oriental or Byzantine rhetoric, partly the inferiority complex, or megalomania. Essentially, however, it is a matter of linking the world achievements into their own heritage, as well as the inclusion of their own achievements to the achievements of the rest of the world. The formula of the type ‘Pushkin and world literature’ may treat Pushkin as a well-known, renowned and universal poet who belongs to the permanent world heritage, but also as having a cultural competence which is equal to and a continuation of the world tradition. Reaching for the word *mirovoi* may be explained by the old connotations of the concept and the word *mir*.

‘Mir’ means the ‘world’, but also ‘people’, ‘community’, or in other words, the world in its entirety – cosmos and universe, the one which is nearer, the one which is ours; without definite boundaries. The more so, that as one which is treated as ‘sacred’, it must embrace the whole universe. Cf: **Святость.**

Similarly the morpheme ‘**все-**’ (all-) functions in the meaning of ‘uniting, embracing all and everything’. The formulas of the type ‘of all Russia, of all lands’ contained at one time a plural form and the idea of unification, in time, they began to take on the meaning of ‘wholeness’, ‘unity’. And the need for being a whole and united, everything constitutes a permanent feature of the Russian mentality. Cf: **Соборность.**

*JF*

### Многострадальный

#### *TORMENTED BY SUFFERINGS*

The one who has suffered much is a frequent description of the Russian nation in political, ideological and religious discourse. It is sometimes used in reference to other nations during ceremonial addresses at the time of official state visits. It mainly signifies the recognition for the annals and efforts of a given nation, in solidarity with the nation's expectations. In the intention of the speaker there seems to be no significant difference in meaning, depending on the audience. The differences remain in the interpretations of the receivers of the message – the audience. Therefore *mnogostradal'nyi* in reference to the Russian audience should be read differently in different languages: the point is that it is not the suffering caused by a foreign tormenter. In Russia the term *mnogostradal'nyi* connotes with the oppression of its own regimes, and therefore it is associated with a 'patient one, bearing all burdens with humility', and comes close to the status of a noble national virtue, and even a Christian virtue. At the same time the term denotes a permanent feature of the nation and qualifies it as a guarantee of perseverance and – compensation.

*JF*

### Молитва

#### *PRAYER*

The most fulfilling form of psalmody of the spirit, a conversation of an enraptured mind with God. The purpose of prayer is to summon, to adore, to praise, to give thanks, to express sorrow or repentance, to make a request or ask for a favour. Forgiveness is the condition of good prayer. The manner of prayer – silent prayer, prayer alone, or in common during rituals, and above all these, prayer on one's knees, bowing, laying face down arms extended in the form of a cross, pilgrimages and fasting – is more important in Orthodoxy than the obligation to pray: *For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice.* (Hosea, 6:6) If a person who is praying finds himself or herself far from church and does not hear the bell beckoning the faithful to prayer, the praying person turns in its direction as did the prophet Daniel in Babylon, opening his window during prayer three times in the direction of Jerusalem; cf: prayer of Moslems with their faces in the direction of Mecca. Prayer is by the constant remembrance of God, the union of man with God. In Orthodoxy, the litany to Jesus is very popular: 'Lord, Jesus Christus, son of God have mercy on me'; the word the 'sinner' is added to this litany in the Slavic East. Cf: **Святой; Святость, Целомудрие; Кротость.**

*SR*

## Москва и Петербург

### MOSCOW AND PETERSBURG

In the 19th century, Moscow was held as the symbol of Russianness in contrast to Petersburg which was considered the symbol of the enemy of Russia – the West. *Petersburg is an elegant man, wholly German (. . .) Moscow is a Russian nobleman (. . .) Moscow is needed by Russia, Russia is needed by Petersburg* (N. Gogol). We find similar opinions among the majority of the Russo-phil thinkers of the 19th century. In the 20th century the contrasting of Moscow to Petersburg loses its meaning. For Jesienin, Kluev and many other nationalistically disposed writers, every large city is considered as a threat to Russianness; a symbol of the Western iron dragon devouring culture. Cf: **Город**. Moscow today, however, is looked upon as the symbol of communism, rather than Russianness in contrast to Petersburg.

AL

## Москва – Третий Рим

### MOSCOW – THE THIRD ROME

The idea was brought to life by the ighumen Filotei at the beginning of the 16th century. It is one of the basic, if not the most important historiosophical ideas which has rambled about in the innermost recesses of Russian thought till this very day creating the ideology and character of the Muscovite state, the archetype of the Russian nationalism.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the thought that God Himself had destined the Russian Land as the heir to Byzantium began to be spread about. A number of years before the fall of Constantinople, the ‘Second Rome’, cf: **Рим; Царьград**, a union with Rome was concluded which acknowledged Rome as the authority in the sphere of faith and dogma; however the Patriarch of Rus treated this as a departure from the principles of the Orthodox Faith. When in 1453, Ivan III married Sophia Palaeologus, the niece of the last Byzantine ruler, he received in the form of a dowry a two-headed eagle for the tsars of Russia. These facts gave the basis to the statement that God had rewarded Holy Russia and entrusted its defence to the one and true Christian faith – Orthodoxy, making Moscow the Third Rome. From that time on, the task of Moscow was to lead mankind to the Kingdom of God on Earth. The concept of a Fourth Rome has never been taken into consideration.

Before the Schism, the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome developed within the confines of the Russian Orthodox Church without any major obstacles. Later the idea was mainly preserved by the Old Believers, who by rejecting the existing ‘Kingdom of the Antichrist’ lived both in the past and in the future, through history and through eschatology. The official church, however, carrying

out reforms in the name of the Greek traditions, abandoned the idea. From the times of Peter I this idea also found no support at the court; subordination to the state of the Orthodox Church, as well as pro-Western reforms did not favour religious nationalism.

A new expression of this idea is found in the 19th century romantic concepts of messianism. In their own way, thinkers for whom eschatology was strictly linked with history of philosophy would return to the idea, however the term 'Third Rome' was rarely used by them. In the Age of Romanticism new concepts were being worked out, though they were less defined, but they fully fitted the same messianistic and eschatological ideas. Moscow as the state was more and more often replaced by Moscow the nation. In eschatological concepts the Russian 'Orthodox nation' began to fulfill the same role which had been played earlier by the tsardom/state of Rus and the Russian tsar. Among the few Russian thinkers of the 19th century who while creating their own historiosophic-eschatological concepts, directly referred to the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, was F. Dostoevsky.

After the October Revolution the idea of combining the concept of the Third Rome with the Third International was born among the 'national bolsheviks' (N. Trubetskoy, R. Ivanov-Razumnik, and others). Today the idea of the Third Rome has been resurrected and raised upon the political banners by, among others, such pseudo-authorities as the notorious writer, the former Minister of Culture in the shadow cabinet of V. Zhirinovskiy – E. Limonov, as well as by the metropolitan of St Petersburg Ioann who claims that the *religious sense of Russian history decidedly exceeds the Russian national borders* and that the 'universal', 'cosmic' mission of Russia is the destruction of the Western Antichrist and the creation of the New Rus as a 'unified Church' and as the *last refuge for the true faith*. This is to be achieved by the Russian nation to whom *God designated the particular duty defining the meaning of Russian life in all its manifestations*. For the metropolitan Ioann, Russia is the 'Throne of God' and the Russian nation – the 'nation of Godbearers'. Cf: **Народ-богоносец; Русская идея**.

AL

### **Мыслитель – Мысль**

#### *THINKER – THOUGHT, REFLEXION*

Basically Western thought, particularly social and philosophical thought is in Russian opinion too rational, 'dehumanized', and even 'anti-human'. Partly this is the result of the very character of Western thought, since it aspires to be analytical and scientifically verifiable. It goes unnoticed that the very same West simultaneously cultivates other forms of reflexion – mysticism included – and thereby in its entirety it constitutes fullness of reflexion as well as fullness of culture; since it is acquainted with and cultivates the full spectrum of behaviours,

expression, institutions, etc. And this ‘lack of notice’ of the above has its source certainly in the pursuit and preference of homogeneity and unanimity; in radical versions – the only ‘correct’ thought and reflexion to be cultivated. Basically, however, aversion towards Western analytic thought, to rationalism, is the result of – an unavoidable in such reflexion, and foreign to Russian attitude – a distance between the researcher and the object of his research, between the thinking and the object of this thinking. Taking it to its logical conclusion, one might state that Russian thought would like to ‘think with what has been thought’, to ‘think with the object of thought’. Then it would be, and generally is, not explanatory, but making it present as if ‘reproducing’ the object of thought. In effect ‘closed onto itself and within itself’. Hence, among others, there exists the cult of ‘sophia’/‘sophism’, since ‘sophia’, for instance, according to Proclus or Areopagita is immanent in the face of being, and its reflexivity is manifested in its ability – peculiar only to itself alone – to ‘think with its own self’.

In this light Russian philosophizing is based mainly on an uninterrupted variation of topical and etymological – often of folk etymologies – meanings of words-concepts, names often along with their phonetic-graphical form, which makes such philosophizing resemble magical, cabalistic practices and is close to the Judaic tradition. It is here that one should see the causes of the blurring of the differences in the reception of Russians between literature and philosophy, and between philosophy and literature, especially poetry. It is here that one should look for sources of ill-famed criticism towards such philosophy and undemanding requirements as to the proofs, justifications and documentations. Characteristically, this type of philosophizing or cultivating reflexion is most sensitive to the shortest distance between ‘thought’ and the ‘object of thought’, and then it becomes critical; cf: reproach and imputation of Florensky of Catholicism, even though Florensky both in his *A Pillar of Faith* and *Iconostasis* cultivates a classic Russian manner of ‘investigating’ including all kinds of ‘etymologizations’.

It may sound like a paradox, but it is not difficult to prove that the Soviet propaganda discourse by utilizing its *Newspeak* thrived so luxuriantly and was so effective. It was based on these same notions of ‘proper and correct discourse’; it fulfilled the expectations of the masses, at least as to its form, if not to its content. It is to the same vision of discourse that national propaganda obviously appeals – and perhaps it may be more effective than Soviet propaganda, since it activates the paradigm of notions which was eliminated in the Soviet period, and thus it is marked with a particular significance and worth.

It is not by accident that the Russian language calls its philosophers *mysliteli* (thinkers). It is not only to upgrade their valour. The term *myslitel’* (thinker) is more closely associated with this type of reflection than the term ‘philosopher’. The English term ‘thinker’ does not reflect the shade of meaning, but has a rather qualifying value. Therefore the Russian *myslitel’* would probably be rendered by the term ‘wise man’. Since the *myslitel’* (thinker) is acknowledged by Russians

as fulfilling at the same time the function of a 'wise man'; it creates around itself a type of cult and pilgrimages are made to the 'thinker' not to 'consult', but for advice on 'how to live'. One might compare such pilgrimages of the Russian intelligentsia, among others, to Bakhtin.

*JF*



## H

### Наполеон

*NAPOLEON* *Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

In the Russian culture and mentality the relationship towards Napoleon changes depending on the historical period and the ideological or artistic trend. Napoleon's jurisprudence became the inspiration for M. Speransky (1772-1839) in designing the reforms of the Russian state. Napoleon is often the theme of romantic literature: the young Pushkin sees him as a 'predator' or a 'murderer', later on as a 'giant', a 'powerful darling of fortune'. To Lermontov, Napoleon was a 'divine hero' – conscious of the tragedy of his fate. D. Merezhkovsky – the author of the novel *Napoleon* sees in the Emperor of the French an enigma, a fatal mystery of mankind. For the symbolists (V. Bryusov) Napoleon is the embodiment of Nietzsche's 'superman', the 'darling of the ages' who is capable of imposing his powerful will upon the contemporary epoch.

The idea of Napoleon is present in the great works of Russian literature: *War and Peace* by L. Tolstoy, as well as *Crime and Punishment* by F. Dostoevsky. For Tolstoy, Napoleon was a vain and prideful man who had no influence on the course of events. His characters A. Bolkonsky, and P. Besukhov are fascinated by Napoleon as an idea – but each of them sees in it the fulfillment of their own dreams and hopes, seeking in it a solution of their moral dilemmas. R. Ras-kolnikov in *Crime and Punishment* treats Napoleon as an individualistic idea of a superman who ignores the moral norms of 'ordinary' people.

Napoleon appears in Russian folklore as well as in the consciousness of the believers of *raskol* – the Old Believers, where along with the person of Peter the Great – Napoleon embodies the Antichrist. This figure symbolizes individualism, desire for power and is associated with the hope, or the fear of the establishment of a dictatorial system.

JS

### Народ

*NATION*

A term that has many meanings. Basically it means *nation* and is synonymous with the word *nationality*, more rarely a *people*.

1. *Narod* is identified with the state and this category determines the political, great-power-status interests of Russia or of the Soviet Union. Cf: **Народность**; **Советский народ**.

2. *Narod* is identified with the people, with peasantry as the bearers of the national characteristics, in contrast to the ‘cosmopolitan’ gentry or intelligentsia.

Cf: **Простой народ.**

3. The term *narod* defines the society which creates one culture.

AL

### **Народ-богоносец**

#### *GODBEARING NATION*

The nation of the Russian people. God designated for it the ‘particular service’ which is contained in its history and all other manifestations of its life. Only the Russian nation can save the world due to the fact that it ‘bears with itself the pure teaching of Christ’. The concepts of ‘Russian’ and ‘Orthodox’ are synonymous (This is the view of the metropolitan of St Petersburg – Ioan, 1993). Cf: **Москва – Третий Рим.**

AL

### **Народность**

#### *NATIONALITY*

One of the elementary and at the same time the least well-defined category in Russian thought. In 1832 Sergei Uvarov, Nicholas I’s long-serving Minister of Public Enlightenment acknowledged it as one of the determinators of the Russian world view and he drew it in a tri-unity motto: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality. As an aesthetic – ideological category it found its place in the ‘triad’ formula of socialist realism: *Ideology, Party Membership, Nationality*. This normally defines the character of the Russian/Soviet nation and has nothing in common with the category of populism. It is an aspect of Russian and Soviet nationalism.

AL

### **Национал-большевизм**

#### *NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM*

Cf: **Белая и красная идеи.**

### **Наши**

#### *OURS*

A category of modern Russian nationalism. The tendency to divide people into ‘ours’ and ‘foreign’ is deeply rooted in the Russian culture. Cf: **Я, мы, они.** Hence we find the terms the ‘class enemy’ and the ‘enemy of the nation’ in So-

viet reality. Today the category 'ours' is disseminated by the newspaper *Den*' (since 1993 *Zavtra*) devoting to it a whole column.

*AL*

## O

### **Обломовщина**

*OBLOMOVISM* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

The concept is derived from the name of the hero of the novel *Oblomov* (1859) by I. Goncharov. On the one hand, it is identified with Russian spirituality which is manifested in the dominance of the element of feeling over intellect, high moral standards, sincerity, a preference for a pastoral way of life; on the other hand – the concept is treated as a complex of negative characteristics such as vain reveries, idleness, useless life style, disorderliness, passivity, accepting mediocrity, avoidance of risk, fear of responsibility, inability to adopt to new situations. The diametrically opposing extremes in the interpretation and the evaluation of *Oblomovism* is based on ones ideological perspective and world view. Its first meaning found approbation among the thinkers close to the Slavophil and Russophil (A. Grigor'ev) ideologies who preferred Russian values; in its other meaning, however, the concept characterized the views of the adherents of the Occidental option in its liberal and democratic tint who treat *Oblomovism* as a fatalistic heritage of the past which ought to be effectively overcome (N. Dobrolyubov).

BO

### **Образованщина**

*THE EDUCATED ONES – THE EGGHEADS*

Cf: **Интеллигенция**

### **Общество**

*THE SOCIETY* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

Cf: **Интеллигенция**

### **Общечеловек**

*MAN IN GENERAL – UNI-MAN*

A concept introduced by F. Dostoevsky. Today often referred to describe a person without roots, without nationality, as if a standardized man – the uni-man who has been seemingly educated by Western civilization. Cf: **Всечеловек**.

AL

**Община***COMMUNITY*

*A union of people who have resigned from their egoism, from their personality and manifest their mutual understanding (K. Aksakov). Above all it is a local community, commonly cultivating the soil. Today's resistance of the nationalist and communist parties against the private ownership of land is the result of the tradition of the Russian *obshchina* and the Soviet *kolkhoz*. Cf: **КОЛЛЕКТИВИЗМ**.*

*AL*

## II

### Петербург

Cf: Москва и Петербург

### Петр I

#### *PETER I*

Tsar of Russia, symbol of pro-Western reforms. He is recognized by the Old Believers as the Antichrist. It was he who seemingly brought about the division of the Russian society into the 'nation' and the 'severed from the soil' intelligentsia.

At the same time, however, more than any of his predecessors had done before him, he tied together even more strongly the idea of the state with the idea of faith. Among other things, he built the new 'Peter's burg'. The name of Sankt Petersburg was not meant to refer to Peter I himself, but to Saint Peter the apostle, as if the tsar symbolically introduced the 'First Rome' to Russia. This in turn brought to fruition Uvarov's triad: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality; however not without the contribution from, for example, Lomonosov or Derzhavin who sanctified the activities of both Peter I and Catherine II. That is why Peter I is found on the banners of both adherents of Western culture as well as the opponents of the West, i. e. the nationalists. Cf: **Возвращение к почве; Интеллигенция.**

*JF&AL*

### Подвиг-подвижничество

#### *NOBLE DEED*

The meaning of the Russian word *podvig* seems not to have any equivalent in any related languages. The possible synonyms, such as heroism, courage, fortitude – do not exhaust the full range of meanings and do not render its connotative values. *Podvig* means the irresistible will to act and the resultant effects for the common good. The sacrifice can be made permanently, even at the cost of one's own life. Here lies the sense and the essence of the Russian *podvizhnichestvo* understood as a permanent readiness to self-denial and sacrifice for another human being.

*Podvizhnichestvo* has its origins in Christian morality. Its purpose is the attainment of perfection and spiritual renewal. A Christian cannot live without acts of self-denial. He who has borne the weight of countless sufferings in the name of Christian virtue, will live forever. In Russian terms *podvizhnichestvo* has been characterized from the earliest of times by not only a religious life, but is as if a permanent element of the Russian consciousness.

*Podvizhnik*, or a protagonist of self-denial is someone who devotes himself entirely and without any ulterior motives to a given cause, to which he has an unyieldingly servile relation and not that of a official duty, with the understanding that everything that he does in the name of God is meaningful and characterized by a spiritual element. *Podvizhnik* bears his cross in his own consciousness and unceasingly serves it.

AZ

## Покаяние

### REPENTANCE AND PENANCE

In the opinion of the Orthodox believers, these are the greatest gifts which are given to man – ‘another baptism’ thanks to which man is freed from his sins and gains the grace he lost through the Fall. ‘Being sinners we become saints.’ Without repentance and penance there is no redemption. *Repentance and penance are the first footholds of earth where a person can place his feet securely; only from here can one move forward – not towards a successive hatred, but towards accord. It is only repentance that can initiate spiritual development of every human being and of every trend of social thought.* (A. Solzhenitsyn)

AL

## Польша

### POLAND

Over the period of centuries Poland was seen by the Russians above all as a political and ideological opponent, pro-Polish sympathies were more or less marginal. Undoubtedly a very dramatic history of Russo-Polish political relations had a direct influence on the formation of the attitude of reserve, mutual rancour and/or open animosity. The Poles were accustomed to treating Russians as oppressors and mortal foes of the Polish *raison d’etre*; on the other hand, the image of a rebellious Pole and traitor with the air of superiority rejecting the patronage of Russia was imprinted on the Russian consciousness. More than once attention was drawn to the fact that the Russian attitude towards Poland and Poles was branded with the mark of imperial thinking arrogating to itself the right to decide the fate of the subjugated nations of Russia. Even those among the most distin-

guished Russians who had earlier declared pro-Polish sympathies, in critical moments of history identified themselves normally with the official policies of the Russian state towards Poland; the statements made by A. Pushkin and A. Bestuzhev supporting the pacification of the November Insurrection of 1831 can serve as an example. Polish-Russian antagonism is not limited, however, exclusively to purely political spheres. At least as significant is the ideological conflict resulting from the differences of cultures, as well as various types of spirituality of both nations. The cultural heritage of Russia is of the Hellenistic-Byzantine tradition, whereas Poland has always drawn its heritage from the Latin-Western tradition. The religious differences gained a particular significance in the 19th century when the Polish messianism ('Poland – the Christ of nations') and Russian messianism clashed with each other. Resentment against Poland was manifested especially by Panslavists who considered Poland as a Judas in the heart of Slavdom, constituting an obstacle to the realization of the concept of Orthodox unity (F. Dostoevsky, F. Tyutchev, N. Danilevsky). Pro-Polish sympathies appeared most often among the adherents of the broadly understood Occidental trend (A. Herzen, N. Bakunin, P. Kropotkin). At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries L. Tolstoy came forth in defence of Poland (*For What?*) as well as V. Solov'ev and N. Berdyaev. After the WWII among well-known Russian intellectuals and artists who did not identify with the communist regime, pro-Polish sympathies were apparent, among others in J. Brodsky, B. Okudzhava, V. Vysotsky, N. Gorbanevskaya, as well as the editor of the journal *Russkaya Mysl'* – I. Ilovaiskaya-Alberti. After the fall of the USSR the spiritual crisis and the political and economic chaos in Russia make the image of Poland and Poles ambivalent and varied.

JJ

### **Почвенник**

Cf: **Возвращение к почве**

### **Права человека**

#### *THE RIGHTS OF MAN*

For many Russians the idea of the rights of man is alien to the Russian culture, it is a figment of individualism and Western liberalism. *Social obligations and civic duties are basic in relation to personal rights* and it is therefore necessary to *unconditionally reject individualism as an elementary principle of life* as well as to *categorically abandon recognition of the legality of the 'rights of man' which has a fatal effect on the state of the society. Perverts and maniacs, the*



*preachers of violence, of smut and licence have no rights to warp our life and deprave our children* – preaches at present the metropolitan of St Petersburg – Ioann.

AL

### **Правда**

*TRUTH* *Blqd! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki.*

Russians often speak of ‘internal’ truth and ‘external’ truth. Internal truth is the truth contained in the human soul, the truth of conscience, the truth of faith, and moral truth. The external truth is the truth of reason. Russia is seemingly directed most of all by internal truth – the truth of faith. The West, on the other hand, is directed by external truth, rationalism which was inherited along with the culture of Rome; hence the Russian division of truth into internal and external. Cf: **Право**.

AL

### **Правда – Истина**

*TRUTH*

The Russian language has two terms for ‘truth’: *pravda* and *istina*. Within each of these several variants of these concepts there can be distinguished several shades of meaning.

*Istina* has an ontological character and is confined to the world or to a higher realm, always however, beyond man. In the religious variant *istina* is achieved through the grace of revelation. In the epistemic (scientific) variant it is discovered. In the juristic variant it is revealed, reached through inquiry. None of these variants admit negation. This ‘truth’ – *istina* is unshakeable, eternal and established once and for all (so much that it is concealed, and it requires some effort or even sacrifice to become acquainted with it, or to deserve it one must be very religious). *Istina* is relentless, in a way, ‘soulless’. Therefore law, courts of law and the inquiry through which the truth is found out have in the Russian discourse negative qualities. Hence there is the unfavourable attitude towards Western-type law of which the Russian ‘truth’ is in opposition.

‘Truth’ is human, it can be relative, it can be questioned, adulterated (an antonym of truth is ‘lies’, ‘falsehood’). Most often it is concealed by people as a result of ill will. It is connected with ‘rightousness’ of conscience, heart, attitude, and contrasted with a ‘wrong’. If an inquiry deals with facts and requires ‘truth’ – *istina*, the court judges ‘according to truth’ by taking into consideration mitigating circumstances, or in other words it requires ‘truth’. ‘Truth’ expresses an ethical ideal – ‘rightousness’. To live ‘according to truth’ is the most important

obligation of man. *Istina*, on the other hand, stands above ethics. In temporal life 'of value is not the truth of fact – *istina*, but the fact of truth, of truthfulness and sincerity'. Even if it is a 'bitter, painful, distressing' truth, it is to be the source of spiritual and mental health. The revealing of concealed truths leads to healing and restoring the society and is supposed to constitute moral compensation.

JF

## Право

### LAW

There is a complete lack of an established consciousness of the need for the existence of law and the necessity of observing it. For the Russian intelligentsia the 'spirit of law' has always been a meaningless abstraction and the whole libertarian, legalistic and constitutionalist approach has been regarded as a red herring which could only divert attention from the issues that really mattered. In the opinion of Andrzej Walicki, none of the so called 'progressive' Russian thinkers, from Radishchev to Lenin, bothered to mention a single word on legal theory. The only people who ever did take an interest in the problems of law were a handful of zealous State officials like M. Speransky, M. Pogodin, and B. Chicherin. The 'spirit of law' was perceived as something particularly Western, or peculiar to capitalism, the West and Rome, and condemned for various reasons and from different quarters in the name of autocracy or in the name of freedom, in the name of Christ or in the name of Marx, for the sake of higher spiritual values or for the sake of material, social justice.

The Russophil thought, while looking for arguments to elevate Russian culture over Western culture places the 'Russian inner (moral)' law in opposition to the 'external, formal' law of the Western world. A disparagement of law was closely related to a 'collective-oriented' way of thinking. While the Western thought basically affirmed liberation of the individual, and the individual took precedence before the law and state, Russia critically approached the self-centeredness attributed to Western culture by opposing the Western 'I' with the Russian 'We': We – Orthodoxy, We – the peasant community, We – the nation, We – the working class, and so on and so forth, which resulted in a complete subjugation of the individual in the We – the Soviet nation, We – the Soviet state. Even such a great moral authority as A. Solzhenitsyn is not an adherent of the rule-of-law state (as understood in the West). In the modern Western culture, the rule-of-law state is defined as a state where clauses or items of statutes and law codes are in accord with the rights of man and are not subject to the morality or world view of any individual, party or social group, etc. Solzhenitsyn, however, argues that *moral principles should stand above principles of the law. Justice means consistence primarily with moral law, and then with a legal system.* This

is an entirely Russophil approach. Both Slavophiles and F. Dostoevsky would support it whole-heartedly. However, by contrasting the Russian 'inner' law with the Western legal system, the author of *The Possessed* prophesized the annihilation of the West in the grip of totalitarianism, whereas Solzhenitsyn knew from his own bitter experience what the subordination of 'juristic principle' to the communist 'moral principle' really meant. Dostoevsky – the late romantic was probably not aware of the threat of subordinating the law to morality of any individual or a collective body such as a nation, religion, class or a political party – A. Solzhenitsyn and other modern adherents of the 'return to the soil' who have themselves experienced trials of fascism or communism and are familiar with the ordeals of Salman Rushdie – the writer condemned to death in accordance with 'moral principles' – still steadfastly defend Russian tradition, negating the 'external' law. V. Aksyuchits, one of the leaders and theorists of nationalism who proclaims the 'Russian idea' is of the opinion that: *The Russian organic law is created by the good, and not by force ('God is not in might, but in truth') and not through the mutual pact of egoistic interests, not through duress and act of law. This type of law built the power of Russia. Law as an unwavering authority of truth and righteousness, with the least amount of formal regulation and with the greatest amount of organicity and harmony – this was a specifically Russian way of experiencing the law. The formal law was not received as a value, for the criterion was to experience truth and not law. The Russian idea was directed not to the creation of legal forms, but the conditioning of such spiritual mentality or such spiritual character which could make do without any external legal control. 'In Russia the content was always above the form, conscience above the letter of the law, morality above force, and force above machinations' (I. Solonevich). This approach encouraged a greater confidence towards people and produced disapproval to the acts of law; hence the primacy of the inner spiritual authority over the external legal and rational authority – life in accordance with faith, and not with duty. Truth is above duty, and duty is above law.*

So far no concept of independent law has been formed in Russia, that is to say, law independent of the authority of the state, or the authority of the Orthodox Church, as well as 'class interests', or the 'interests of the nation'. Neither has a phenomenon of the citizen – the product of social revolution – appeared, the citizen who is equal in the eyes of the law without regard to race, creed, national origin, class, etc. Within the Russian framework, the collective 'We': We – Orthodoxy, We – the Russian/Soviet nation, still has the upper hand over the individual citizen. Russian nationalism, similarly to other nationalisms disregards the rights of individual citizens and continually brings into prominence the rights of the collective – nation.

AL

## Правовые системы

### *LEGAL SYSTEMS* *Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

Historians of culture and law speak of the functioning in Russia of two legal systems which are not coordinated with each other, and which are not treated equally, which is the result of a general cultural and religious dualism. Admittedly, this dualism was created as a result of a too rapid acceptance of Christianity without a longer period of adaptation owing to the lack of mediating institutions necessary for adaptation.

The already existing indigenous Russian law alongside with the Russian language found itself in a position beyond religion and culture, i. e. in a sphere of commonplaceness of being vis-a-vis Byzantine law, often referred to as Church Slavonic, or sometimes as Greek. The Russian law cannot be translated into the language of culture, or Church Slavonic, nor is Byzantine law translated into the common Russian. This is the first step towards a wholly divergent terminology, and of various interpretations, as well as various objects and ranges. In contrast to the manner Roman law was received in Europe, in Russia, the Byzantine legal tradition was not adapted to the new realities of jurisprudence. Hence the Byzantine law having been placed in the sphere of culture is not implemented, whereas the acting, indigenous law finds itself beyond the sphere of culture. Therefore the Byzantine, or rather the Byzantine – Church – Slavonic law tends to lose its practical functions (except for the very narrow domain of ‘Orthodox Church religious courts’), and fulfills religious, ideological and ceremonial functions. Moreover, the acting law was based on custom. The law was adopted through a type of apprenticeship and imitation, similarly to the way of mastering a craft, and not on the basis of academic studies.

Certain changes in this situation take place during the reign of Alexis (Alekssei Mikhailovich), from the time the *Ulozhenie* – the Law Code was passed. But even here the Byzantine tradition prevailed: by this act Alexis promotes himself to the status of the Byzantine Emperor, of the ‘impersonated law’. In spite of this, *Ulozhenie* was met with the determined protest from the Patriarch Nikon, for the true judgement belongs to God and the tsar clearly usurps here the laws of God, and what is more, allows the unforgivable blending of the sacred with the profane. The Code takes into consideration, among other things, the practical legal realities and is translated into the vernacular. Still, what is more important is that Nikon does not discuss the cohesion and precision of the Code (he does not notice its inconsistencies), being more absorbed, one might say, with the semiotic status and its linguistic form.

Although it played a definite role in the annals of Russian culture, *Ulozhenie* did not break down the past barriers: *Transferred to the sphere of culture, the new law loses its direct relation with practical jurisprudence. (. . .) That is why, some of the acts will never be utilized, and also none of the acts will ever be in*

*force* (V. Zhivov). A similar fate was met by the legislature of the 18th century when over 30,000 acts were passed. In actual fact, some of these acts were not really meant to be carried out from the very outset. They were pure ideological acts, a ritual gesture of the Sovereign. It is evident that the real administrative and judicial practice had to be formed and carried out somewhat alongside the official 'law'. The situation was all the more complicated since the previous acts had not been annulled, nor renewed, and even those adept in the way of the law were totally baffled, or interpreted the law at will. Generally, this resulted in the blurring of the idea of the law in the minds of the people – with every social group working out their own views, their own morality, and their own patterns of behaviour, to the point of open enmity towards law. *It reached the point that an act directed against a member of his own group could be considered a crime, whereas the same act performed against a member of another group had no legal basis* (V. Zhivov).

Generally speaking, however, two extreme attitudes can be delineated which predominated throughout the 19th century until today; the legislator is treated as someone creating the light of God (Dzherzhavin about Catherine II), as well as being the Antichrist. *Jesus Christ forgave sins, and the Antichrist established court of law* (Filaret). Cf: **Право; Закон**.

JF

## **Православие**

### **ORTHODOXY**

After the seat of the Roman Empire was transferred to Constantinople, known thereafter as the New Rome, the bishop of the new capital began after a very short time to use the title of the universal patriarch. The Old Rome church hierarchy would not accept this change and demanded the acknowledgement of the Old Roman patriarch's spiritual supremacy over all bishops of the Christian world. The New Rome initially accepted that and was designated as the second *cathedra* after Old Rome. Dissatisfaction increased, however, for Old Rome changed arbitrarily the evangelical and Council dogmas – *Filioque*, Holy Communion dispensed in the form of only host-bread. In 1054 the papal legate issued a bull excommunicating the patriarch in Constantinople. The patriarch, in turn, excommunicated the legate. The crusade of 1204 was the last straw. Constantinople was sacked, both the inhabitants and clergy suffered equally, a Latin bishop was placed upon the throne and the local Roman councils were declared universal, even though the East never participated in them. Subsequent dogmas were added – out of expediency – and efforts were made to subordinate other bishoprics and dioceses under the jurisdiction of Old Rome. At a later period, the West attempted in its own way to reconcile Christianity – however, always under its own leadership (the Union of Lion of 1274, that of Florence in 1439,

and of Brest in 1596). This led to new wars and conflicts which have lasted and have grown in strength until the present day.

Orthodoxy is made up of autocephalous (independent) and autonomous churches. They are not unified in terms of hierarchy. The Mother-church with its spiritual, not jurisdictional primacy has historically been the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Other ancient Patriarchates and Autocephalic churches (in order of declaration of Autocephaly) include: Alexandria in Egypt, Antioch in Syria, Jerusalem now in Israel, Moscow in Russia; the churches in Georgia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Albania, Poland, Czech, Slovakia, the USA and Canada. Other autonomous churches are found on the Holy Mount Sinai, in Finland, Japan, China, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Moreover, some self-styled churches which are not acknowledged by other Orthodox Churches are: The Patriarchate of the Ukraine (in Kiev, the USA and Canada), the Greek-Orthodox Ukrainian Church in Canada, the Russian Church Abroad, and the Macedonian Church. The Uniates – the members of the Orthodox church who in Poland in 1596 accepted the supremacy of the pope at the Union of Brest – the Greek-Catholics in the Western Ukraine and in Poland known also as the Ukraine-Byzantine Rite are also under the jurisdiction of Rome.

The Orthodox Church, the Orthodoxy, considers itself the true and right glory-fying of God. It is contemplation that constitutes the essence of Orthodoxy, the contemplation of the glory of Christ, the Cross and the sealed Tomb cracking under the power of the Resurrection. Orthodoxy is the least normative form of Christianity, the least susceptible to the expression in the form of ideas, known more for its aspect of prayer rather than its preaching. 'If you are a theologian pray genuinely, and if you truly pray, you are already a theologian' (Evagrius of Pontus). The form of contemplative spiritual practices of Orthodoxy has its sources in Palestine and the New Testament; hence the significance of Orthodox monasticism – a particular vocation of laymen such as: hermits, charismatics, *staretses* – monks of exceptional holiness and insight, hesychsts with their perpetual recitations of the Jesus Prayer amongst the holy time, space, monastery, temple, knowing the secrets of icon – the sign of the invisibly radiating presence of Christ, bringing God to mind, which stimulates the desire to imitate Him. Christ – the Godman took the form of man in Bethlehem so that man – the image of God – could become God through the Grace of his own free will. The beginning of all communion with Christ – the Son of God and God the Father is the calling upon the Holy Spirit who unites the sacramental community – Church in Christ. The Church is Christ and therefore, it is charismatic – the one, sacred, apostolic and universal; the Greeks called it *katholiki*, *katholou* meaning *in respect of whole*, Slavic Orthodoxy *soborny* and *infallible* (only the Church where there is a **full** admission of faith, where everyone is a guardian, where bishops are witnesses to God's creation). Orthodoxy is the constant sending of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles and all people. It is in it that the foundation of all

collegial power of the Council is found. With the Orthodox Christians every bishop is Saint Peter in his sacramental authority, the local symbol having the significance of the universal unity of faith; in the West only Rome is the perpetual Peter, the only representative and vicar of Christ. Orthodoxy has no interest in acknowledging any historical institution, especially since Peter, just as other apostles, was only a disciple of Jesus Christ. The Master is One and Only – the Head of the Church – the one Church – Christ. *Theognosis* means: becoming Sons of God through the optimistic deification, *pneumatization* of human existence, it is cognizance of God – the incognizable in His Being, but immanent and transcendental in the manifestations of His energy, which are common to all Three Hypostases of the Holy Trinity (monastic hesychasm on Mt. Athos), it is a joyful, devoid of fear, expectation of *Parousia* – the Second Coming of Christ.

Orthodoxy follows the word of God as presented in the Holy Scriptures, and the Sacred Traditions (the Canons of the Holy Apostles, the doctrine of the seven Ecumenical Councils and the ten Local Councils recognized by the Holy Universal Orthodox Church, canonical precepts of the Fathers of the Church accepted by the fourth, sixth and seventh Universal Councils, liturgical regulations and the rules of the monastic life; there are no varied monastic vows, all monks being *basilians*), and the resolutions of the Councils of the Local Autocephalic Churches which are obligatory only in a given Church.

Orthodoxy does not recognize: 1. the canons of *Filioque* in the Credo added by Rome in contravention to the New Testament and the Universal Council; 2. the primacy, the jurisdiction over the whole Christian Church and the infallibility of the Pope, recognizing him only as the bishop of Rome and the patriarch of the West; 3. the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of the Mother of God; 4. the doctrine of Purgatory, however fervent prayers for the dead are practised.

Orthodoxy recognizes: 1. the seven Sacraments: Baptism, Confirmation, Confession – Penance, the Eucharist, Priestly Ordination, Matrimony, Extreme Unction; 2. Communion established at the Last Supper in two species (given already to small children only by a priest and a bishop); 3. Baptism by immersion (going under water three times), sometimes by the pouring of water along with confirmation are dispensed normally by a priest; 4. the service of reading and singing (no musical instruments are accepted); 5. the sign of the cross made with three fingers (the symbol of the Holy Trinity) from the right to the left; 6. marriage of clergy of the diocese (second marriages are not permitted) and the celibacy of monks (bishops are always of the monastic estate); 7. churches are oriented, i. e. the altar is always facing the East; 8. the cult of the Mother of God and the saints; 9. the *Uspenie* – the taking of the Mother of God to Heaven after her death. In the Orthodox Church, unlike in the Roman-Catholic Church the Mother of God is not taken to Heaven in both body and soul; 10. the cult of icons (statues

and figures are not recognized); 11. votive candles and olive lamps at home and in church.

The division of Christianity and the lack of intercommunion have always been a great anguish for Orthodoxy. Orthodox Christians actively participate in all works and meetings which may bring closer the day of brotherly reconciliation under the leadership of the one, not earthly but heavenly Sovereign – Jesus Christ. Cf: **Святой; Святость; Крест; Богочеловек; Икона; Церковь; Чистота; Кротость; Молитва; Целомудрие; Сострадание; Страдание; Юродство**, and others.

SR

### **Простой народ**

#### *COMMON PEOPLE*

'Common people' or a people; it is often improperly translated as a 'common folk', since normally 'folk' connotes 'common, ordinary'. In the 19th century, lower strata of the society were thus defined. In the Soviet Union, in the society supposedly classless, there was no place for the common people, the society – the Soviet nation being a monolith. Today this concept is coming back to life in the Russian language.

AL

### **Простонародность**

#### *POPULAR CHARACTER*

Cf: **Народность; Простой народ; Народ**

### **Прошлое – Настоящее**

*PAST* **Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.** – *FUTURE* **Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.**

In the short story *The Steppe*, A. Chekhov observed: *a Russian man likes to recollect, but he does not like to live*. Apart from scholarly discourse, the past and history undergo strong mythologization and the shape of a utopian ideal state of the world. In ideological discourses the so called Holy Russia is considered to be such a utopia, cf: **Святая Русь**, in the artistic representations – depending on the artist's particular orientation – some chosen periods from the annals of Russia also take on a mythical or utopian form. In both cases the chosen 'ideals' have a bearing on the postulated projections as to the analogical utopian future. Cf: **Будущее**. The present is thus treated as a fall from the glorious past, or as a



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hidden foretaste of a great future and an expectation of a great cause, in order to awake from lethargy and show one's 'beauty and power'.

The Soviet period, with its condemnation of the old, particularly Tsarist Russia, and its treatment of every act in the present as if it were 'historical', should probably be considered as an exception, with the difference that this raising of the status by applying the term 'historical, great step forward' was, however, not so much meant to build the present as to construct the image of the future to which one is striving. This 'historicity' was to qualify a given act both in its significance as to the project design and – retrospectively – as a qualification of this act by future generations.

At present, however, the myth of the bygone days – the Tsarist period, especially the time dealing with the 19th century, is being revived again as an 'ideal' period. Despite the recent Soviet propaganda, but not without some foundation, the fact of the poverty of millions, of the endemic waves of famine which have plagued Russia, persecutions, censorship, etc. are conveniently forgotten. It is claimed that during the time of the tsar it was actually Russia (be it with the Ukrainian bread) fed and clad all of Western Europe, or that the Tsarist penal servitude was not all that severe and cruel. A similar nostalgic and mythological attitude is now being portrayed also with regards to the Soviet period. Admittedly in the actions and discourse of former communists, still this tendency towards mythologizing may gain them a greater multitude of supporters than anyone could have been able to predict.

*JF*

## Р

### **Рабочий класс**

*WORKING CLASS*

Cf: **Классовость**

### **Разум и рассудок**

*REASON AND EMPIRICAL SENSE*

The old philosophical differentiation of two cognitive faculties according to which empirical sense perceives that which is relative, worldly, finite, and reason perceives that which is absolute, divine, infinite – takes on in Russia a particular cultural meaning, serving to positively contrast Russia as well as Orthodoxy with the West and Western Christianity. Empirical sense which is evaluated as being ‘dry’, abstract, superficial ‘analytical’, and which supposedly predominates in Europe is opposed to the specific for Russia, integral ‘reason’ which is approved of as communal, ‘deep’, intuitive, achieving a synthesis, and reconcilable with religious faith (I. Kireevsky). From the very outset, the gnosological opposition of empirical sense to reason takes on for Russians ethical, spiritual, social, religious and a historical – philosophical character; for it is to the ‘empirical sense’ attitude understood as the cause of the Fall, that the betrayal of moral principles is imputed; as a result of this empirical sense attitude, people are alienated from the church community, and this has a disintegrating and impious influence upon individual and social lives. A particular mission is assigned to Russia in the postulated reconstruction of the integrality of reason and spiritual and social life.

In contrast to the West which strongly emphasizes individuality, self-reliance and non-relevance of different types of knowledge, including the knowledge based on empirical sense and reason, the idea of the synthesis of philosophy and science with theology in the sense of Kant’s critique of pure reason, in other words, ‘integral knowledge’ is closer to Russia; thus being conditioned by this integral knowledge, the idea of ‘integral society’ and ‘integral life’ has the significance of the ‘living and genuine communing with the Absolute’ (V. Zenkovsky). The tendency towards ‘mystical realism’ where the empirical reality is merely a means by which another, higher dimension of reality is expressed, encourages the conviction that the notional – logical analyses characteristic of empirical sense which are able to capture only the ‘external’ dimension of reality through their exclusive concentration on it, become the instrument of mystification: giving the external dimension of reality the semblance of independence,

covering and disavowing the absolute reality. On the other hand, reason which overcomes the one-sided 'common sense attitude', and which is able to reach a trans-empirical, higher reality, loses somehow its pure human character – it recognizes and expresses divinity, transcends beyond dilemmas and alienation, takes on an eschatological sense.

*MB*

### **Рационализм**

#### *RATIONALISM*

Russians have a tendency to apply to the term 'rationalism' which has many meanings, a particular cultural sense; as a concept which is to express the essence of the West, i. e. Western civilization, religion and philosophy, in contrast to Russia. It becomes an instrument of the critique of the West. Conducive to that is the clear tendency on the part of the Russians to identify the complex phenomenon of rationalism with all its various aspects, with cognition by means of empirical sense which is in contrast to 'integral reason' and also to the Faith. Cf: **Разум и рассудок**. Rationalism conceived as hypertrophy of empirical sense appears then to be the basis just as much of a specific feature, as the 'malaise' of the West, of formalism, fragmentation, superficiality, lack of roots, the loss of the real and genuine contact with the Absolute. The rationalism of the West based on empirical sense – the cause of the Fall – becomes a challenge for Russians who see in the overcoming of it as well as in the postulated reconstruction of the full spiritual integrality, a historical mission of Russia.

*MB*

### **Рим**

#### *ROME*

The First Rome. Cf: **Царьград; Москва – Третий Рим**.

The symbol of the roots of Western culture, rationalism, Catholicism – dissent from the 'true' faith, the symbol of the 'external' law, of the 'external' truth and 'external' beauty, all of which are foreign to the Russian culture.

*AL*

### **Россия**

#### *RUSSIA*

The basic tenants of the Russian ideogram of Russia seem to have been grasped most adeptly by F. Tyutchev in the lines, *Russia is not to be grasped with reason* (. . .) *In Russia one can only believe* (1866), as well as in *The Rus-*

*sian Geography* (1848/49), in which the Russian Imperium has three capitals (*Moscow, Peter's grad, and Constantine's grad*); it knows no boundaries nor limits (*Where ever are its limits, and where its boundaries – to the north, to the east, to the south, and to the west?*), it has seven great rivers and seven internal seas, and it stretches *from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube . . . Such is the Russian Imperium. . . and it will never pass away, As Daniel prophesied and as the Spirit foretold.*

Faith and not reason, attitude and not importance. At the same time Russia has the status of the object of faith. And as the object of faith it reveals itself only to the faithful. Otherwise it is unknowable. Russians often repeat this verse and with it interpret the incomprehensible, even for themselves, character of Russia. Even more, they put forward this incomprehensiveness as an advantage, as a claim to glory.

*Geography*, in turn, shocking for Europeans since it was written in the period of the Spring of the Nations, along with the approach of Russia from the perspective of Orthodoxy – Russians either do not want to, or really are not able to see in the verse other aspects – other than the blurring of the borders of Russia; Russia is everywhere, it is spread out across the whole world. This does not seem, however, to be only a conventional, poetic, confessional, or even an 'imperial' blurring of boundaries. It articulates rather an actual state of affairs, a geographical and political state of affairs of Russia, so to speak. Russia really does not know and does not have its borders. 'Russia' means the Ukraine, and Russia' for example, is Tatarstan. By changing its borders and centres of culture and statehood, Russia never separated itself out from among the surrounding peoples and their political and state organizations, and by incorporating them into its mass, it still retained itself as Russia, including all of them, assuming various official terminology.

Customarily multi-national and multi-state organisms attempt to assume a general, primary name; even the present so called III Yugoslavia which includes Serbia and Montenegro did not, for instance, assume the name of Serbia, that is, the name of a part of the federation. This did not happen in Russia, and does not seem to have been a problem of the Russian consciousness. A similar situation exists today. Established on 7th November 1917 the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had within its makeup a series of autonomous republics and national *okrugs* – districts, but the Russian Federated Republic did not belong to any of them; according to the Constitution the Russian nation, constituting the majority in the Soviet Union did not have its own state organ and was represented by the RSFSR in its entirety. The same legal state was retained even after the fall of the USSR. The former RSFSR was reconstituted as the Russian Federation with the also official name of Russia. As it is generally known, some of the republics of the Russian Federation would like to resign, and

theoretically they could; but not Russia, since there is no such republic within the body of the Russian Federation, and it does not appear as if the Russians would care to have such a republic. It is possible that on this level a mechanism operates which is at the basis of the concept of the Russian WE. With all certainty one can state that it is, on the one hand, an expression of a deeply engrained makeup of Russian culture (mentality), on the other hand, that it is a culture-creating factor, and primarily a myth generator.

*JF*

According to the definition of I. Il'in, one of the currently most popular migr Russian philosophers *Russia is a uniform, live organism in respect to its geography, strategy, religion, language, culture, law and statehood, economics and anthropology. The organism is faced with the task of working out a new state organization. Its division will lead to a long-term chaos, to universal bankruptcy, and subsequently to a new integration of territories and Russian nations in one, new entity. It will then be for history to decide which of the small nations will save their existence in the new integrated union* (1948).

*AL*

## **Русофобия**

### ***RUSSOPHOBIA***

Every powerful nation induces various reactions abroad, from fascination to fear. Russia is no exception and its reception among foreigners, its own subjects included, vacillated between Russophilism and Russophobia. After the partitions of Poland, Polonophil sentiments predominated in the countries of Europe, which resulted in animosity towards Russia. Often in the 19th century, Russia was perceived as 'barbarian Moscow', a 'universal dictatorial monarchy'. In the accounts of foreigners, such as Marquise de Custine, the country had become a symbol of despotism, contempt for the individual, universal servitude, hypocrisy and xenophobia. Certain Russian thinkers also did not spare their severe criticism for their own homeland, reproaching it for its sterility of spiritual vegetation and the lack of its own culture.

This could hardly be regarded as Russophobia or unreasonable fear and dislike of Russia, a hatred towards Russia taking on a form of an ideological programme of its total destruction. The notion of Russophobia was introduced to the language of journalism by Igor Shafarevich in 1989. Basically, it means the conviction of the inferiority of Russia, of Russia being the incarnation of moral degradation, the lack of dignity, the glorification of the knout and power, obsessive hatred of foreigners. This Russia is believed to be a deadly threat to the world. Totalitarian communism in this respect is a consequence of the Russian past. According to Shafarevich, Russophobia is a world view of a 'small nation' of iso-

lated groups of intellectuals who remain under the influence of some powerful force' and who have set for themselves the aim of subjugating the 'Great Nation' of Russia, and Russia's 'spiritual occupation'. The 'small nation', i. e. the 'anti-nation' represents the interests of Jewish nationalism which is interested in the annihilation of Russia. The 'Great Nation' lives through its tradition, its religious faith, its organic union with nature; the 'small nation' lives by doctrinary speculation, destabilization, destruction and demoralization.

In the ideology of parties and nationalistic and neo-communist trends, Russophobia means an anti-Russian, international conspiracy of Jewish-Masonry, a lobby of international capital, special secret services, all aiming to deprive Russia of its role as a world power, reducing it merely to be a supply of raw materials without any political, economical and military independence. The adherents of the theory of Russophobia assume a different historical path for Russia, its independence from the ideals of Western democracy, market economy and hedonistic consumptionism.

*JS*

### **Русская душа**

#### *THE RUSSIAN SOUL*

The Russian soul constitutes the source concept of Russian mentality serving to emphasize the particular spiritual identity of Russians and Russia (in the latter case one speaks also of the 'spirit of Russia'). In the conviction of Russians the phenomenon of the Russian soul contains in it a mystical element. Basically, it transcends all empirically observable characteristics and it is impossible to be unambiguously defined in categories of 'rationality'. Russians strongly accentuate their mysteriousness, their exceptionality and paradoxicality, the qualities which are incomprehensible to the outside world. They perceive the antinomy of the 'Russian soul' as expressed in the coexistence of contradictions such as the love of limitless freedom as well as the equally limitless servitude, passing in a 'closed circle' one into the other, e. g. anarchy – despotism – anarchy, etc. They believe that the bringing of contradictions to the extreme will create a chance for their radical, total and even final solution, which requires from Russia and Russians the discovery of themselves, recognizing themselves in the mystical truth of the immaculate, in its purity, Russian Orthodoxy. The Russian nation will then tell the world 'their word' and indicate to the world the right way.

The assumption of antinomy of the 'Russian soul' goes with the Russian tendency towards a dichotomy of thinking: either all good, or no good at all; the quest for absolute values, the good without any taint of evil, and also insensitivity to relative values and compromising solutions. Russia seen from such a perspective of being submerged in contradictions and evil, taken to the extreme, leading to the temptation of searching for a total, final solution, seems to gener-

ate without end. This is an opinion that Russians themselves would certainly deny.

MB

### **Русская идеология**

#### *RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY*

Russian ideology is the conception defining the total form of life of the individual and that of society which corresponds to the Russian religious and moral ideal. In accordance with this ideology the autocratic authority of the tsar comes from God, and the mutual relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church could metaphorically be described as a 'symphony'; the authority of the tsar guided by divine precepts has the Orthodox Church under its protection and supports it in its struggle with heretics; the subjects of the tsar have the obligation to honour and cherish the authority of the tsar and be obedient to him; the Orthodox Church acts for the good of the 'symphony' by providing an appropriate upbringing, education, instilling a sense of patriotism and a feeling of devotion to the person of the tsar.

The fidelity towards Russian ideology was supposed to assure the divine protection of Russia, making it one of the most powerful of nations; the deviation from this idea – the sin of rebellion, the killing of the tsar – would bring about the fall of Russia as a consequence. The Russian nation should accept the justness of divine retribution, understand its redemptive sense, and through submissiveness and repentance return to Orthodoxy and the principles of the Russian ideology, trusting that God will help restore the power and greatness of Russia, and through its example will show the world the whole strength of the one and only redemptive faith of Orthodoxy.

MB

### **Русская идея**

#### *THE RUSSIAN IDEA*

The Russian idea is a category of Russian missionism. The idea appeared in the period of Romanticism and was, and still is susceptible to various interpretations (Cf: works under the title *The Russian Idea* by V. Solov'ev and N. Berdyaev). Roughly, according to it every nation is the exponent of some 'idea' in history and the Russians being a great nation express a particular idea. Today, V. Aksyuchits states: *The core of the Russian idea focusing all its meaning in one unique sense is the conception of **Holy Russia, Moscow as the Thirth Rome.** In the Russian idea, **Holy Russia** is a spiritual ideal of the kingdom of truth and justice, love and goodness according to which historical Rus should be built. The*

*mission of Moscow as the Third Rome constitutes the defence and preservation of the purity of Divine Truth, and spreading it among all nations. . . Cf: Москва – Третий Рим.*

*AL*



## C

### **Самодержавие**

*AUTOCRACY* *Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

Autocracy constitutes one of the elementary principles of the Russian ideology, the second base of the triad: *Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality*, formulated by S. Uvarov in 1833, perceived as a creative principle of the past, present and future of Russia. Autocracy is not identical with self-sustained power and absolutism where the power is an end in itself; it is to signify the established order of society in which the tsar and the nation constitute an organic bond. Privileges of the authority do not exclude its dependency on the common principles of the whole state organism – it does not lead to licence, and the dependency of the nation does not devolve into slavery. It was believed that only autocracy so conceived would fully meet the requirements of the spirit of the Russian nation; it protects the nation from the curses which are unavoidable in Western political systems; it excludes politicizing and political expediency. The Russian nation standing on the foundation of autocracy, fully trusts the authority which it regards as an organic part of itself. At the same time the authority completely trusts the nation since it is bound with it not by external but internal ties.

The meaning of autocracy goes beyond the political dimension and assumes a religious and moral character; it undergoes sanctification. Devotion to autocracy in a certain sense assures Russians of historical welfare and the deviation from this devotion brings calamities upon Russia. Cf: **Державность; Народность.**

*MB*

### **Самозванец**

*THE PRETENDER*

It is the term used in official philosophy of history and a scholarly discourse to designate pretenders who make claims which are doubtful or not proved, to titles and functions of historical personages. This phenomenon is known in various cultures and different variants, both secular (pretensions to being the 'rightful' ruler) and religious (posing as a particular saint). In Russia, however, this phenomenon gained a particular notoriety and has been characterized by an exceptional persistency: from the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) to the end of the 19th century; it even occurs in the 20th century, however, marked not so much by real actions of discontented groups but rather by rumours and grumbling. In some periods such as in the 18th and the 19th centuries a series of pretenders appeared

in Russia. In this respect, this phenomenon is typical for the Russian culture and Russian mentality.

In the mentality that creates pretenders, they are not really considered as pretenders, on the contrary, it is a term applied to the actually 'unjustly' ruling tsar who is often considered as the Antichrist.

Among all the pretenders, the False Dimitri I is most often referred to by ideological discourse. His emergence with Polish backing constitutes good material for inciting anti-Western and anti-Catholic attitudes. At the same time, these discourses omit another side of the phenomenon in which the False Dimitri is seen as the 'Tsar-liberator' who gained the support of vast masses of people, and that the idea of the emergence of pretenders did not come to Russia from the West.

At the basis of the Russian acceptance of pretenders, both the act and the social movement, there lies a deeply rooted notion of the Russian people about the 'just Tsar' and the expectation of the coming of a 'Tsar-liberator'. At the basis of this utopian psychology, B. Uspensky perceives elements of religious thinking and is inclined to treat this religious aspect of the emergence of pretenders in Russia as a purely Russian cultural phenomenon.

*JF*

## **Свобода**

### ***FREEDOM* *!qd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.***

The Rusophil tradition categorizes the idea of freedom into 'external' and 'internal', similarly to the divisions of truth and law, etc. 'External' freedom lies in the domain of the Western world – this is licence of individuals who impose restraints upon one another (K. Aksakov), this is 'freedom from' external duress, control and authority. Therefore in the West formal law is a necessity (V. Ak-syuchits). *True freedom is only found where the Spirit of God resides (. . .)* *Freedom is only the freedom of the spirit* (A. Aksakov). Raskol'nikov, the hero of *Crime and Punishment* by F. Dostoevsky, loses his freedom at the moment he manifests his lawlessness when he commits a crime; he regains his freedom during his penal servitude along with regaining his faith, despite his external enslavement.

*A Russian by his very nature is a free man. His freedom is manifested in the organic naturalness and simplicity, in this improvisatorial lightness and straightforwardness, which distinguish Eastern Slavs from Western nations in general, and even from some Slavic peoples of the West. This internal freedom expresses itself in everything: in the slow fluency and melodiousness of the Russian speech, in the Russian way of movement and gesticulation, in the Russian attire and dance, in the Russian cuisine and in the Russian customs.*

*Russians have lived and grown up on the vast, boundless spaces and have striven for unrestrictiveness. . . (I. Il'in, 1948).*

AL

### **Свой – Чужой**

#### *OURS – FOREIGN*

'Our world' based on the concept of 'I – We – here – now' appears as a known, with an established structure, within defined norms, and therefore unquestionable. 'Foreign world' means the unknown, unstable, without norms, and that is why it is generally questionable as a 'world', rather qualifying as a 'non-world'. Semantic research into the category of 'foreignness' in the Russian language indicates that a foreign world in contrast to 'ours' is thought of as homogenous, monolithic, non-discrete, and therefore 'amorphic' (separate countries are not differentiated, all of them are the same, there are no distinctions among people or objects – everything is similar, 'one size fits all') and 'constitutes a danger'.

'Our world', on the other hand is a discrete world, distinguishable, individualized, familiar. In the semiotic sense this is the world of 'proper names', the world of 'singular forms meaning oneness, singularity' while the 'foreign world' is a world of an abstract plural form and common names. Even though the internal diversity of a 'foreign world' is noticeable, the diversity itself is qualified in negative terms, it takes on the features of chaos, of dangerous overexcess, of madness, etc.; it only requires to track the metaphors of warnings or defence against the 'invasion, deluge and aggression' of culture and initiative of the Western world. Very often a foreign world is such that it is not worth knowing, for various reasons, the most important being the fear of disturbing, warping and the ruining of 'our world' along with its 'principles/integrity'.

Someone who has gone away, emigrated, settled down in another world is treated as if he were 'dead' – he is spoken of as 'having been', or as 'non-existent'; political qualifications are based only on this. Similarly, a foreigner is a cause for distrust, and he is treated not as an individual but impersonally, and is categorized in terms of stereotypes of the sort as 'German', 'Pole', 'spy', etc. , 'in one word – a foreigner' as in Bulgakov. He who 'talks like us' is doubly suspect – he speaks correctly, but he thinks corruptly and 'with an accent'. With a Dutchman one can speak the Tartar language, what is the difference, both Dutch and Tartar are foreign languages, they are not 'ours' therefore, they are 'not languages at all'.

This still active, for it is fixed in linguistic structures, concept of the 'foreign world/man' does not remain neutral; in the general concept of the Western cultural world, even among the so called Westerners or dissidents. Besides, a very

important role is played by another concept of Russian culture – the lack of distinction between ‘YOU’ and ‘WE’, and therefore the impossibility of creating a concept ‘partner = on the par with the other world/system’, which can be indicated, among other things, by the commonly heard amazement that ‘u nikh ne kak u nas’ – it is different in their country than it is in ours’. This is in contrast to the curiosity of the ‘otherness’ as expressed by other inhabitants of Europe. Here the ‘sameness’ and ‘similarity is rather disappointing, while in the case of the reactions of Russians disappointment and anxiety are caused by something that is ‘different’, ‘not like that in our country’. It is here that we should also look for the mental causes of why Russians in the diaspora of republics of the former USSR fail to assimilate the language and culture of the natives, and the Russians’ requirement of the natives to adopt the Russian language and culture.

*JF*

### **Святая Русь**

#### *HOLY RUSSIA*

Having a character of an almost folk formula, the name Holy Russia stimulates various connotations in different ideological, political and even religious discourses.

At present, it is supposed to evoke a vision of Russia as ‘truly Russian’: putting into practice the highest spiritual values; Holy Russia which fulfills its historical mission, the guardian of the true faith, of the chosen nation, etc, etc.

This is a two-way vision. It indicates a certain ideal state, appropriate to Russia in its past, warped with time, mainly due to Western influences, as well as a desired state – that the lost ideal state should be restored and constitute an example and a goal for all the endeavours of contemporary Russia.

The vitality, and at the same time its effectiveness for the propaganda purposes, of the formula lies certainly in the annals of the Russian concept of ‘holiness’, in the non-discrimination of the concepts of ‘sacer’ and ‘sanctus’, cf: **СВЯТОСТЬ**, but mainly in the viability of the original pagan element which treats land and ‘people’ as ‘holy’. Without this viability, the perseverance of the idea of the ‘return to the soil’ would be rather unclear, cf: **Возвращение к почве**. The same can be said of the fascination with Schelling and the ‘organicism’ regarded as a factor facilitating the articulation of Russian nationalism in the 19th century.

*JF*

*At the beginning of this century an idea escaped the consciousness of the Russian people that our Homeland is not the Great Russia, it is Holy Rus which is clad in the national-state power to which Divine Providence endowed the extraordinarily important duty to be the last mainstay of universal Orthodoxy, to*

*be the Tamer of the world's evil. Hence the title the Third Rome was bestowed upon Moscow. . . (the Archimandrite Constantine, 1992).*

### **Святой**

#### *A SAINT/A HOLY PERSON*

In a biblical sense, one of God's chosen people who has rejected sin and pagan customs. In the *New Testament*, a person who is called upon by Christ, an adopted child of God; a joyful, cheerful one ('a sad saint is no saint at all'); the one who has the grace of God and is charismatic with a gift of performing miracles, a monk, an ascetic; a 'newly born' (in taking upon oneself the Orthodox Church vows of monks, one is given a new name which symbolizes the break with the past); a canonized person, a martyr, a crucified one; the one who is continually offering up the Jesus Prayer, the one who sings alleluia and the *Doxology* of the Most Holy Trinity (Holy Lord, God of Power and Might, the Holy Immortal have mercy on us); in the West the *Doxology* is sung in the liturgy only on Good Friday, whereas among the Orthodox, it is sung always).

Saints are the Angels, the Prophets, the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church, the martyrs of all times, the monks. Holy are places, rites, foods, time, the Law, and various objects. All people are called to holiness, perfection, and the adoration of God and to glorify Him. Cf: **Святость; Кротость; Афон; Чистота; Страдание; Сострадание**, and others.

SR

### **Святой - Святость**

#### *SAINT/HOLY; HOLINESS*

The Russian language as well as Polish does not differentiate the concepts of *ieros* and *agios*, or that of *sacer* and *sanctus*; these concepts have always been rendered by the Slavic *svêt- saint*. The choice of the vernacular *svêt-* with its archaic, pre-Christian connotations is the evidence of both the basic attachment to the already existing concept of 'holiness', and, at least in part, of inscribing it to the new - Christian concept of 'holiness'. One cannot exclude the possibility that the new Christian concept of 'holiness' was influential in the reconceptualization of the phenomena defined previously by the pre-Christian concept of 'holiness'. It is here that many features of Russian culture and mentality can be found to have their basis.

As it has been pointed out by V. Toporov on the basis of a large Indo-European and Iranian linguistic corpus, the basis of the concept of *svêt-* is created by a set of meanings connected with a life-giving force, growth, swelling, fertility, blossoming, dissemination, abundance, bearing fruit. This provides, among other things, the basis for naming the earth and the world in general as 'holy/sacred'.

On the ideological plane this explains why the term ‘Holy Rus’ – *Svyataya Rus*’ is so vital in various Russian discourses.

The connection of ‘wisdom’ with the powers of procreation, or in other words, the unity of the intellectual and sexual elements, leads to calling the earth ‘wise’, as well as leads to the concept of ‘Holy Wisdom’ which later took on the form of Sophia as the Divine Wisdom; however, in Russian sophiology the concept has been, in a sense, isolated and associated with a particular state of the material, created world.

Toporov also suggests that ‘holiness’ as an ‘image of maximal abundance’ could serve as the basis for the formation of the later ‘spiritual holiness’, a sort of superhuman state of bliss, when the creation ‘in the spirit’ is achieved. This is a significant step in the direction of working out a concept of the ‘other holy world/kingdom’ as well as the indifference – very often the conscious neglect and rejection of ‘this, temporal world’ – the attitude of passive expectation of the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth, the attitude which is regarded as typical for the Russian culture. Admittedly, this archaic attitude was also contained in the Soviet concept of the ‘bright future’ attributable to the notions of ‘common welfare’ and ‘inexhaustible abundance’ which was to happen supposedly ‘spontaneously’ rather than as an effect of the actual achievement of the society. For this reason, the so called ‘Days of Abundance’ were held every so often in the Soviet Union.

In the light of this archaic ‘holiness’ one would expect that also the Orthodox Christian religious ‘holiness’ was to be conceptualized somewhat differently than in the Western world, especially in the realm of Roman-Catholicism.

This treatment of the ‘world/earth’ as ‘holy/sacred’ must have been conducive to the sanctifying of the inhabitants of such a world. It was no accident that since the 14th century a peasant was called *krestyanin* in the Russian language, which originally meant a ‘Christian person’. And it is also no accident that the Orthodox discourse prefers Saint Paul the Apostle and quotes his sayings to all the faithful, referring to them as ‘saints’: *to all (. . .) called to be saints* (Romans, 1:7), or, *What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body. . .* (I Corinthians, 6:19-20).

JF

## СВЯТОСТЬ

### HOLINESS

Holiness can be a state of being, a holy place, a person or an object. It is a complex reality which borders on the Mystery of God, with devotion and morality. Holiness is a holy and pure life of a person, but it is also revelation of God Himself Who is holy in a mysterious way that is impossible to describe. This is the way to the source – to the Creator, through deification – Divine energies – the

light of Mount Tabor – love and forgiveness, perfection in the Person of God-man. Holiness is a temple, a Christian, a saint, an ascetic, a *starets* – an elder. Since the time of the Coming of the Holy Ghost there has been no division into sacrum and profanum – the Holy Ghost sanctifies the whole universe, no division is made between Jews and Greeks – all belong to Christ.

Rus which was called Byzantium after the fall of Byzantium possessed three forms of human holiness :

1. *strastoterpsy*; cf: **Страстотерпство**,
2. *Jurodivye*, cf: **Юродство**,
3. *starsy*; cf: **Старчество**.

SR

### **Святцы**

#### *A RECORD OF MARTYRS*

A record of martyrs and other saints according to the date of their deaths. The Orthodox liturgy of the Saints is celebrated on the ‘antemension’ – a canvas with relics of the martyrs – for martyrdom is a blessing. The time of peace favours Satan who robs the Church of Its martyrs (Origen). Cf: **Сострадание; Страдание; Святой**.

SR

### **Север**

#### *FAR NORTH*

Native Russian folk mythology connects the Far North with the North Star and the constellation of the Great Bear as the axis of the world. Other mythologies well known to Russians, place their ‘heaven’ or ‘isles of happiness’ in the Far North. Even the Greek Apollo took refuge from the scorching heat of Delphi, somewhere in the north.

The climatic theories of the mentality of various peoples singled out the Far North as more ethical, honest and straightforward. A genius from the Far North managed to reach incomparably greater heights than his counterpart from the South (F. Bacon, D. Hume, Montesquieu); it is worth noting how fast a myth was created of M. Lomonosov as the genius from Archangel in the Far North.

In an objective geographic description Russia placed itself actually in the Far North, both in relation to the ancient world and to modern Europe. Hence not without some pride, the term the ‘North’ was taken as a synonym of ‘Russia’ in the language of literature, journalism and political rhetoric, however, in contrast to the South meaning ‘Europe’.

From the times of Peter I the stereotype 'Russia – the Far North' entered into the Russian culture for good. This stereotype was eagerly used not only to contrast Russia with Europe which was metaphorically called the 'South', but also to show Russia as a more authentic version of Europe, Russia which like Europe inherited the Greco-Roman classical character; with just such an intention V. Zhukovsky was called the 'Orpheus of the North', and Petersburg the 'Northern Palmyra', etc.

As a term of a geographical and cultural zone within the Russian Imperium proper, the Far North could be taken as a synonym of Great Russia, contrasted with Little Russia – the Ukraine; cf: the names of two of the Decembrist organizations: the Northern Society and the Southern Society, or more often, of Petersburg as 'New Russia' in contrast to 'Old Russia' synonymous with Moscow, as was exemplified in N. Nekrasov's poem *Druzheskaya perepiska Moskvy s Peterburgom*.

Supposedly, on the basis of the climatic theories of mentality of the Age of Enlightenment, as well as preferences of realism, there appear reinterpretations of the severe and austere environment of Russia – the Far North, perceiving it as an aspect of the divine, of Godly humility and of the Passion of Christ. Similarly to the concept of 'Godbearing nation', a term 'Godbearing nature' is formed.

Due to the repressive policies of the tsarist and Soviet regimes, the Russia's own North has taken on a mythological character of an enclave of the most ancient of the Old Russian traditions preserved to this day by the peasantry, monasteries and religious sects.

*JF/SM*

## **Симфония**

*SYMPHONY*

**Cf: Русская идеология**

## **Скандославия – Скандовизантия**

*SKANDOSLAVIA – SKANDOBYZANTIUM*

The concepts introduced by D. Likhachev in whose opinion, in the development of the Russian culture the geographical juxtaposition of Russia between north and south had a decidedly greater significance than the east-west axis. Cf: **Евразия**. According to Likhachev, it was the Byzantine culture that gave Russia its Christian character, whereas Scandinavia gave Russia its military and systemic foundations. The influence of the Asiatic culture was minimal. For Likhachev, the European culture is a culture of the entire mankind, while the Rus-



sian culture becomes a universal culture only in as much as it belongs to the European culture.

AL

### **Скрытый; Неприметный – Проницательный**

#### *UNREVEALED – INCONSPICUOUS – PERSPICACIOUS*

The concept has much in common with the opposites Internal/External, but it encompasses a slightly different area, that of aesthetics and ethics, and concerns one's outlook on life. It deals with the unmitigated 'essentiality' and, at the same time, 'perspicacity' – *pronitsatel'nost'*.

Perspicacity is a gift, either intuitive or divine, of recognizing 'good and evil', the 'essential and the superficial', the 'truth or imitation', and in a most general sense, this gift of being guided not by the senses and a sensual image but by a 'pure heart'. The qualifications based on the senses of the type of 'beautiful – ugly' in this system are deemed to be deceptive. The system itself, on the other hand, must have been formed in cultural conditions in which the content level and the level of expression were differentiated, and in which the expression plane in relation to the represented content were perceived as non-obligatory, or having a conventional character – in other words, in the conditions of the detachment of the sign from the point of reference, and the realization of the autonomy of the systems of signs.

'Unrevealed', 'inconspicuous' by provoking with its expression plane, its 'disqualification' (qualifying itself as something 'non-essential') puts 'perspicacity', a 'pure heart' and 'true faith' to the test, or the fidelity of the perceiver to the criteria of essentiality. This is what happens in folk tales, in the apocryphal legends of the saints, in moral and religious parables, but also in ideological precepts, where such perspicacity is attributed to the common folk, common people (those taking things at their face value), the working class, etc., to the nationalistic concepts of the Russian nation. At the same time, it is not unimportant that even insignificant figures are endowed with this perspicacity, especially in a clash with an unaccepted reality or culture: with the educated strata of the society, with foreigners, and in general, with the Western World. It is not an accident that the theme of Leskov's short story *Lefty* has become popularized so easily, and every once in a while it is called back to life.

The attachment to 'inconspicuousness', and the preference of it, or even the requiring of it from the faithful in religious discourse in Christianity is rather common, and in this respect the Russian culture does not differ much from any other cultures; the differences result from a non-religious relation to 'inconspicuousness'. The distinctiveness of the Russian 'cult' of inconspicuousness was well

grasped by I. Solov'ev by using the example of a 'Russian beauty' – *krasavitsa* and a 'Russian swashbuckler' – a *bogatyr*'. Both the 'beauty' in the *krasavitsa* and the 'strength' in the *bogatyr*' are long kept in a 'latent', unrevealed state, the former is brought to life in all its loveliness only for the 'beloved one', the latter 'will sleep away thirty years' on the oven, only to awaken to fight the decisive duel with a foe. The manifestation of these virtues of beauty and strength on a daily basis *would mean diminishing, wasting and dissipating of this miraculous gift*. Such a way of thinking is *characteristic for a nation which expects something more momentous from the ordinary, beauty from the inconspicuous, strength from the weak*.

For the Western culture which is rooted in the traditions of ancient Greece and Rome such a concept of 'latency' is alien. Here activity is based not on awakening or revealing, i. e. coming into being, but on experiencing of existence, on overcoming difficulties through beauty or strength. On the other hand, the basic 'Russian plot', so to speak, depends on the 'overcoming of one's own state of prolonged sleep – death', and the content of this 'plot' is not 'life in itself, but the liberation from the sleep, from death, a form of resurrection'.

Such an approach, one might judge, explains the 'impetuousness' typical of the Russian character, the transition from inertia to the dynamic, from gentleness to cruelty, from submission to rebellion, from calmness to hysteria, from bashfulness to an unabashed licence, etc.

If that which is 'unrevealed, latent, and inconspicuous' is to constitute the 'essence' than the effect of sudden effort should be recognized as the 'essence as already revealed (although in its 'pure' form, or in other words, devoid of the 'expression plane'). And it is this lack of the 'expression plane' for the 'essence' being revealed, which causes that it assumes an extreme form, totally unregulated, in other words, 'amorphic' and at the time of the 'sudden effort' disappearing: it does not enter into the culture in any long-lasting forms.

JF

## Славянофилы

### SLAVOPHILES

In our time the terms 'Slavophiles' and 'pochvenniks' are used in reference to the Russian nationalistic thinkers, among others, the so called 'Village' writers, for whom the greatest ideological authorities, of which they openly admit in their journalistic works, are nineteenth-century Slavophiles, such as K. Aksakov, A. Khomyakov, I. Kireevsky, and others, as well as such 'pochvenniks' as F. Dostoevsky, M. Strakhov, A. Grigor'ev, and the Pan-Slavists (M. Danilevsky). Modern 'Slavophiles' are generally solely Russophiles.

AL

## Смирение

### *HUMILITY/SUBMISSIVENESS*

Humility is recognized by Russians as one of the basic features of their mentality. Cf: **Кротость; Терпение**, and others, alongside the diametrically opposed concept of rebellion. The phrase *smirenje pache gordosti* meaning 'humility above pride' which functions in the Russian language, refers to the Orthodox ideal according to which humility is an expression of the grace of God. Sergius of Radonezh, c. 1314, and Seraphim of Sarov, b. 1759, both personified the boundless humility and meekness of heart. Humility was supposed to be the basis of Russian messianism.

Humility is believed to be one of the means of doing battle with evil powers – the Antichrist and violence. At the basis of the concept of *starchestvo* – the elders, cf: **Старчество**, is the eradication of self-will and subordinating oneself to the will of the *starets*. Humility is connected with the ideal of the saints, of the impoverished and poorly clad; special emphasis is placed upon living a properly communal life, as in the example of L. Tolstoy.

Slavophiles appealed to humility in the face of the Russian law preserved by the common folk; Dostoevsky appealed to the intelligentsia: *Humble yourself ye proud man!*

AZ

## Смута

### *THE TIME OF TROUBLES*

The Russian term meaning a period of anarchy between 1598-1613, marked by economic crisis, violent changes of regimes, peasant revolts and rebellions. Russian writers, historians and philosophers, for various reasons, have continually harkened back to the events of this period. The Time of Troubles has served as an object of study of the cruel mechanisms of the struggle for power, much attention being devoted to the psychological analyses of the individuals enmeshed in the events; among others in *Boris Godunov* by A. Pushkin, *Tsar Boris* by A. Tolstoy. The period has been treated also as an important stage in the creation of the Russian national consciousness; hence the creation of myths of historical personages embodying patriotism of the whole populace of the former Muscovy Tsarite – Dmitri Susanin, Kuzma Minin, Prince Dmitri Pozharsky. At the same time the most important event of the Time of Troubles, which was the Polish incursion, was more than once presented as a manifestation of the anti-Russian expansionism, typical of the 'Latin' and 'Roman – Catholic' Europe.

In times of crisis of Russian statehood, i. e. October Revolution of 1917, the post-Gorbachev's times, the events of the Time of Troubles are willingly perceived as a historical analogy which helps to understand the contemporary situa-

tion; cf: the perception of revolution in B. Pil'nyak, or M. Voloshin. Sometimes there appears to be a conviction, even though not explicitly expressed, that the Time of Troubles, or in other words, an all-encompassing crisis of statehood is a cyclical phenomenon, repeating itself in the annals of Russia.

SM

### **Собор**

*COUNCIL, ASSEMBLY, ORTHODOX CHURCH COUNCIL, ZEMSKII SOBOR*

A traditional, historical type of Russian 'parlamentarism'. However, *Sobor is neither a congress, nor an assembly at which the 'chosen of the nation' filled with awareness of their own importance make successive historical decisions'. Sobor is above all a religious, symbolic and spiritual act restoring unity of the authority and Orthodoxy, the unity which was lost during the Time of Troubles, conciliating them with each other and with God, and affirming the return of God's Law as the autocratic basis of Russian statehood* [Metropolitan of St Petersburg Ioann, 1993]. Cf: **Державность; Соборность; Смута; Единомыслие.**

AL

### **Соборность**

*CONCILIATORINESS*

*Sobornost'*, or unity in freedom is one of the four attributes of Orthodoxy formulated at the second ecumenical council, and contained in the Nicene Creed. Conciliatoriness is the 'spirit of Orthodoxy' (S. Bulgakov), it is the formula expressing the core of the Orthodox religiousness as the *unity – free and organic, of which the living beginning is divine grace of mutual love* (A. Khomyakov). Divine grace constitutes an *ontological premise and a constitutive principle of conciliatoriness*.

Through deeper analysis, conciliatoriness does not belong in the sphere of theoretical (speculative) concepts, extending far beyond the borders of 'pure' theology and philosophy, it encompasses the whole realm of Russian culture. It is worth noting, a principle characteristic of conciliatoriness is the free association of people as well the close relationship of this category with Christocentrism. These significant features permit to clearly delineate the principle from the later Soviet collectivism regarded as a restricted subordination of the individual to certain unified norms of behaviour. According to N. Berdyaev's formula *Collectivism (. . .) does not acknowledge the value of the individual (. . .) Collectivism is not conciliatoriness – 'sobornost'' – unity in freedom, but 'sobornost'' – a 'collection' of people, which has a mechanical and rational character.*

The external lack of form in Russian classical literature, e. g. excerpts of seemingly 'superfluous' text in *War and Peace* by L. Tolstoy, the polyphony of the novels by F. Dostoevsky and the abandonment of the final formula of the 'ultimate truth' in the works of A. Chekhov – all these have a common denominator – conciliatoriness in its various aspects.

Both on the level of the formation of the text and on the level of the ultimate formulation of the personality of a hero by an author, we can note a fear of a domination over Another Man (a literary character), a fear of a human opportunity to define the finiteness of the world – ultimate and (irreversible even in the literary world), disbelief in the right to be the judge of 'thy neighbour' (even though he is merely an invented character).

The ultimate truth of Another Man preserved in the text of a literary work deprives him of the hope of transforming himself and of gaining a spiritual rebirth, of which he cannot be deprived as long as Another Man lives. The requirement imposed on an author to formulate the personality of a hero is as if an attack on the Last Judgement on the character, for only God knows the supreme and ultimate truth of a man. Within earthly life created in a literary work *no one knows the ultimate truth* (A. Chekhov). No one knows this, not because the truth is relative and that the supreme truth does not exist at all, but because even God, according to Orthodox theology, learns the truth of a man only after the man's death. To the very moment of the death of the Other Man there always exists the hope, the depriving of which would mean the performing an anti-Christian act upon him.

Both the writer's and his characters' equal rights to express their opinions in novels of F. Dostoevsky, have the same source deeply rooted in the Russian spirituality. The author and his hero actually possess equal rights but in the face of the absolute and not the relative truth which in its entirety is given only to God to know. In relation to the ultimate truth all other truth is relative, every thought 'uttered' on earth according to the words of F. Tyutchev, 'is a lie'.

The problem of mutual relations between conciliatoriness and totalitarianism has remained to this day debatable. Some people have a tendency to regard the Soviet totalitarianism as a direct continuation of the Russian conciliatoriness. Others see it as a sort of pathological degeneration. The virus of totalitarianism has never been alien to the Russian culture, but it affected an insignificant branch of culture adverse to the idea of conciliatoriness. The actual mechanism of infecting part of Russian culture with totalitarianism constitutes a mystery and requires further research.

*IY*

### **Советский народ**

#### *THE SOVIET NATION*

The Soviet nation is one of the fundamental categories of the communist vision of reality. In its basic assumption, according to the definition of its official canon it is a *new historical, social, international commonwealth of people having one territory, one economy, one culture which is socialist in its content, a nationwide state union, as well as having a common purpose – the building of communism*. This category was brought into existence after the 17th Party Congress, where it was decided that the class struggle in Soviet society had come to an end. In the Stalinist constitution of 1936, the place of the proletariat as a leading class was substituted by the Soviet nation. The ‘class enemy’ was replaced by the ‘enemy of the nation’.

The proclamation of and a theoretical basis for the existence of the Soviet nation took place at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. Members of the peoples living in the USSR became members of this nation through the submission to a common state authority, the acceptance of Soviet citizenship, the unconditional acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist ideology as the determinating factor of social life and the assumption of the Russian language – the ‘first among equals’, the language which was to be obligatory to learn and was to dominate in communication. Assuming that it was an international category, it became the basis for a great-power Soviet chauvinism. Basically, collectivist, it formed the consciousness of a citizen, leading to the creation of the particular mentality of the ‘Soviet man’ – ‘homo sovieticus’ who valued his subordination to the state more than retaining his own identity, and his affiliations to the Soviet nation more than his own national feelings.

WC/AL

### **Советский человек**

#### *THE SOVIET MAN*

The Soviet man, a member of the Soviet society – the fundamental aim and, at the same time, a prerequisite for the building of communism. According to the Programme of the Communist Party in 1956, he was to be *internally rich, morally pure and physically perfect*. The world view of a Soviet man was determined by life in a collective, through the collective and for the collective as a drive wheel of a machine, in which the individual fulfilled the role of a screw (M. Heller). Preschool, school, a variety of state, social and political organizations and institutions were to form him. Unified by an idea, his perception of the world was to be based on the dogmas flowing from this idea; he held in reverence figures, attitudes, objects, historical phenomena as well as those of Soviet reality.

Communist ideology succeeded in creating such a man only to a certain extent. Many people, however, did not succumb to complete deformation, for they worked out within themselves a *saving submissiveness and the ability to remain*

*inconspicuous, a habit, by which one would not have to admit to one's actual relationship to the environment, even to one's self* (V. Bukovsky).

The reality of life in the USSR – low material standards, instead of the promised ‘heaven on earth’, the reduction to a minimum of the spheres of freedom of a citizen, while ‘opening up’ gradually to the West, create in the Soviet citizens doubts as to the one and only right idea, and with this arise notions contradictory with the Soviet ideology. Hence the homo sovieticus is a man with a double, both external and internal morality and psyche.

WR

### **Сострадание**

#### *COMPASSION*

Suffering together with another; fellow-feeling, sympathy, expressing compassion; commiseration; sorrow for the affliction or distress of another; acts of charity done to sufferers as bearing witness in the service of Christ, His death on the cross and His resurrection.

Compassion is a communion in prayer and in life, the sharing of joy and sadness; for the compassionate, one has already experienced the tribulations and therefore he is able to come to the aid of those who are put to the test. This concept was most fully expressed by St John the Evangelist: *Greater love have no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends* (15,13). Cf: **Святость; Святой; Кротость; Страдание**, and others.

SR

### **Справедливость**

#### *JUSTICE*

Although the concept of justice/righteousness possesses many common characteristics with ‘truth’, ‘truthfulness’, ‘sincerity’ it goes beyond the boundaries of the meanings of those lexemes. The desire for righteousness is a feeling which, to a great extent, defines the way the Russian perceives the surrounding world. The idea of justice is derived from the teachings of Christianity about truth: *For the righteous Lord loveth righteousness; His countenance doth behold the upright* (Psalm, 11:7); *All Thy commandments are faithful. . .* (Psalm, 119:86); *Righteous art Thou, O Lord, and upright are Thy judgments* (Psalm, 119:137). Divine law is on a higher level than the justice of man which being based on the human interrelationship is imperfect and incomplete; hence the prejudice of the Russian people towards legal institutions the imperfections of which, by definition, are determined by their human dimension. Cf: **Закон; Право**.

The greatest authority for a Russian is a just man. The statement ‘severe but just’ is a measure of the superiors in the army, in civil service, in church, etc.

In the period of totalitarian regimes, the idea of ‘justice’ was taken advantage of by the communist elite for political objectives – it constituted the same measure of punishment towards the so-called ‘enemies’ of the Soviet authorities.

AZ

### Старчество

#### STARCHESTVO

*Starets* is the one who *takes your soul, your will into his own will. By choosing starets you surrender your will and give it away with self-denial* (*The Brothers Karamazov* by F. Dostoevsky). The idea of *starchestvo* or spiritual direction was a combination of an ascetical monasticism, of a deepening of religious formation with an attempt of going beyond the walls of the monastery and the participation in the life of the secular society. Its main centre was the Optina Hermitage near Kozelsk – a monastery exclusively of monks.

The practice of *starchestvo* played a large role in the breaking of the isolation of the established church from the intellectual elite, which made it possible for the Orthodox culture to participate in solving the spiritual crisis experienced by nineteenth-century Russia. *Starets* was a spiritual guide giving aid to the suffering common people and a co-partner to assist in resolving ideological dilemmas of the educated people. The most renowned *starets* in the Optina Hermitage was Ambrosius whose original name was A. Grenkov (1812–1891), a *starets* from 1860, and who was visited by F. Dostoevsky (he is one of the prototypes of Zosima from *The Brothers Karamazov*). Such writers as N. Gogol, L. Tolstoy and A. Tolstoy, as well as Slavophiles also maintained contacts with the Optina Hermitage; Leo Tolstoy visited Ambrosius as many as three times, and it was at the Optina Hermitage that K. Leont’ev spent the last years of his life.

In the consciousness of Russian people *starets* was a personification of ‘un-schooled’ traditional Russian wisdom and a divine messenger. Even G. Rasputin used to use the title of *starets* at the court of Tsar Nicolas II.

JS

### Старый обряд

#### OLD BELIEF

The crisis of the Russian Christian culture which began to take place during the Time of Troubles (1597–1613) ended in a schism in the Russian Orthodox Church in the mid-17th century. Since the controversy was over the reforms of the rite and liturgical books, the two opposing sides were referred to as the Old



Believers and the Reformers. The main roles in the dispute were played by Archpriest Avvakum and by Patriarch Nikon.

According to the Old Believers, the changes in the liturgy as the result of the reforms of Nikon brought about the state of the impossibility of salvation (participation in a cosmic transformation). In the Church in the lands of Rus they saw not an institution but a mystical body, a transformed face of the earth, while in the liturgy – a manifestation of cosmic transformation. In their understanding, Christian reality (rites, religious books, prayers, sacred gestures as well as the state and the law) has eschatological dimensions. Hence such a vivid expectation among the Old Believers of the second coming of Christ. This eschatological vision of the world led to the fact that the Old Believers were less attached to the temporal world and life, and at the same time, they were less creative towards a historical reality. The sacramental transformation of the world was more important for them than the expectation of *Parousia* – the second coming of Christ.

As the result of external events – the Old Believers were naturally drawn to frontier areas where the Tsar's police could not easily reach them – to remote areas in the north of Russia, to Siberia, and the lands of the united Republic; their persecution led to their massive self-immolation and forced them into the monastic life – a large part of the Orthodox society found itself beyond the direct influence of the gradual cultural changes in Russia. The religious conservatism of the Old Believers, mostly of the common people, was combined with a traditional conservatism of life. The events and disputes over liturgical reform inspired the conflicting parties to create a peculiar form of theology which explained to the faithful the way of life and faith. When it turned out that for the Tsar and a number of bishops the rite did not constitute an inviolable part of the truths of faith, the Old Believers decided to prove the rightness of their beliefs not only by acts, but also by a conservative attitude towards life (Archpriest Avvakum; in the 18th century, the Denisovs the founders of the monastery on the River Vyg, the largest sanctuary of Old Belief).

The disputes over the reforms reached the very foundations of the language and the hierarchs of the East who were asked to resolve differences assumed an arbitrary attitude, ignoring the Russian tradition. They did not take into consideration the fact that the understanding of the world order in Rus was the result not only of the dogmas of the seven ecumenical councils, but also of the combination of the Greek Christian culture, along with its theology, its rites, its law, symphony of the church and state authorities with the mental reality of a young Christian society in which the ability to conceptualize faith had not been yet developed. The specific Russian understanding of the world order was the key opening the way to the manifested order of the world towards the formulation of its own cultural order. This took place on the basis of the image of Revelation which had arisen in defined conceptual areas inherently connected with the lan-

guage. When after the political fall of Byzantium, the Church in Constantinople began to cooperate with Rome in theological matters, this fact was interpreted in Rus as the latinization of Eastern Christianity in the area of its most fundamental conceptions.

The Russian schism had also a religious – legal and state aspect. The commonly existing principle in Russia of not founding the existence of the Church upon strict norms was inherited from Byzantium. The Church was to cooperate with the state in building a Christian society. However, the relationship between the State and Church was not based on a legal division of competencies, but on the assumption that the state functions on the basis of faith and the doctrine of the Church. The reform, however, led to a situation in which the state ceased to identify itself with the recognized norms, with the community of the faithful. As a result, the culture of the state began to take on secular institutional forms, and one third of the society was left beyond its reach and also beyond the reach of the State Church. In the opinion of the adherents of tradition, Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich undermined the authority of the Church in matters of faith, while Patriarch Nikon attempted to subordinate the state to the Church and opposed the idea of conciliatoriness in the bosom of the Church. By this, the principle of symphony was undermined.

Byzantium passed on to Russia the conviction that the image of reality is contained in the understanding of the Holy Trinity. In the Byzantine culture attempts were made to bring about order into the human world by projecting in it this image. On the basis of this interpretation the definition of symphony of the imperial and patriarchal authorities was formulated. This symphony as well as the preservation of the purity of the liturgy along with the rites accompanying it became especially important for Moscovy which after the Council of Florence (1439) and the fall of Constantinople (1454) took upon itself the role of a depository of the interpretation of Revelation, which found its reflection in the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome – the theology of state of which the Old Believers became staunch defenders.

For the faithful to the tradition of the Russian Church, disagreement to the changes had a theological dimension, whereas in the course of time in the evaluation of historians and writers interested in this problem, this disagreement assumed a form of an issue in the field of history of culture or contemporary idea. For writers of the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries the subject of Old Belief was only a background and a pretext for declaring moral principles formed on a different basis. For example, Leskov in his works referred to the conviction of high ethical standards of the Old Believers, to justify the thesis which was close to Tolstoyism of the moral purity of the common people who did not need the guardianship of the Church. Old Belief was also one of the modernist literary themes, allowing for the symbolic treatment of

culture (A. Remizov). Moreover, it served as material for ethnographic sketches (M. Prishvin). The administrative objective based, among others, on the repression of the Old Believers, became for Mel'nikov-Pechersky the basis for the writing of not only official reports, but also novels depicting this milieu.

The phenomenon of the Old Believers gradually lost its peculiar character in literature and in research work, being compared and included in the multitude of religious sects in nineteenth-century Russia. The return of writers to the subject of the Old Believers testifies to the search for the key to the essence of the Russian culture, which from the time of the reform in the 17th century, developed according to its own code. It would be a mistake, however, to judge that the phenomenon of Old Belief differs significantly from the Slavophil idea of Old Rus.

*HK*

### **Страдание**

#### *SUFFERING*

Suffering to which bore witness: Christ, St John the Baptist, the Apostles, and the first Christians. Martyrs 'are afflicted with the love of Christ'.

A member of the Orthodox Church is not a stoic extolling the greatness and importance of his suffering but a diligent disciple of Christ Who bore the Passion of the Cross instead of the glory and joy which was owed to Him, and He became the Teacher, the Guide, and his disciples, like Him, took a liking for abuse, privation and persecution. It was poverty, illness, the cross, distress and devotion, the seeking of agony and death that accompanied their lives; voluntary or ascetic suffering is not to be found in the Old Testament. The mystery of the martyrs is based on the increase of strength in helplessness, and that strength is increased by Christ – the 'Man of anguish'. Cf: **Святость; Святцы; Молитва; Целомудрие; Сострадание**, and others.

*SR*

### **Странник**

#### *PILGRIM*

A pilgrim is a wanderer, the freeiest man on earth who though travelling over the earth, is in heaven; a rolling stone who does not stand rooted to the earth; there is nothing of the earth in him; he is free of the earth, all the earthiness is contained in a small bundle on his shoulder (N. Berdyaev). We find this idea among the Old Believers, in the works and attitudes of, among others, F. Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoy, A. Solzhenitsyn, in the Narodniks, the anarchists and Russian revolutionaries. The Russian persists in seeking the unattainable, legendary city

of Kitez; earthly matters do not satisfy him. Cf: **Юродство; Старчество**, and others.

AL

### **Страстотерпство**

#### *WORSHIP FOR SUFFERING*

One of three types of holiness in Rus. Cf: **Юродство; Старчество**. *Strastoterpets* is one who has likened himself to Christ, he has rejected the world in the name of God and his neighbours. Almost unprecedented in the history of neophytes – the Russian nation – a specific national form of a cult of saints. *Strastoterpets* is guided not by fear and cowardliness, not by a lack of energy and fortitude but non-resistance of evil and humbly meeting one's death which is accepted as a gift of God. The weak, the sinful in human sinfulness devote their lives and talents not to achieve personal praise but to the Russian nation (*pechalniki za narod i stoyateli za zemlyu Russkuyu*). The charitable, the humble, the obedient, full of forgiveness, giving away their fortune, often ending their lives in a monastery, admired for their constant readiness in all circumstances to give their lives for motherland and the nation. They are canonized not for their patriotism but because it was for them a way to fulfill the commandment of Christ to love (*po smerti molashe Boga za Rus'*). The most distinguished of these are: 1. princes in the service of the state and nation; 2. prince-monks; 3. the clergy; 4. the female saints; 5. the holy martyred children were worshiped with a particular reverence, who like the Holy Infants of Bethlehem not through words, but through the acts of their death, profess their belief in Jesus Christ.

SR

### **Судьба**

#### *FATE*

Even though the Russian term *sud'ba* is customarily rendered into English as 'fate', these are two basically different concepts. *Sud'ba* does not contain within itself chance, coincidence, risk, just as 'fate' is not connected with the meaning to 'judge', to 'judge beforehand'. 'Fate', even that which is personified and situated beyond the subject, leaves to the subject its own peculiar 'free will'; it can, for example 'be either provoked or not, or it can be opposed, whereas *sud'ba* does not take this kind of 'will' into consideration: one must subordinate himself to it, accept it with humility – *pokorit'sya*. It is here, in the relation to 'free will' towards *sud'ba/fate* – that lies among others, the basic difference in attitudes of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, the Russian attitude and the Western attitude.

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Even more, *sud'ba* is as if pre-established, it embraces the whole of human life, and therefore it can be interpreted as (in a general outline) a fixed way of life. Being understood as a 'divine providence' it contains in itself a 'higher meaning', it becomes the 'experience of man', and consequently leads to the justification and acceptance both of all kinds of misfortunes (including historical calamities) as well as acts (compare a proverbial sympathy of the Russian people for criminals and convicts). On the other hand, the attempt to change one's fate is looked upon not too favourably. Certainly not without good reason, with such understanding of *sud'ba* all attempts of opposing it must be associated with an iconoclastic attitude; and generally this is the case. It certainly is not by accident that all historical revolts in Russia together with the October Revolution, on the one hand, activated just such attitudes and anti-religious acts, and were carried out under the slogans of holy missions, on the other hand.

So, when it is said in various discourses *sud'by Rossii* or *puti Rossii*, the talk is not only of history, but rather, above all, of the 'destiny – the mission' of Russia and it is there that the contents of this mystical 'destiny' is sought.

*JF*

## **T**

### **Терпение**

#### *PATIENCE IN HUMILITY*

Patience similarly to humility took hold in the consciousness of Russians as an ideal preached by Orthodoxy: *In your patience possess ye your souls* (St Luke, 21:19). Nothing can equal long-termed patience in humility. Assuming an attitude of a dialogue with God a Russian identifies his enduring in humility with the bearing of the Lord of sins of humanity. Patience in humility allows one to free himself from suffering. Hence is derived the characteristic for Russians of the low level of civilized amenities; they patiently bear the hard conditions of life, the severe climate and the despotic regimes. This quality was constantly taken advantage of by tsars, party secretaries and presidents.

*AZ*

## У

### **Уния церковная**

#### *RELIGIOUS UNION*

The Union of churches within Christianity. The conception of bridging divisions within the Christian Church and bringing about the unity which was destroyed within the first millenium of Christianity through disagreement on doctrine or practice, and resulted in the Church's regrouping into separate parts. Attempts at the materialization of the concept were made from the 14th century onwards, both between the two major branches of the Christian world: the Greek-Byzantine, Eastern – mainly Orthodox and, above all, Latin, Roman-Catholic churches, as well as between their national, local parts in the particular countries or states of Europe.

The principles of the ties linking the institutions and religious communities of the East and West were formulated in a general, comprehensive outline at the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1439. Although they were basically purely theoretical and impossible to implement, attempts were made to put them into practice after the Patriarchate of Constantinople fell into Ottoman hands in 1453, and the tenets of the union were rejected in the Slavic countries, first in the Poland-Lithuanian Republic (the Union of Brest, 1596; the dissolution of the union between the Armenian Church and Rome in the united Republic, 1634), and then in the Habsburg lands (the Union of Croatia at the beginning of the 17th century; the Union of Uzghorod in Ruthenian lands in 1646; in Hungary in the 17th-18th centuries, and finally in Bulgaria in 1860. An interesting doctrinal, legal and ritual solution was the so-called neo-union in the Russo-Poland border lands in the period of the Second Republic, which made plans for the revival of the uniate ideas in the political, ideological, national and religious situation of the 20th century, after the Uniate Church of the Greek Catholic Rite had been practically eliminated on the territories annexed as a result of partitions by Russia. The neo-union provided for the union of the Churches of the Latin-Catholic and Byzantine-Slavonic denominations, with the return at the same time to the dogmatic, ritual and liturgical purity of the Orthodox Church and the return to the source of the genuine tradition of Russian Orthodoxy, or even to its Muscovite-Russian edition.

The religious and organizational solutions concerning the union as well as the ideological principles that motivated its need, have direct and numerous references to the political life of the Russian state and to the Russian Orthodoxy. Therefore, the Muscovite state from its inception was decidedly opposed to any

attempts to include the Russian metropolitan in any agreement with Rome after the Act of Union at the Council of Florence of 1439; (the Cardinal-Metropolitan Isidore, one of the participants of the Council, was imprisoned and then escaped); it opposed the efforts of the Holy See under the papal legate Antoni Possevini who tried to gain Tsar and Grand Prince of All Russia – Ivan IV (The Terrible) for the cause of the union; Moscow was also opposed to the influences from the West, Latin-Polish Catholicism, Ukrainian Orthodoxy, particularly after the annexation of parts of the Ukraine to Muscovy in 1654.

This negative attitude – sheer enmity towards the union (being directed and realized in a territorial and national-cultural sense, bias towards the West, Rome, Catholicism, both of the official Moscow-Russia, and so the state and the Orthodox Church, as well as the nation, society, culture – found its full manifestation in the stamping out of the idea of the union and the Uniates in the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian lands, the lands successively incorporated into the Russian Empire from the mid- 17th century by means of wars, diplomatic treaties, and finally through the Partitions, as well as repressions and persecutions – the result of the unsuccessful national insurrections throughout the 18th, 19th and the first half of the 20th century, until the collapse of the USSR. The union was gradually eliminated, the Russian population was reconverted to Orthodoxy, first in Byelorussia and the western *gubernias* of the Russian Poland, particularly in the Polesie region and on the territories of Chelm, and then also in the Ukraine before the outbreak of WWII. After that, after the notorious *synod* of Lvov in 1946, when the Uniate Church in East Galicia and Volhynya, deprived of its hierarchy and its clergy was forced to go underground. Today, after the falsehoods of the Communist ideology and the downfall of atheistic social and political utopia in all three regions in the East Slav world, the revived Greek-Catholic Confession of the Slavonic Rite in the Ukraine, which is called at present the Ukrainian Catholic Confession of the Byzantine Rite constitutes – along with much weaker manifestations of a revival of the Uniate aspirations on the part of Christian communities in the region of Byelorussia and Russia – one of the most serious obstacles in the ecumenical dialogue between Rome and Eastern Christianity, the world Orthodoxy, especially in the reconciliation between Roman-Catholicism and the Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Moscow.

*RE*



## Ф

### Флаг

#### *NATIONAL FLAG*

Although Russia's national colours – the official flag of the Russian Federation (*Natsional'nyi flag Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) was adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies on 31 October, the battle over the flags still continues in various meetings and political rallies. The national flag is divided into three horizontal fields of equal width, the top field being white, the middle one – blue, and the bottom field – red (*belaya, lazorevaya i alaya polosy*). Some other colours are used by different parties and factions: Communists continue to use the red banner, Nationalists – the 'monarchic' flag, i. e. of black-golden-white colours.

The confusion results from the general historical instability of the state heraldry – the heraldic symbolism of Russia. In contrast to Poland, neither the national emblem (black double-headed eagle) nor the national colours have ever taken on such symbolic significance in the consciousness of Russians. None of these became the symbol of the nation, hence the facility of reinterpretations of these symbols and implying various traditions to them. The common people seem not to know their own symbols at all. The question 'What's your emblem?' would not have or most probably has no foundation. The people would most willingly consider their emblem as one of the more popular icons, or a banner with an icon.

The Nationalists interpret the colours of their black- golden and white flag as follows:

1. the black colour stands for the colour of the two-headed eagle – a symbol of the power of the East – the great power with a foothold on the Baltic to the Pacific;
2. the yellow (golden) colour is the colour of the standard of Byzantium – the symbol of the right of inheritance and the nurturing in the Russian nation the Truth of Christianity – Orthodoxy;
3. white – the gray colour of Saint George the Victor – the symbol of a great, unselfish and joyful sacrifice for the Motherland, for the Russian Soil, which is the main and ever-lasting feature of the Russian national character that has always bewildered and filled foreigners with awe.

In fact, however, the black-golden-white flag was a state flag for only twenty-five years, from 1858 to 1883. The Russophil Tsar Alexander III introduced a white-blue and red flag on the eve of his coronation and thus brought about the 'war of the flags' which did not end until the eve of the coronation of Nicholas II

on 5 April 1896 when the flag was decreed as the 'national' or 'state' flag that was in effect in the entire Imperium, including Finland. In May 1918 a red flag was introduced, and then on 6 November 1918 – the anniversary of October Revolution, at the site of Executions on the Red Square, all flags and symbols of the fallen regime were solemnly and ceremoniously burned. It was under the white-blue and red banner that the Whites fought in the Civil War and this tradition has been kept alive in exile.

The colours of this flag have been interpreted in various way, among other things, the red as the most popular in the nation, as the colour of the Tsars, but also as the colour of banners with icons; the blue has been regarded as the colours of the mother of God – patroness saint of the Russian Orthodox Church; the white is supposed to be the symbol of freedom and greatness.

Some disoriented political orientations appear also under the flag with the Cross of Saint Andrew against the white background. The flag was used during the reign of Peter I in state functions, but eventually it has become connected with the Navy.

It is worth adding that the adherents of the black-golden and white flag, very often associate it with the triumphant entrance of Alexander II into Warsaw in the late 1860s. Admittedly, the Russians flew the black-golden and white flags in welcome to the Tsar, the Poles, however, flew the white-blue and red flags on such occasions – the colours of the Polish Cavalry that had taken part in the Napoleonic Russian Campaign in 1812.

*JF*

## X

### **Христоцентризм**

#### *CHRISTO-CENTRISM*

Christo-centrism is the aspiring to 'imitate' Christ. The Russian culture was specifically Christo-centric because its main purpose was the de-secularization of man. The moral ideal has a definitely New Testament-like character. In modern Russian culture, evangelical Christo-centrism manifests itself both directly, as in *The Resurrection* by L. Tolstoy and in *The Brothers Karamazov* by F. Dostoevsky, and indirectly through authors' ethical-aesthetical orientation towards the highest moral ideal, that of Christ. Hence the impression of imperfection in the characters that have been created, along with social and moral criticism, while at the same time, the 'real' life of the literary hero is projected onto the 'ideal' life of the hero of the New Testament, even if the author was not completely conscious of such a projection. That is why so few 'positive' heroes are found in Russian literature. Every man is 'worse' than Christ; in the consciousness of the author there always exists that 'best one'. The overlapping of the Christian ideal, of the moral absolute in its Eastern Church 'Orthodoxy' upon the real life in Russia, has emphasized the inevitable incompleteness of Russian life. On the other hand, the other side of Christo-centrism is the full and unconditional acceptance of God's world. Before God all are equal as His subjects, which at the same time means that all are worthy of love, sympathy and pity. Hence we find the sense of love for the poor, the *yurodivyi*, 'holy fools' and the wretched, the aestheticism of love to thy neighbour with the full realization of his imperfections. Heroes of Russian literature represent, in a certain sense, different variants which are more or less successful, in their striving to imitate Christ.

*IY*

## Ц

### Царь

#### TSAR

The complete liberation of Rus lands from the domination of the Tatars, 1480, approximately coincided with the fall of Byzantium, 1453, which in a spiritual aspect was generally regarded as the assuming by Rus a religious mission: for while in Byzantium, Islam had taken hold, in Rus, Orthodoxy predominated. This was, in a certain sense, the direct premise of the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, and at the same time it was the stimulus to sanctify the state authority of the Grand Prince. From that time on, Russian rulers began to call themselves 'Tsars', and from the time of Ivan the Terrible, who took charge of the Government himself in 1547, the title of the 'Tsar' became the Russian rulers' permanent official title.

The word 'tsar' although introduced as the equivalent of the Byzantine 'basileus' had a particular tradition in the Church Slavonic and Russian languages; it was treated as a word coming from God Himself, and it was used instead of the name of God with a particularly observed spelling ЦРЬ, and not ЦАРЬ. Initially, it was accepted by many, not without some resistance, and gradually it became a permanent fixture, bringing its sacred connotation on to the ruling monarch. With time, the monarch was referred to as the *pravednoe solntse* – the 'just' but also the 'genuine' sun, with the meaning of – the 'sun' created by God – even though in liturgical texts of the time this epithet was reserved exclusively for Christ. During the reign of Peter I, T. Prokopovich, by assuming the Tsar as the messiah, and by calling the Tsar *pomazannik*, restored the meaning of the word *pomazannik*, the anointed one, to its Greek equivalent *christos* which he sometimes spelled as *Christos*, 'The Lord's Anointed', and thus calling the Tsar indirectly Jesus Christ. Sometimes, as it was in the case of S. Javorsky, the name *Spas* – the Saviour was used in relation to Peter I, and P. Krekshyn in his *Notes on the History of Peter* refers to Peter with the words of the Lord's Prayer: 'Our Father, Peter the Great. Thou hath led us out from nothingness. . . ' Peter I himself also gladly identified himself with Christ. After the decisive battle at Poltava in 1709, he rode into Moscow in a crown of thorns, while the people welcomed him with palms and shouted Hosanna. From 1721 onwards, after abolishing the Patriarchate – the supreme organ of the Church, the Tsar established a 'Religious College', and then the Most Holy Synod, taking over a series of prerogatives which had previously belonged to the patriarchs.

However, he does not declare himself the Head of Orthodoxy, treating this status as an obvious attribute of the authority of the autocrat. It would be Catherine II who would call herself the head of the Orthodox Church, and in 1797, Paul I would validate this title through a special legal act of succession to the throne which decreed that 'Russian monarchs constitute the heads of the Orthodox Church'; Paul I even wished to celebrate the religious services himself.

Apart from the Old Believers or the *beguny* – 'the fugitives', the common folk in Russia treated the Tsar as a living icon; there are known cases of placing lighted candles in the villages along the route of Tsarina Catherine's carriage. Even the Tsars themselves recognized their predecessors as holy icons, e. g., Nicholas I prohibited M. Pogodin to print the tragedy *Peter I*, since it was unbecoming to present sacredness in a theatre; in a similar manner, the Tsar reacted to the 'sacrilegious' and 'irreverant' image of the monument to Peter I in Pushkin's *The Bronze Rider*.

This tendency to sanctify the highest authorities did not die out in the atheistic Soviet state. Even though the explicitly expressed motivations of the cult had changed, the 'cult' was still observed within the framework of the same archaic semiotics. The place of the Holy Scriptures was taken over by the works of the 'classics', the icons were replaced by portraits of the leaders, and iconostasis by similarly composed photograms of the Politburo on the walls of the Mausoleum, and the place of the Holy Sepulchre was taken by the Mausoleum of Lenin, and numerous monuments and busts had a character of some Baroque statues of the saints. At present this nostalgia to the sacrum is directed towards the idea of the beatification of the last Tsar Nicholas II as a 'martyr', or in the direction of the returning to the cult of Lenin and Stalin. In the same categories, Gorbachev was interpreted as the Antichrist – the False Tsar/God; some other interpretations dealing with the anticipation for a 'rightful' Tsar, such as rumours of Lenin being still alive, and of the tsarevich's – the son of Nicholas II – miraculous survival, etc., also prove the issue.

*JF*

## Царьград

### CONSTANTINOPLE

Constantinople or the Second Rome. Cf: **Рим; Москва – Третий Рим**. Symbol of the roots of Orthodoxy. In the 19th century Russian pan-Slavism declared the idea of the liberation of Constantinople from the Turkish domination and the establishment in it the capital of the All-Slavic Union.

*AL*

## Целомудрие

### *VIRTUE*

Unity and power of personality, internal spiritual harmony of man's internal being, chastity, sexual purity. *Tselomudrie* is at the same time great-heartedness, wisdom in everything and in the whole of one's being, simplicity and organic unity. Its counter-terms are: dissociation, disorderliness, disintegration, dissoluteness, dispersion, scattering, restlessness of one's thought, of one's spirit, and one's body; a 'disordered' man has shifty eyes, covers his face so it ceases to be the face, the whole – it is merely a mask. Cf: **Святой; Святость; Чистота; Кротость; Старчество.**

SR

## Церковь

### *ORTHODOX CHURCH*

The word denotes: a) the Christian community collectively; b) the Church hierarchy; c) a building used for public Christian worship.

Applied as a house of worship, the Lord's house, a church in its architectural setting and symbolic dimension refers to the Old Testament reality; the Sanctuary is divided into two parts, the first part being a 'sacred place' and the other part being the 'holy of holies' in which behind a screen the Ark of the Covenant, Aaron's rod, and a vessel containing manna are preserved. An Orthodox church is composed of two or three parts. In the case when the church is divided into two parts, one of its parts is an altar corresponding to the Old Testament 'holy of holies', and the other part is the nave. On a symbolic level this arrangement is to remind the faithful that Christ is composed of two natures: the invisible divine nature and the visible human nature, that man himself is composed of body and soul and that there is a mystery of the Holy Trinity which is unknowable to the human mind, but man experiences its influences. Such an arrangement also indicates a perceptible world and an imperceptible one, the altar denotes heaven, and the church signifies the earth.

The three-part arrangement of the church is comprised of the vestibule, the nave and the altar. This complex triple symbolism is expressed in the Holy Trinity; that which is on earth is symbolized by the vestibule, that in heaven by the nave, and that beyond heaven by the altar; by the penitents, the faithful and the clergy.

The main reason for the building of the Orthodox church is to make offerings. That is why the altar where the holy ceremonies are celebrated is the most important part of the church, the remaining parts may be treated as an extension of the altar space. The whole body of the church is meant to separate the faithful from

the sinful world. The Orthodox church may be built on a cross-in-square plan, the cross being treated as a sign of victory over sin and death – the cross as the foundation of the faith. Another architectural form is that of a rectangle, which is to express the idea that the Orthodox church is similar to a vessel carrying its faithful through a life full of dangers to the haven which is the Heavenly Kingdom. Churches built in a form of a circle are supposed to symbolize infinity and eternity of Orthodoxy. In the symbolism of the house of worship the oriented west-east longitudinal axis should be taken into consideration. A church oriented in such a way is the symbol of the wanderings of God's people who come out from the darkness (the West) and head towards the rising sun, on the way to Christ and to the true Light. It is from the East, along with the sun, that the light and warmth come which give life; from the altar the faithful receive spiritual strength and sanctification in the form of the Consecrated Gifts. Christ is called the 'Sun of Truth' which disperses the darkness of sin and evil. Orthodox churches are domed, the domes symbolize the celestial expanses, the world of angels and saints, the dwelling place of God. The domes in imitation of the flames of candles are to remind the faithful of prayer and the unending striving towards the Creator. The very numbers used have an emblematic significance. One dome symbolizes the One God, two domes mean the divine and human nature of Christ, three are a reminder of the Holy Trinity, five domes symbolize Jesus Christ and the four Evangelists, seven stand for the seven sacraments, nine signify the nine Angelic choirs, while thirteen domes symbolize Christ and His Twelve Apostles.

The vestibule – the western part of the Orthodox church, normally separated from the other parts, and symbolizing the darkness of sin and the lack of faith – is meant for the penitents, those isolated for their sins and for those unbaptized. The nave is reserved for the baptized ones belonging to the community, to the faithful who have been enlightened by the light of faith. The iconostas separates the nave from the altar before which there is a raised stand known as *soleya* (L. solium, the throne, the seat) from which the Eucharist is partaken of. The central part of the *soleya* is in the form of a semi-circular recess which bears the name of an *ambo*. This symbolizes the stone that had been rolled away from the tomb of Christ by the angel, from which the news of the Resurrection was first announced to the world. From the *ambo* the Christian gospel is read and sermons are preached. The side parts of the *soleya* known as *kliroses* (from Gk. meaning fragment or part) are devoted to the choir, the psalmist and for the clergy who are not celebrating the holy rites.

Iconostas (Gk. *eikon*, image, and *stasis*, position) is a richly carved wooden or stone partition with triple doors on which icons are placed in a specific order. The largest central door is known as the 'royal gate' (in earlier times it was called the 'holy gate', and in Russia the 'tsarist gate', for through this gate the

Consecrated Gifts were brought out. The side doors (the northern and southern doors) are called the 'deacon's doors'. At the very top of the iconostas there is a cross; there also may be found the tablets of the Ten Commandments, Aaron's rod with a serpent entwined about it, and a vessel with manna. Under the cross, in the middle of the largest row of icons, there is an icon of the Holy Trinity, or of the Resurrection of Christ, or less often an icon of the Crucifixion, and on both sides, the icons of the patriarchs. The central part of the lower row is occupied by an icon of the Mother of God with the Baby Jesus; on the left there is an icon of David, on the right, that of Solomon, and farther on, on both sides, the icons of the Prophets of the Old Testament. In the following row we find the motif of the so-called *deesis*: Christ enthroned, with the Mother of God appearing on one side and Saint John the Baptist on the other, along the sides there are Twelve Apostles, or angels, Church Fathers, martyrs, prominent hierarchs, and sometimes local saints and founders of monasteries. In the lowest row, above the tsarist gate there is an icon of the Apostles' Communion, and on the very gate, an icon of the Annunciation, as well as that of the figures of the four Evangelists; on the right side of the gate there is an icon of Christ, and on the deacon's door an icon of an archangel, of some saintly deacons, as well as icons of those who are particularly honoured in a given church. On the left of the tsarist gate, an icon of the Mother of God is placed, then on the other deacon's door – archangels or saintly deacons, as well as icons of particularly revered men in a given church.

The content of the iconostas is to bring to mind to the faithful that everything creates one harmonious choir that praises God forever, and who bears their entreaties of forgiveness for the sins of the world to the throne of God. Iconostasis is to remind the faithful that the saints are our mediators between the Creator and mankind. The ideological purpose of the iconostasis is also a type of a re-enactment of the history of salvation through reference to the symbolism of the Church of the Old Testament (the tablets of Moses, the rod of Aaron, the vessel of manna, the Prophets heralding the coming of the Messiah) and the Church of the New Testament (the Annunciation, the institution of the Eucharist, the Crucifixion, the Apostles, the Evangelists, Fathers of the Church, and the Saints). The considered layout of the icons in the iconostasis makes it possible that one can look upon them from close-up and then the faithful can notice the details looking at individual events and figures; from a certain distance, the iconostasis appears as an eternally living wall brightened with the flames of candles which separate the two worlds: the temporal world from the supernatural world, the visible from the invisible, the earth from heaven. The unity of both the worlds is testified by the saints in their true images which belong to both worlds.

The third and most important part of the Orthodox church is the altar (*L. altare* – structure for offering sacrifices, and in the Orthodox church serving also as a presbitery) it corresponds to the 'holy of holies' in the Old Testament temple. On a symbolic level this part of the church is the abode of God, the place



where Christ sits on the throne, the expression of the divinity of Christ; heaven on earth. The most important as well as the most holy part of the altar is the *pre-stol*, the 'throne of God', which symbolizes that which is found beyond heaven, the throne of the invisible God. *Prestol* is also a symbol of earthly sacrificial places such as the guestchamber in which the Passover was eaten at the Last Supper, the Communion Table, Golgotha, the Lord's Sepulchre. Therefore the altar is covered with a white tablecloth in remembrance of the shroud in which the body of Christ was wound. On it there is placed a shining, light cloth which is to symbolize the Transfiguration. At the left side of the altar there stands the *zhertvennik*, a table of offerings, on which bread and wine are prepared to be received at the Eucharist. Covered with the same types of tablecloths as the *pre-stol*, the table is meant to recall the place of Christ's birth – Bethlehem and at the same time the place of his death – Golgotha. At the altar there is also the Bishop's throne, *gornee mesto*, the raised seat conforming with the spiritual and canonical authority of the bishop – Apostolic succession, and on both sides of the altar are placed the *soprestol'ya*, the seats of the presbyters (the elders). The raised seat also has its own symbolism, it is to resemble the invisible throne of Christ and only the bishop may sit upon it. By sitting upon it the hierarch surrounded by the priests is to suggest the Saviour surrounded by His Apostles.

Combined structurally with the Orthodox church there may be a bell tower. The bells announcing the feasts of the church year, summoning the faithful to prayer, recalling the mystery of the Incarnation, in their symbolic layer, are the voice of God. Consecrated by the bishop, they resound a blessing to the faithful. Three types of the strokes of the bell can be distinguished: small strokes symbolizing the Old Testament Prophets and future events foretold by them; great strokes which announce to all the land good tidings; iron strokes announcing the oncoming of the Last Judgment, sound of the angels' trumpets calling the living and the dead before the presence of the Lord.

AB

## Ч

### **Человек**

#### *HUMAN BEING*

As an evaluative category it has a variable content, the invariable being only the 'exemplariness'. The traditional Russian pattern – 'God's being' created according to God's likeness and image, in other words, a specific icon, the makings of, and at the same time, an assignment and an end. Such qualities and virtues as gentleness, kindness, humility are conducive to the achievement of this end, of reinforcing in oneself – the icon. Undesirable are, among others, vain pride, self-reflexion, caring for one's own bodily appearance, for this leads to the perversion of the icon. The closest to the icon is therefore a 'common man' and common folk; he is consumed neither by self-consciousness nor by civilization, these are rather the inventions of the corrupt West.

A similar state of affairs was preserved in the Soviet system. Only the set of the required virtues was changed. A 'real Soviet man' is to realize within himself the 'idea' of the Communist – he has to be devoted heart and soul to the Party and the Cause, keeping himself as a biological and psychological entity in the background, or treating himself as an instrument to the fulfillment of this idea. The concept of the 'common man' was also preserved in this system, with the addition that he was a Soviet man. His important feature still remains his lack of self-reflexion and his indifference to all worldly possessions, especially those of the Western civilization.

Both in literature and painting the 'common man' (both Russian and Soviet) is normally soiled with mud, overworked, wornout and ragged, unless he is not celebrating, and he is not in his best suit of the Hero of Socialist Labour, with his obsolete tools of work. Although rarely diverging from reality, on the one hand, this convention most clearly explicates the idea of 'commonness' and 'simplicity', and on the other hand, the idea of 'beauty': common people are supposed to be beautiful with the beauty of the 'idea/icon' which is inherent in them and which they strive to put into practice.

*JF*

### **Чистилище**

#### *PURGATORY* *Blqd! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki.*

The Russian Orthodox tradition has no separate concept of Purgatory as a separate substance, along with Heaven and Hell. The lack of this 'intermediate' recurrent motif significantly influences the Russian view of the world, which in

this case is based on a binary Orthodox mentality. Hence the specific ethical maximalization which comes down to the idea of ‘everything or nothing’; hence the tendency to immediate qualification of the ‘damned problems’ as well as the lack of satisfaction from partial success or not complete defeat. Typically, the attempt to introduce Purgatory into the second volume of *The Dead Souls* as a specific link in the structure of the novel, brought N. Gogol to an artistic failure, not finishing the ‘poem’. This happened because the three-part cosmos of the novel remained in a deep contradiction with a binary Orthodox consciousness.

The culture of the ‘silver age’ (in particular V. Ivanov) used the idea of Purgatory on a large scale utilizing the specific ‘Dantean code’.

*IY*

#### *PURGATORY*

Every person after death stands before the universal Last Judgment. Everyone will be made responsible for each and every sin – the sin of the mouth, of the tongue, of the eyes, of the hearing, of the sense of smell, touch, for anger, hatred, envy, vanity, pride, arrogance, and above all, for the **lack** of love. That which in the human language may be called purgatory, for the Orthodox is not a geographical location, but a creative state, intermediate between death and the Last Judgment. Creative, because the prayers of the living, their offerings for the dead, the Sacraments of the Church constitute an intervention in the fate of the dead and a continuation of the redemptive acts of Christ. It is a union in the common eschatological fate. Since souls have no bodies, neither any cosmic location nor astronomical time concerns them. *Patristics* – the study of the writings of the Fathers of the Christian Church – is silent about the transitory time, mentioning only that it is not a vacuum, and souls mature in it and they enter the extra-sensory world. The ‘bosom of Abraham’ is a place of light, of refreshment and rest – are the words sung in the Orthodox Church – that is the way to perfection and cleansing, passing to the Temple of the Lamb through the fiery swords of the Cherubins who are threatening only for evil people. Mutual prayer of the living for the dead and the dead for the living – with God all are **living** – fulfills the expectations of *Parousia* and conditions the communing of the saints. Souls that have not received forgiveness of sins, or souls that have received forgiveness but have not served punishment for their sins during their lifetime, cannot serve punishment in purgatory through additional agonies, to the satisfaction or redress of God, since otherwise the Creator would appear to be desirous of punishment, unmerciful and cruel. One will not become dear to God through his pains and moaning. There is no single place both for penance and deeds. If agonies were the only means of redemption, the Church and prayer would not be necessary. The infliction of agony would merely mean cruelty. We make the choice while we live on earth.

*SR*

**Чистота***PURITY OF HEART*

From purity of heart, love is begotten, *Amo ergo sum* (Boratynsky). The heart is the altar of God. It is the indispensable condition on the way to holiness. The concept of purity as present in both Old and New Testaments is not clearly defined, similarly to the concept of virtue to sexual life . Cf: **Целомудрие**. Purity is ablution, sacrifice and moral discipline, but also virginity – virtue in a narrow sense – sexual abstinence, ritual purity in defence against paganism. Above all blessed is purity of heart. Cf: **Святость; Святой; Кротость**, and others.

*SR*

## Этноцентризм

*ETHNOCENTRISM* *Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładek.*

Ethnocentrism is a limited or parochial perspective which evaluates other societies and their cultures according to one's own cultural expectations. It implies a very restricted understanding of foreign cultures, and a notion that one's own is not only different, but 'better'. It is a tendency for a person to evaluate life phenomena from the point of view of the values and interests of one's own ethnical group. Among ethnomaniacs there predominates a narrow-minded view of seeing one's society as unified by race (blood ties), language, and often a consciousness of one's superiority over others.

The establishment in 1917 of ethno-territorial units (union republics, *krais*, *oblast's*, autonomous *oblast's* and autonomous *okrugs*) and the entering the information about national descent was conducive to the creation of ethnocentrism. This led to a reaction of self-defence of non-Russian nations after 1945 – at the end of the WWII – as the result of the justification of Russians as the 'leading nation' as well as the 'most progressive' among the Socialist nations possessing equal rights within the Federation of the USSR.

The end of the 1980s brought an explosion of ethnocentrism. Ethnic consolidation becomes for the national minorities an instrument of their political separation from Russians and Russia. In consequence, this causes a division into 'natives' and 'foreigners'. Practically, this idea means the domination of the collective body over the individual. After the collapse of communist ideology, religion and culture, ethnocentrism turned to be the means of self-identification of non-Russian minorities.

Ethnic consolidation is characteristic of nations that do not possess their own statehood, while ethnocentrism is born within the minority national community. The circumstances conducive to the preservation of one's own culture turn out also to be the discrimination and persecution experienced by ethnic minorities from the ethnic majority.

JS

**Komentarz [JW1]:** Ten skrót jest niezrozumiały na pierwszy rzut oka; pasuje raczej do książki z historii wojskowości.

## Ю

### Юг

#### *THE SOUTH*

As one of the cardinal points of the world, the South has the same positive qualities as the East.

In terms of climate and civilization the South is understood to be the region of the Mediterranean, particularly the Roman world, and within the framework of Imperial Russia, the coasts of Russia's Black Sea and Little Russia with Bessarabia (the Southern Ukraine and Moldavia). The climatic conditions and the annals of the coastal lands of the Black Sea along with their accounts in ancient commentaries make these areas function as a native ancient world and as a native Southern Europe: Italy and the Cote d'Azur. In addition to that, this area is imagined to be a subtropical area. Along with its own West, the histories of the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia which are inscribed into the history of the entire Imperium, etc. , this gives the Russian Imperium the status, so to speak, of a model of the whole world, synchronically, diachronically and in cultural heritage.

The world of the Southern Slavs assumes a separate position. It is 'Southern' only in a learned discourse or in geographical terms, as referring to a specific locality. Basically, this is the Byzantine-Orthodox-Slavic world, the cradle of the language and the Slavonic alphabet as well as the area of the liberating mission of Russia.

From the end of the 18th century the southern provinces of the Russian Imperium fulfill the functions of the Orient, the waters, the summer residences, the Ancient World, the Hellenic world; and in the Soviet period – the function of the subtropics, the land of the Golden fleece, resort spa for the working people, as well as the asylum and mecca for the cultural opposition.

Having and desiring to have within its framework the West and the South – Russia treats the lands, however, as if they did not belong organically to the Imperium, therefore they retain the status of their own exoticism, the status of their own, but still exotic, in other words, a rare gem in the crown. In any case, in its ideological or mythological discourse Russia may define itself as the East, or the Far North, it perceives itself in Europe, but not as the West or the South.

Exoticism is to be admired, but not cultivated. Therefore after the romantic fascination with the South there follows the adoration and sanctification of the barren Far North, and to the South there are attributed, as it was in the case of F.

Tyutchev, some blameworthy (for various reasons) features, of ostentation, of tumult, of illusion and spiritual impotence.

*JF*

## **Юродство**

### *FOLLY IN CHRIST*

The *yurodivye* are the ‘holy fools’ – A common Russian form of holiness, popular in the 16th through 19th centuries. Prokop Ustyuski, Basil Blazhenny, Isaak Zatvornik, Jan Velki Kolpak, Jan Vlasaty, Xenia of Petersburg and many others, were inspired revealers of God’s will, somewhat jesters, somewhat crazed with folly. They would wander about almost completely naked, with beams of wood on their shoulders, in chains, boldly reproaching the Tsars for the misdeeds of their reigns, they wept over the future fates of the nation and the motherland. Although the world would at times sneer at them, they unceasingly stigmatized the world’s faults, praying for cities and people. Characteristic for them was their unwavering love for Christ and the Cross, freedom bordering on an anarchic individualism, disapproval of the ‘soft’ life. The practice of *yurodivye* had already been known to the Christians solitaries and desert monks in the waste places of Egypt and Palestine from the third to the sixth centuries. Thirty-six ‘holy fools’ were canonized in Russia. After the reforms of the Russian Orthodox Church during the reign of Peter the Great, the Most Holy Synod directly subordinated to the Tsar, and to the Tsar’s *Ober-Prokurator* failed to recognize and beatify the *yurodivye*, which did not mean that they ceased to exist. ‘Folly in Christ’ as a manifestation of the mystical exaltations of the people came about as the result of the literal interpretation of Saint Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians: *Divine folly is wiser than the wisdom of man, and divine weakness stronger than man’s strength* (1:25); the idea of the ‘folly in Christ’ disappeared when the holiness of the Grand Princes began to weaken and disappear. Cf: **Страстотерпство**. ‘Holy fools’ adored by the common Russian people, wandered about Russia, preaching, prophesizing and warning. Mostly uneducated, but among them there were some who were learned: Prokop Ustyuski who came from Novgorod, and who was most probably a German, could speak Latin; Jan Vlasaty was in possession of a breviary, i. e. a book containing the offices to be said daily by Catholic priests. In the 17th century the practice of ‘holy fools’ began to disappear, however, it was preserved only on the northern borders of Russia, in Vologda, Archangel and Vyatka.

*SR*

## Я

### Я, мы, они

#### *I, WE, THEY*

Traditionally, the Russians ascribe to the Western culture egoism, and by rejecting the egoistic, 'Western' **I** and **You** they juxtapose it with **We**. **We** – Orthodoxy, **We** – the community, **We** – the (Russian/Soviet) nation, **We** – the social class, **We** – the state, etc. In the Rusophil thought the individual stands for vain pride, egoism, being lost in the world, helplessness; the collective, on the other hand, the nation, the social class, means strength and righteousness (A. Khomyakov: *Truth which is not available to the thought of individuals, is available only to the collectivity of individuals in communion with love*); the Russian culture is life in a collective, of course, in agreement with nature, Western culture is civilization and egoism of individuals. Cf: **Культура – Цивилизация**.

Placing the collective **We** on a higher level must lead to totalitarianism as well as to the creation of the category of 'foreigners', to contrasting **We** and **They**, to the creation of the enemies of the nation, to the lack of tolerance. Totalitarianism made a demand for **We** – the monolith without any differentiation. In today's Russian consciousness the collective still has the upper hand over the individual citizen. Cf: **КОЛЛЕКТИВИЗМ**.

AL

### Язык

#### *THE LANGUAGE*

From the time Christianity was declared the official faith, until the 18th century, the Russian culture was characterized by the so-called *diglotism* – bilingualism, based on a distinct semiotic division: Church Slavonic serves the area of culture, whereas the areas of daily life (daily existence) which is not treated as culture – is served by the Russian language. Church Slavonic is considered as unconventional (revealed) and closely connected with the content to be transferred. Therefore all variants or renderings from this language are considered as distortions of a message. This was what caused the great schism (*raskol*) leading to the conflict between the Old Believers and the adherents of the New Rite, especially since the latter, to a large degree, came from south-western Russia, the territory which was under the influences of the Western Baroque culture, and thus had a more lenient attitude towards the language and the sign. The unconventionality is not required from the Russian language; this being more varied



and it is used in more practical, every-day situations, and is directed more to communicating content rather than communicating merely linguistic form.

*JF*

### **Язык греческий**

#### *THE GREEK LANGUAGE*

Generally the Greek language is regarded as a revealed language, and also the language of the true faith – Orthodoxy. Like Church Slavonic, Greek is unequivocally in opposition to Latin. Characteristically: the learning of foreign languages is considered as dangerous, for it leads to heresy. Latin is not supposed to be learned before Greek, while to those who know Greek, learning Latin, as the second foreign language, would not matter much. Even at the Slavonic-Greco-Latin Academy in Moscow where Greek, Latin and Polish were to be taught, Polish was not taught at all, and Latin which had also been in the curriculum, was withdrawn until a special *ukaz* of Peter I in July 1701.

Nethertheless it did happen that even Greek was treated on par with other ‘pagan’ languages: both the alphabet and Church Slavonic were created by Greek brothers, Saints Cyril and Methodius, whereas the Greek alphabet was invented by some unbaptized and pagan Greeks. This opinion gained impetus after the Union of Florence in 1439 and after the fall of Constantinople, 1453; the Fall is interpreted as a punishment for the betrayal of Orthodoxy, the Greeks as erring in their faith.

*JF*

### **Язык латинский**

#### *LATIN* *Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki. Bląd! Nie zdefiniowano zakładki.*

Except for Greek and Church Slavonic all other languages are considered as pagan. The Tatar language and Latin are qualified separately, since they are associated with different creeds. Patriarch Makarios of Antioch was warned by the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich, with respect to the Turkish language: *God forbid that such a Holy Man should foul his lips and tongue with so impure a speech.* And Ivan Vishensky would say: *Latin the Devil adores beyond all measure,* while Nikon replied to the Latin retort of Paisiya: *You cunning slave, I gather from your tongue that you are not Orthodox, for with your Latin tongue you sin openly.*

A similarly unfavourable reaction to Latin is noted in eighteenth century Russia under Western European influence. Of particular importance here, is M. Lomonosov’s *Preface on the Benefits of the Orthodox Church Scriptures*, 1757. Even in this particular treatise that laid down the foundation for modern literary

Russian style, Latin of Roman Catholics, especially of Poles, is regarded as a barbaric and backward language. Making use of this Latin muddies the purity of the German language in territories where Catholicism dominates, even though there had been some 'masterly writers' in that language (German), but only in the Protestant regions. This somewhat lenient attitude to German and the irreconcilable relation to Latin and to Polish of this manifesto of Lomonosov, signify already an explicit return towards a confessional patriotism, which in the future would bear fruit in the form of Uvarov's triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality. As R. Picchio, said the ideological message conveyed in the manifesto was based on the opposition towards the Latin-Polish world and towards the Roman Catholic part of Europe that supported it.

In other words, Latin as seen by the Russians is not just one of the languages: it is perceived as a hostile, insidious ideology and the creed of a warped faith.

*JF*

### **Язык русский**

#### *THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE*

The acceptance of Western customs and the learning of foreign languages was blamed at the beginning of the 18th century, among other things, for the cause of crop failures (according to the testimony of Kantemir). On the other hand, it was recommended that the Church Slavonic language should be taught to foreigners with the hope of thus converting them to Orthodoxy. However, grammar books and text books were regarded with great suspicion, since they introduced certain innovations in spelling and syntax and even openly introduced 'heresy' by suggesting the possibility of the declension of the name of 'God' in the plural, etc.

Even so, it was actually in the 18th century that the Russian language took a position of the 'cultural' language. There arose a pressing need for its more or less official sanctioning. Such a role was played by the *Preface on the Benefits of the Orthodox Scriptures* by M. Lomonosov: the work constituted the linguistic 'norm', securing for the Russian language the status of 'absolute majesty'. As the prestigious basis for this language (as well as the new Russian culture as a whole) the Church Slavonic was acknowledged. From that time on, the Russian language, also due to its close relationship with the revealed 'Helleno-Slavonic', would often be praised above all other languages (an extreme example being I. Turgenyev). The mythology of the Russian language actually repeated the mythology of Church Slavonic: Russian accepted for itself, especially in ideological discourse all the connotations of its cultural predecessor.

In this context one should interpret both the Tsarist and Soviet policies towards nationalities of other language traditions, as well as the 'ideological' status of the Russian language in the period of the expansion of Communism. Utopian

schemes and conceptions of a universal language, as well as the bestowal of the highest competencies in the area of linguistics to Stalin, do not appear to be without a connection to such a historical background and such a perception of the language; the thesis of Stalin's simple usurpation of such a title, although it is a very convenient thesis, probably would not hold up to closer scrutiny.

*JF*

### **Язык славянский**

#### *THE SLAVIC LANGUAGE*

The terms 'Slavic' and 'Old/Church Slavonic' were used interchangeably in Russia, the name 'Slavic' rendering the status of Church Slavonic even better for it embraced every sphere of its use, not only religious or liturgical. The name 'Slavic' happened to be a good ideological instrument: it easily overlapped Russian and other Slavic languages. Owing to this, all of Slavdom, with the exception of the Latin-Catholic Poland, was perceived as the bearer of Orthodoxy and as closely related with Russia. What is more: often due to the same high status of Greek as a revealed language, also Greek was defined as 'Slavic', or conversely, Church Slavonic was described as 'Greek/Hellenic', which should be understood as the 'Orthodox Church/religious' language. For example, such a title was given to a Grammar Book of *dobroglagolivogo ellinoslavyanskogo yazyka* published in Lvov in 1591. On the same principle, a similar name of the state *Rossiiskoe Gosudarstvo Grecheskoe* was coined, in which the term 'Greek' possesses religious connotations.

Such terminology reflected, on the one hand, the sense of the spiritual Byzantine heritage, and on the other hand, it easily became the basis for other ideologies: imperial, pan-Slavic, Slavophil and nationalistic ideologies.

*JF*

### **Язык церковнославянский**

#### *CHURCH SLAVONIC*

The Church Slavonic only partially functions in Russia, similarly to the way Latin functions in Europe, in other words only as a liturgical language. Latin while not losing its liturgical function, became the universal language of law, all arts and sciences, secular culture, including literature, etc. By serving such vast spheres of human activity, Latin was the cause of the establishment of a variety of institutions engaged in translating, and in the process it became modified, which the Orthodox clergy more than once found fault with, seeing in this the secularization and the warping of the divine message. In Russia, on the other hand, Church Slavonic retained its position of a revealed language, and basically

untranslatable. It was further mythologized by associating it with the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Greek brothers who worked out the Cyrillic alphabet and prepared an Old Slavonic translation of the Scriptures and chief liturgical books.

As it was said by B. Uspensky, in Russia, Church Slavonic had a character of an 'icon of Orthodoxy'. The theological motivation of such a relation towards Church Slavonic was based on a special linguistic theory which was worked out by I. Volotsky on older Greek foundations: The Word, similarly to God the Son is mysteriously born of the spirit, subsequently it is materialized through the body of man. Through this a true faith defines the true manner of expression, hence, claims Uspensky, the reluctant attitude towards other languages as they are associated with another creed. And thus, for instance, Latin is received as the symbol of the Roman-Catholic faith, and the Tatar language is associated with the Moslem faith.

*JF*

### **Язык эллинский**

#### *THE HELLENIC LANGUAGE*

The term 'Hellenic' is an equivalent of 'Greek' and possesses the same connotations. It assumes additional meaning in the 18th century – the Age of Classicism, the period of interest in ancient culture. Having Byzantium as the interceder and being heir to its liturgical (Greek) language, with an aid of the term 'Hellenic', the Russian consciousness annexes, at the same time, the cultural heritage of Hellenism. The Russian language itself is also eagerly called 'Hellenic' referring to the myth of the relationship of the two grammars; both the grammars patterned on the Greek grammars as well as the practices of translation which forced certain modifications in Russian; the use of loanwords favoured the construction of this mythology. The term 'Hellenic' was also used in opposition to the Roman traditions in general, and not merely to Roman Latin tradition. In order to ennoble, the Russian language, or to justify the connection to Roman culture, also ancient Latin was often qualified as being characterized by a 'Hellenic element'. This state of affairs was maintained until the 20th century inclusively. All these connotations, though with different intentions, but practically in an unchanged form, were automatically repeated, for example, by Osip Mandelstam, both in his poetry and his essays; he seemed to have completely mixed up all these concepts, and the motifs he employed have the most distinct resonance of acceptive and fascinative nature. The history and the reception of this 'Hellenism' are worth noting (or even researching) in the more modern Russian literature.

*JF*

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