FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

CHAPTER

06

THE PATRON

Katalin Cseh

**Member of the European Parliament
and Vice-Chair of the Renew Europe Group**

The EU is a global player, and it is time to act like one. During the coming years we must leave behind the harmful 'geopolitical dwarf' stereotype. In a rapidly changing world beset by a range of interconnected challenges, the EU must step up and become the torchbearer of universal values that have the ability to bring about change far beyond our borders. Matching our foreign policy toolkit with political will and economic, trade, and diplomatic influence, we have a unique opportunity to improve global standards in all policy domains. This chapter will present just how this should be done in a manner that is both efficient and sustainable.

CONTENTS

1.
INTRODUCTION

THE AUTHOR:
Tomasz Kaminski

PhD, Associate professor at the Faculty
of International and Political Studies,
University of Lodz

Thomas Sowell said that "reality does not go away when it is ignored". The reality around Europe is changing rapidly, and EU foreign and security policy has to adapt to those changes. New security threats, power shifting from the Western world to Asia or from nation states to non-state actors, and the increasingly global character of all major challenges that Europe is to face in the next decade are forcing the EU to reform.

This chapter sketches out a plan of reform around four topics:

1. Sources of European power;

2. Projection of European values;

3. European security: Comprehensive approach and strategic sovereignty;

4. Going beyond the neighbourhood – The EU as a truly global actor.

These topics were chosen on the basis of public discussions during the Expert Forum held online by the European Liberal Forum in October 2020.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first part briefly presents the current state of affairs, identifying major problems to be solved. The second part analyses three possible scenarios of EU foreign and security policy development—from sailing where the wind blows to executing fundamental changes in line with the liberal agenda. The final part outlines the set of policy recommendations for the preferred scenario of deep and far-reaching reforms. ■

<div align="right">

2.

THE CURRENT STATE OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

</div>

SOURCES OF EUROPEAN POWER

The European Union is not powerless or weak, as it is sometimes perceived. The portrayal of Europe as an aging, declining force struggling to remain relevant is false. In reality, the picture is different; one can point out many dimensions of European power making the EU relevant as well as influential. They comprise a long list: normative, market, regulatory, civilian, soft, quiet, transformative, integrative, and even knowledge power.[1] A number of these are quite unquestionable sources of the EU's power in the world.

First of all, the EU is a major global economic force that has the ability to set global standards in competition policy, environmental protection, food safety, the protection of privacy, or regulations on hate speech in social media.[2]

Secondly, Europe has great "soft power,"[3] based on the attractiveness of European values, culture, and way of life but also its commitment to humanitarian aid, economic assistance programs, trade deals, international law, and multilateral diplomacy. Jeremy Rifkin once wrote a very persuasive book on this phenomenon, which is now even more relevant than before. Europeans enjoy a better quality of life than most of the world's population and find security not through the accumulation of wealth (as in the U.S.) but through an inclusive society, based on sustainable development, cultural diversity, equality, and respect for human rights.[4]

---

1 Mitchell Young, Knowledge Power Europe: What Science Diplomacy Can Teach Us about the EU (ECPR General Conference, Wrocław, September 2019), https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/45386.

2 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

3 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, New Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005); Kristian L. Nielsen, "EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap", Journal of Contemporary European Research 9, no. 5 (28 November 2013), https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/479.

4 Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Reprint edition (New York: TarcherPerigee, 2005).

Finally, Europe is also a military power. 2019 was the fifth year to have seen an increase in defence spending by European NATO members. European military expenditures are comparable to those of China and far exceed Russia's.[5] Even if European military capabilities are limited due to the current fragmentation of defence markets, problems with interoperability, and the lack of a European Army,[6] Europe is not a "military worm"—as Mark Eyskens, Belgium's then-foreign minister, summed it up in 1991.[7]

Military investments - such as common military policies - are developed less than their potential. Although there are rules governing procurement in the field of defence and security[8], political will is essential to take a further step in a common defence policy. Thus, there is significant room for improvement in areas such as the EU's credibility as a global power, the quality of the EU diplomatic service, security and common defence, and many others. EU remains a global power with the ability to shape the world, but only a coordinated approach to European defence policies, shared by all Member States, can guarantee a strategic advantage.

PROJECTION OF EUROPEAN VALUES

The EU is quite clear as far as the set of common European values are concerned. Human dignity, Freedom, Democracy, Equality, Rule of law, and Human rights are not only written into its Treaty but also construct the political identity of the EU in the world. The EU presents itself as an international actor with principled behaviour in foreign policy, not resigned from its idealistic aspiration to advance a better world.[9]

The EU has in recent years started to think about the promotion of its values in much a broader sense than before. To the list of traditional topics such as democracy, human rights, or free trade, now we have to add green transformation

5 SIPRI Yearbook 2020 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020), https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020.

6 Salima Belhay, "A European Army by and for Europeans" (Initiative Policy Document, May 2019).

7 Mark Eyskens said that Europe is "an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm,": "The Importance of a European Foreign and Security Policy", The Economist (23 March 2017), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/03/23/the-importance-of-a-european-foreign-and-security-policy.

8 European Commission, "Directive 2009/81/EC on public procurement in the fields of defence and security, to comply with Article 73(2) of that Directive", Consolidated version of 2020

9 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (European Union, June 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en.

or our digital agenda. In particular, the European Green Deal requires engaging other actors—not only foreign states but also cities and enterprises. After all, the EU accounts for only 10 percent of global emissions and any gains made in Europe can be easily wiped out elsewhere.[10]

Value projection abroad has never been easy, but the EU has proved to be successful in many cases, particularly in countries that are aiming to become member states. The use of global diplomatic, trade and economic power can help to spread values abroad by setting conditions for climate protection or human rights, the rule of law and equality as a prerequisite for finalising trade or investment agreements.

However, the EU has to actively search for political ways that help it to be more efficient in this regard by including specific clause for implementation of aid programmes to third countries, together with an intelligent and efficient sanctions policy.

Predominantly, the EU has to answer the question of how to reach beyond the neighbourhood and become a transformative power in the global sense. Taking into account that "the world is being Asianized",[11] with five billion people living there who produce 40 percent of global GDP, having an impact on Asia becomes one of the most important challenges ahead of Europe—not only in terms of projecting European values but also in securing European economic interests.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND STRATEGIC SOVEREIGNTY

The traditional approach to security is very much concentrated on military issues and confronting military threats. When we change the security referent from territory and state to people, trying to answer the question about what makes people insecure, we see a different picture. Our everyday threats are related to topics such as health security (Covid-19 is a just one example), climate change, terrorism, cyber-attacks that may affect our privacy, disinformation undermining our democracy, or migration, also perceived as a security problem. In other words, taking into account the experience of the pandemic, the number of beds for people in hospitals is more important to their security than the number of tanks, and the number of doctors and nurses is far more important

---

10 Dimitris Valatsas, "Green Deal, Greener World", Foreign Policy (17 December 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/united-states-democrats-green-new-deal-eu-europe-technically-feasible-environment-progress/.

11 Parag Khanna, The Future Is Asian (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019).

than the number of soldiers. The distinction between internal and external security threats is not very relevant anymore; however, it is still present in many analyses and political discussions in cliché form.

Europe needs to spend more on security not only in order to build resilience but also to achieve strategic sovereignty, that needs to be compatible with that of NATO commitment.

Alliance with the U.S. is a cornerstone of our security policy, but the Trump presidency has clearly shown that our dependency on America puts Europe in quite an uncomfortable position, one that is reliant on the American political cycle. It means that there is a need to spend more, to build our own capabilities, to enhance cooperation and integration. However, the recent budget negotiations suggested that few are willing to pay the price. The agreed-upon numbers are significantly lower (e.g., the European Defence Fund shrank by 39%) than what the European Commission initially proposed at the start of the MFF process in 2018.[12] This creates a risk of an even broader gap between rising expectations and limited resources.

European citizens are not against further integration in areas of security and defence. Public backing for it has remained unchanged at 75% over the past 30 years. Europeans tend to express support for reducing government spending, but they counter-intuitively prefer cutting civilian over defence funds. Thus, lack of progress in EU security and defence cooperation cannot be attributed to a lack of public support but rather the attitudes of national elites, such as defence bureaucrats, or protected national industries, who benefit from the status quo.[13]

Reframing our security policy, making it more comprehensible, and focusing on non-traditional security threats (such as, for instance, cybersecurity, health, or environmental threats and countering disinformation campaigns) may even strengthen public support for spending increases and foster European security cooperation.[14]

EU foreign policy is very much concentrated on regional issues and relations with big powers, such as China and the U.S. Despite heralding global ambitions as in its "Geopolitical Commission" and having some capabilities to act globally

---

12 Niklas Novaky, "The Budget Deal and EU Defence Cooperation: What Are the Implications?", Euractiv (blog) (22 July 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/the-budget-deal-and-eu-defence-cooperation-what-are-the-implications/.

13 Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson, and Andrew D. Garner, "A More Martial Europe? Public Opinion, Permissive Consensus, and EU Defence Policy", European Security 28, no. 2 (3 April 2019): pp. 153–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275.

14 Lili Bayer, "Meet von Der Leyen's 'Geopolitical Commission'", POLITICO (4 December 2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/meet-ursula-von-der-leyen-geopolitical-commission/.

GOING BEYOND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD — THE EU AS A TRULY GLOBAL ACTOR

(e.g., regulatory power), the EU is not perceived as a truly global actor. On the other hand, the major challenges facing the EU (climate change, migration, cyberattacks and disinformation, fragmentation of power, decline of the Liberal Order, etc.) are global in nature, not merely regional issues. They require a security policy approach capable of combining internal actions (on various levels) as well as boosting the EU's role on the world stage and not only in the region.

However, the EU's foreign activities and resources are very much concentrated on the neighbourhood. To some extent, it is understandable due to the political programmes in the region (such as the Neighbourhood Policy)[15] and a series of regional crises that require a European response, such as security challenges posed by Russia, the situation in Libya, or relations with Turkey.

This is also a result of the political preferences of many Member States, which define their national interests in local contexts and are predominantly focused on their neighbourhood. It results in a lack of solidarity and advancement of very narrow-minded policy choices. There are a number of examples of such behaviours: from Poland and some other CEE countries blocking fair burden-sharing during the migration crisis[16] to Germans building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite its detrimental effect on energy security for the whole Union and CEE states in particular.[17] Each of these cases creates a lot of tensions between Member States, sometimes even unproportionally to the real importance of the problem, which hinders the building of a common foreign and security policy.

This is strictly related to behaviour of Member States undertaking unilateral action against problems that could be better solved in the European context. The immediate effect is the lack of coordination with regard to the choices of individual states in foreign policy. From a political point of view, this can be the consequence of the pursuing of national interest. But in terms of external projection (i.e. how the European Power is perceived), it can be a factor of weakness for the whole Union - especially in the perception of rivals or enemies.

---

15 Agnieszka K. Cianciara, The Politics of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Routledge, 2020).

16 Alexandra Brzozowski, "Poland Rejects Southern Europe's Push for Mandatory Relocation of Migrants", Euractiv (blog) (18 September 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/poland-rejects-southern-europes-push-for-mandatory-relocation-of-migrants/.

17 Balázs R. Sziklai, László Á. Kóczy, and Dávid Csercsik, "The Impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European Gas Market Bargaining Positions", Energy Policy 144 (1 September 2020): 111692, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111692.

There have been signs, however, that the EU is really pivoting towards geopolitics. The European External Action Service has been relocating its resources to better match current needs. For instance, in 2019 the EU presence in the Middle East and in Central Asia was strengthened with the opening of Delegations in Kuwait and Turkmenistan.[18] In March 2019 the Juncker Commission and High Representative Federica Mogherini adopted a joint communication presenting the strategic outlook on China.[19] This document set a precedent for the EU by positioning China as a 'systemic rival' and an economic competitor. That was accompanied by a series of assertive actions to confront China's abusive behaviours, such as the implementation of an EU foreign investment screening regulation[20] or the initiation of reforms to curb the distortive effects of foreign subsidies on the European market.[21]

Such an update of Europe's defensive economic toolkit "has ramped up regulatory shields to protect European firms from unfair foreign competition".[22] It was a necessary move towards greater economic sovereignty that will help to protect EU citizens from the downsides of globalisation and increase efficiency in the great power competition.

Yet the European Union has not stopped cherishing international cooperation as the most effective way to meet global challenges. This liberal way of thinking is deeply rooted in Brussels and drives the EU's policies. The change of power in the U.S. gives hope that America will come back as a fellow defender of the Liberal World, based on rule of law, free trade, cooperation, and promoting democracy and human rights. Joe Biden, presenting his foreign policy plan,[23] clearly stressed the value of transatlantic relations and cooperation on issues where our interests converge, such as combating climate change. ■

18 Human Resources Report 2019 (European External Action Service, July 2020), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eeas_human_resources_report_2019.pdf.

19 EU-China – A Strategic Outlook (European Commission, 12 March 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52019JC0005.

20 European Commission, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union (Brussels: 21 March 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/452/oj.

21 "WHITE PAPER on Levelling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies" (Brussels: European Commission, 17 June 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/foreign_subsidies_white_paper.pdf.

22 Nicole Koenig and Nils Redeker, "After One Year of the 'geopolitical' Commission, It's Time to Get Real", Euractiv (blog) (14 September 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/opinion/after-one-year-of-the-geopolitical-commission-its-time-to-get-real/.

23 Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again", Foreign Affairs (2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.

3.
OPTIONS
AND SCENARIOS

The next decade of EU foreign and security policy is far from being clear. There are a lot of possible paths but, in line with the concept of this Liberal White Book, we are going to sketch out and assess three alternative scenarios:

- Scenario 1: Muddling through

- Scenario 2: Tackling the most pressing issues

- Scenario 3: Changing the EU fundamentally

MUDDLING THROUGH

No major institutional nor conceptual changes are implemented. EU foreign and security policy remains responsive, not active, and while much effort is concentrated on regional issues and military threats, it is not efficient in any of these. The divergences between Member States and within them play an even more important role with some help from outside actors. China and Russia, but also the United Kingdom and the U.S., manage to use those divisions to pursue their own aims.

Europe is divided, particularly on Russia and China, and policy coordination is extremely difficult. There are significant caucuses in favour of the policy of engagement with both countries, backed by the political and economic interests of certain Member States and companies. In the case of Russia, this division clearly follows the division of Europe between East and West, with CEE countries threatened by Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space and an aggressive neo-imperialist policy. Russia has successfully blocked any further integration of Ukraine or Belarus with Europe. In case of Ukraine, there is a lasting deadlock created by the "frozen" conflict over Crimea and Donbas. In Belarus, civilian protests, deprived of European support, have died; and a consolidated regime has driven the country even further into the Russian sphere of influence.

Countries continue to compete against each other in search of commercial advantages in the Chinese market and in order to attract Chinese investors. Beijing continues to play into the bloc's divisions, building a strong position in some Member States eager to develop relations with Beijing on a bilateral basis rather than within the EU framework. Those countries search for bilateral agreements with Beijing that infuriate other Members and undermine any common efforts to coordinate policies towards China.

Incoherencies are also visible between certain European policies. Trade relations and development policy are implemented in their "black boxes" without any coordination with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Inter-institutional policy conflicts over security, development, and crisis management objectives interfere with intergovernmental disputes over leadership—repeating the EU policy failure in Libya from 2011[24] over and over again.

The EU's role in the world is declining, and rifts are growing with not only Russia and China but also the U.S. Washington, struggling with the rise of China, is both disappointed with the fact that Europe cannot be a more serious partner in the global power game and is simultaneously ready to use that European weakness.

Advancing globalisation and technological transformation are making the EU even more dependent and vulnerable. With the usual caveat that accompanies every prediction, one can say that international relations are at the dawn of a digital revolution. Those having the best AI, the best robots, may have the best warfare advantage and the most productive economies. They will lead the world if only they can manage to adapt to the system when the production of goods is almost completely divorced from work; this may cause AI-driven mass unemployment.[25] The next 10 years might further set the scene before these great changes are brought on by the digital revolution. Europe, not able to overcome its divisions, is on track to lose in a competition with China and the U.S. Europeans will observe increasing economic, political, and military vulnerability and dependence. Their economic, health, cyber, or military security will be in the hands of others.

---

24 Michael E. Smith, "The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus: Organizing for Effectiveness or Incoherence?", Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 9 (1 October 2013): pp. 1299–1315, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.758441.

25 Kevin Drum, "Tech World. Welcome to the Digital Revolution", Foreign Affairs (2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/tech-world.

TACKLING THE MOST PRESSING ISSUES

In this scenario, the EU concentrates its foreign and security policy on a few major partners and problems—firstly on improving relations with the U.S. in order to defend and strengthen the Liberal Order, based on common values such as democracy, rule of law, or universal human rights. The reinforced transatlantic community manages to strengthen cooperation in order to confront climate change on the basis of the Paris Agreement.[26] The EU and the U.S. accelerate their cooperative climate action by engaging other countries, cities, regions, businesses, and civil society members across the world. The transatlantic partners also finalise a new version of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),[27] liberalising one-third of global trade. This agreement gives the West substantial leverage to shape the global rules of the road not only on trade but also labour, technology, and environmental regulations.

Secondly, EU policy towards China has shifted towards a more realistic and assertive approach that started in 2019. China is perceived as a partner in dealing with global issues, such as climate change or health protection. At the same time, China is defined as an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting an alternative model of governance.[28] The EU sticks to the redefined understanding of reciprocity with relation to China—European markets are closed to China in all those areas where China remains closed for the EU. The creation of high-level U.S.–EU dialogue on China has helped to coordinate efforts and implement a set of measures to protect Western interests vis-à-vis Beijing.

The EU's "global transformative power" remains limited, but Europe is efficient towards the countries in its neighbourhood. The EU is still a magnet for its neighbours, who make a lot of efforts to retain the possibility of becoming Member States. In 2030 there are no new members apart from the Balkan states (Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania), but a few others are well on track. Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia have decided to integrate and have started formal negotiations. Turkey has resigned from pursuing full membership but, similarly to the United Kingdom, still has very close relations with the EU, being de facto economically dependent on the European market.

---

26 The Paris Agreement | UNFCCC, accessed 28 November 2020, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement.

27 Will Kenton, "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)", Investopedia, accessed 28 November 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip.asp.

28 Justyna Szczudlik, "The EU's New China Policy Works", China Observers (blog) (14 October 2020), https://chinaobservers.eu/the-eus-new-china-policy-works/.

With no major change in EU policy towards Russia, relations with the country remain difficult and frosty. The continuity of sanctions29 has finally brought about partial success—the Kremlin has reluctantly loosened its grip over post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The territorial conflict with Ukraine is resolved but there has been no political transformation in Russia itself. Isolated and jeopardised, the Kremlin regime still poses a security threat for Europe and has instruments to destabilise its neighbours and the EU itself.

In terms of security policy, the EU has not moved forward very much. Discussions on the European army and integration of defence markets are far from over, and the EU stays militarily dependent on the U.S. Thanks to more efficient cooperation with non-state actors, such as big tech companies or transnational organisations, the EU is much more resilient in some aspects like health, cyber, or environmental security.

CHANGING THE EU FUNDAMENTALLY

In this scenario, the EU manages to make a few steps forward in the process of strategic sovereignty and successfully adapts to the changing international environment.

First of all, there is a consensus in Europe on common global interests and the perception of threats. Security policy is based on a comprehensive defence system that engages actors on different levels: municipalities and regional authorities, national governments, and EU institutions. There is no division over external/internal or traditional/non-traditional threats, which are perceived as irrelevant. Major security problems have their external and internal elements, and you cannot be successful without combining different means to face them. Terrorism may serve as the most obvious example, with clearly "external" military, digital, or financial actions against the ISIS caliphate combined with fighting second generations of radicalised terrorists living in Europe. Instead of having only a subsidiary role as provider of internal security,30 the EU has become a core player in the advanced institutionalized system of security cooperation and coordination.

Europe has also changed its perception of security, resigning from "the state-centric orthodoxy of conventional international security, based upon military

---

29 Matěj Bělín and Jan Hanousek, "Which Sanctions Matter? Analysis of the EU/Russian Sanctions of 2014", Journal of Comparative Economics (21 July 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.07.001.

30 Jörg Monar, "EU Internal Security Governance: The Case of Counter-Ter

defence of territory against 'external' threats".31 Instead, it successfully employs a human security perspective, which privileges the individual as the referent of security analysis. In this approach, military instruments (and expenditures) are only part of a much broader policy area that consists of several dimensions: climate security, health security, food security, economic security, cyber security, environmental security, etc.32 Consequently, providing security to European citizens becomes a fundamental policy goal of the EU and the idea of a more comprehensive security policy becomes one of the most important policy areas of the EU, taking precedence over many others. To take decisive action in the field of security, it is essential to act and decide in a timely manner at EU level. A key discussion in this context is the use of qualified majority voting with regard to foreign and security policy.33

The European Army is finally at the full disposal of the EU34 and its internal defence market is integrated around the European Defence Agency, which ensures coherence between Member States and with NATO. Due to this, the EU is less dependent on the U.S. and has moved closer to strategic sovereignty.

The European Commission acts in a truly geopolitical manner, thinking "big" and using common resources to reach ambitious goals. In other words, the EU is performing as a real global power. In close cooperation with the U.S., Japan, Canada, and other democratic leaders, it is striving for democracy's strong position back on the global agenda. The process of retreating democracies and declining global freedom35 has not only been stopped but also reversed.

Europe's presence in the world has also been strengthened thanks to the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS). With a much larger budget and reinforced staff, the EU diplomatic service invests its financial and diplomatic resources on every continent. Particular attention is being paid to the fast-developing Asian region. The EU has resigned from focusing its Asia policy predominantly on China, now distributing its awareness and resources much more equally among different Asian partners. Thanks to this, the EU benefits from Asian growth and has

---

31 Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies", Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 77–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509990519.

32 Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), pp. 87–102.

33 In the light of reaching impactful foreign policy initiatives, Ursula von Der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech sustained the idea of adopting a qualified majority voting system in areas pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This will help acting promptly when facing challenges. Although the Treaties provide for this possibility in certain contexts (so-called "passerelle" clauses), the facts have shown that in certain situations the necessary alignment of Member States in taking such decisions is still lacking.

34 Belhay, "A European Army by and for Europeans"

35 Democracy in Retreat. Freedom in the World 2019 (Freedom House, 2019), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat.

a growing political impact on the situation in the region. In particular, the EU is able to impose its vision of rules-based connectivity—rules and regulations that allow for efficient, fair, and smooth movement of people, goods, services, and capital between Asia and Europe.[36]

WHAT IS THE IDEAL SCENARIO FROM A LIBERAL POINT OF VIEW?

The ideal scenario for European liberals is the third one. Even if the EU altering its foreign and security policy fundamentally through this courageous vision and coherent set of actions clashes with the expectations of some individual states, it is the best solution for the whole continent.

The core assumption of this scenario is that Europe acknowledges the external challenges that we are facing and adapts to them. Recognition of the most important trends that are going to shape the world in the next decade is necessary for efficient policymaking. These trends include (among many others) the globalisation of security threats and fragmentation of power—or pluralisation of diplomacy, meaning that diplomatic practices, institutions, and discourses are no longer limited to traditional inter-state diplomacy.[37] The EU's adaptation to them requires "1,000 small sanities", borrowing from the title of Adam Gopnik's book on liberalism.[38] In other words, the change has to be made by many steps, sometimes small but still necessary: there is no need to call for a revolution.

The liberal vision for foreign and security policy could be framed around four points:

A LIBERAL VISION FOR FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

- The EU's global actorness should be based on the set of existing sources of power that have to be reinforced. Firstly, this means regulatory power (sometimes called "the Brussels Effect"),[39] which enables Europe to set global norms in many areas. Secondly, our attractive values (from respecting freedom of media to upholding judicial independence) should be defended and promoted both in Europe and globally. Thirdly, this includes our system of alliances and transatlantic cooperation in particular, with NATO as its

---

36 Connecting Europe & Asia: The EU Strategy (European Commission, 19 September 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50699/connecting-europe-asia-eu-strategy_en.

37 Noel Cornago, Plural Diplomacies: Normative Predicaments and Functional Imperatives (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013).

38 Adam Gopnik, A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism (New York: Basic

39 Bradford, The Brussels Effect.

cornerstone. Fourthly, our professional diplomatic service today is too small to be efficient. Finally, we should build on our credibility as a global power, which must include military capabilities at the disposal of the Union's political leadership.

- The EU should not resign from value projection or building a liberal order globally in close cooperation with democracies around the world (e.g., the U.S., Canada, Australia, middle powers in Asia). To be more efficient, we should make better use of European diplomacy, including public diplomacy.[40] Our diplomatic activities should target not only states but (taking into account the fragmentation of power in the world) also non-state actors such as cities, regions, NGOs, or big corporations—which are going to be even more powerful in the next decade. They may serve as transmission belts for our ideas, bringing them to people. Value projection is important not only for our interests (e.g., commercially) but also to our security. For instance, the successful transformation of Russia into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state should be included in the long-term vision of European politicians who intend to keep Europe secure. It means that we should not resign from supporting civil society in Russia[41] and other places, bolstering the people who have stood up against authoritarian regimes. We should never underestimate the significance of people-to-people contacts in the form of promoting European culture, students' exchange programmes, academic cooperation, etc. that may, in the long run, contribute to political change.

- The EU should understand security in a comprehensive way that merges a traditional, military-oriented approach with the human security concept. Such a comprehensive defence system should be multi-level and acknowledge areas traditionally not perceived as related to security. The prime example is education, which provides security to the people. In the same way we have to educate citizens to live in the Digital Age, we should also educate them to live in a world full of new threats (from pandemics of viruses to spreading disinformation) which undermine not only our security but also our democracy.

---

40 Mai'a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen, European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work (Springer

41 Joseph R. Biden and Michael Carpenter, "How to Stand Up to the Kremlin", Foreign Affairs (2018),
    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/how-stand-kremlin.

- The major challenges facing the EU are global in nature, so there is no sense in concentrating so much of our foreign policy resources on regional issues. European policy should acknowledge the major power shifts in the world and adapt to them. Western domination over world politics has ended. The flow of wealth and power is turning from West to East, defining our age and shaping the lives of people all over the world. [42] Europe should not be blind to this but should follow the U.S. in its "pivot to Asia",[43] not in the form of a temporary transfer of attention towards Asia but rather as a fundamental rebalancing of foreign policy.

---

42 Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century, 1st edition (London: Vintage, 2017).

43 Janan Ganesh, "US Shift to Asia Is More than a Short-Term Pivot", Financial Times (20 February 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/1f3dab26-346c-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5.

4

ROADMAP AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

WHAT IS A REALISTIC LIBERAL ROADMAP TO REFORM THE EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY?

We should follow liberal tradition and concentrate on gradual reforms rather than calling for revolution. This means that we should advocate:

1. Better use of existing resources, re-allocation to match changing needs

In particular, the EU should adapt to major world power shifts, paying more attention to developing its relations with Asian countries, big companies, or cities which, in this century, are becoming the nexus of economic and political power.[44] Bosses of big technological companies are drivers of the digital transformation. Megacities are central actors when it comes to facing many global challenges: from climate change and mass migration to fighting poverty. The EU should recognise this fact and adjust its diplomacy accordingly. In the next decade, we will probably reach the point where the idea of sending an EU ambassador to Google becomes a reality.[45]

2. Strengthening existing European institutions (e.g., European Commission, EEAS) rather than creating new ones

The EU does not need new institutions. All those which are crucial for an effective foreign policy are already there—the EEAS, European Commission, or European Defence Agency. The problem is that they lack enough capabilities, have limited budgets, and are understaffed. The EEAS, for instance, only employed 4,500

---

44 Just forty city-regions are responsible for over two-thirds of the total world economy and most of its innovation. See Parag Khanna, "How Megacities Are Changing the Map of the World", Ted Talks (2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7y4GlmwPLQ.

45 This idea was expressed during the ELF Expert Forum event.

people in 2019,[46] while the German Federal Foreign Office currently has around 11,500 members of staff.[47] Without the reinforcement of a European diplomatic service, we cannot realise ambitious global political goals.

3. Changing European discourse, abandoning old-fashioned ways of thinking, e.g., security perceptions

Foreign policy discourse in Europe and security discourse in particular are dominated by archaic ideas that do not fit with the reality of the 21st century. Talking about armies, we think of 20th-century wars. Talking about diplomacy, we imagine white-tie state banquets and older gentlemen with cigars discussing politics. In the next decade, we should try to better understand the world we live in: with hybrid wars that are never declared; with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns that are our "bread and butter, everyday wars"; with diplomats who spend more time on Twitter than at parties and communicate mainly with a foreign public rather than government officials.[48]

4. Consolidating cooperation with allies on the basis of common interests

Different interests of Member States have been obstructing integration in the areas of foreign and security policy. They are not going to disappear anytime soon, but their significance might diminish in the face of the large-scale common challenges that we have to confront. Defending the liberal order based on international law, confronting China to secure a level playing field for European business, or fostering the green transformation beyond Europe are in the interest of all member states. Unfair competition from foreign companies or unjust burden-sharing of global climate change policy might affect all Europeans. In the next decade, alongside progressing globalisation and global power shifts, the number of areas where it is possible to clearly agree on what is in the common, European interest may only grow larger.

5. Cherishing cohesion and coordination between Member States as well as different policies (trade, development aid, CFSP)

European foreign and security policy is formulated and implemented on three levels: by EU institutions, by member states' governments, and by regional/local authorities. Problems with coordination between levels are serious but bringing together different European institutions might also prove difficult.

---

46 Human Resources Report 2019.

47 Auswärtiges Amt, The Foreign Service - Staff (German Federal Foreign Office), accessed 9 November 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/-/229736.

48 Tom Fletcher, The Naked Diplomat (William Collins, 2017).

The pillar construction of the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty,[49] however long gone, has left an imprint. Quite often, the high-level politics of the CFSP have their own black boxes, different from the black boxes of lower-level political areas managed by the European Commission. The sooner the EU eliminates these black boxes, the better and more efficient foreign policy it will have. In the world of complex interdependencies where we live, coherency across policies matters more than ever; but is also very difficult to obtain. The need to enhance inter-institutional, horizontal coordination should steer any changes in EU foreign policy architecture.

WHAT ARE THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO EACH OF TOPICS?

1. Considering different sources of power

With regard to "European Power", the market size and regulatory power (the so-called "Brussels Effect") will give the EU an increasing impact on international relations. Liberals should seek out ways to make these instruments even more effective. Brexit, on the one hand, may diminish the EU's market size; on the other, it could make greater room for pro-regulatory coalitions in the EU.[50] Either through multilateral agreements or, if it proves impossible, by unilateral action, the EU should try to globalise its regulations—particularly in such areas as the digital economy, the environment, market competition, or consumer health and safety. With 2030 in mind, European regulations should, form the core, be - and influence - global regulations on climate issues, consumer health and safety and market competition.

Alliance with the U.S. has been one of the cornerstones of the European position in the world. In trying to reach strategic independence, we should not forget about maintaining transatlantic links. The United States' newly elected President Joe Biden is right in stressing that the world does not organize itself and someone has to write the rules, forge the agreements, or animate the institutions that guide relations among nations and advance collective security and prosperity.[51] Europe has to work with its closest partner to mobilize collective action on global threats and promote the liberal world order. One of the steps to be taken is a TTIP that, apart from economic benefits for both sides, might help to set global standards for trade, spreading Western values around the world. In this respect, the TTIP should be signed by 2030.

---

49 "European Union - The Maastricht Treaty", Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed 28 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union.

50 Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 187.

51 Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again".

Values and future of diplomacy

With regard with Projection of European values, considering the transformation of politics known as "mediatisation",[52] the EU should pay more attention to developing relations with big media outlets. This should be one of the main tasks for EU diplomats if they want to be effective in public diplomacy. The "bad boys" of this world, enemies of Europe, do use social media as instruments of disinformation campaigns or even information warfare.[53] Apart from efforts to defend itself against such attacks, we should not hesitate to organise our own campaigns aimed at promoting European ideas or influencing the actions of foreign actors. This should become a routine diplomatic activity that is carefully planned and properly financed. Digital diplomacy in 2030 will have a crucial role in the very centre of European foreign activities

Non-state actors and EU Foreign Relations

In order to be more efficient, the EU should also develop its relations with important non-state actors: big companies, NGOs, cities, networks of cities, etc. Even if we will not refer to our officers delegated to work with Google or New York City as "ambassadors", they will play the important role of facilitating everyday contacts with those powerful and important international actors. Such actors could either be our allies in promoting values or partners without whom we cannot impose some important regulations. For instance, it would be rather impossible to regulate the digital economy (e.g., securing personal data safety) without close cooperation with Facebook or Google.

The EU should also acknowledge the importance of the sub-national dimension of foreign affairs. Cities and regions are very active internationally, building bilateral relations and transnational networks such (e.g., C40 and ICLEI).[54] The rising importance of sub-state links has become a reality in European relations with China;[55] cities can also be security providers[56] and they are absolutely crucial in climate policy. Although climate policy is formulated at national and supra-national levels, cities are responsible for its implementation. Brussels should

---

52 F. Esser and J. Strömbäck, eds., Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137275844.

53 Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality, Main edition (Faber & Faber, 2019).

54 Michele Acuto and Steve Rayner, "City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging (New) Lock-Ins?", International Affairs 92, no. 5 (2016), pp. 1147–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12700.

55 Tomasz Kamiński, "The Sub-State Dimension of the European Union Relations with China", European Foreign Affairs Review 24, no. 3 (1 October 2019), pp. 367–85.

56 Ian Anthony, "Cities and Security", SIPRI (26 November 2015), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2015/cities-and-security.

build channels of communication with partners on the sub-national level, trying to coordinate the para-diplomacy of regional and local actors with EU foreign policy. By 2030, Europe should develop a network of daily communication channels with key non-state actors.

Multilateralism should remain the "default choice" for any European policy initiatives because defending liberal values is not possible without our allies' support. Building and cultivating relationships with traditional allies, such as the U.S., the UK, Canada, or Australia, should be accompanied by a search for new ones. The EU is attractive to states like Ukraine, Georgia, Asian middle powers, or some African countries. They are ready to cooperate, to learn, or to follow our regulations. Europe should be ready to assist them in identifying areas of common interest and managing points of conflict. By 2030, the EU should expand its network of free trade and association agreements, reinforcing multilateralism.

2. European security: comprehensive approach and strategic sovereignty

The European Union should change its security referent from territory to people—looking at security challenges in a much more comprehensive way than today.

People's security depends on actions taken at different levels. Therefore, there is a need for continuous public debate over how to divide tasks between different levels of administration, how to employ private business, etc. The need to cooperate with different stakeholders such as cities, companies, governments, and transnational organisations in order to build a comprehensive defence system is rather obvious. The problem is how to build effective channels of communication with all those actors on all those levels. This task is even more complicated than building a European army and is much more important from citizens' perspectives. Europe must aim at developing a security policy forms with a multi-level system and a clear division of responsibilities by 2030.

Security depends not only on the number of troops or aircrafts. Military expenditures should only be one part of a much longer list, including cyber defence, climate, healthcare, and education. If the European Union is to be a security provider, it has to have much more say in some of the spheres that are now in the competences of Member States, such as health policy or education. Further integration in many areas should be presented to European citizens from a security perspective—as a necessary step for increasing the resilience and well-being of society in the context of different threats. In 2030 the EU will have an important role in providing health security, and there is a developed common

system of education for security and resilience in all European countries.

3. Going beyond neighbourhood - the EU as a truly global actor.

Recognising that all major challenges that we face are global in nature, the EU should not resign from active policies towards its neighbours. The accession of the Balkan countries should only be a matter of time—they should become Members as soon as they meet all the requirements. Yet, at the same time, we have to keep the doors open for other neighbours like Ukraine, Turkey, and Georgia. The perspective of accession is the single strongest instrument that the EU has at its disposal, allowing huge influence over countries interested in joining. We should not be rash when thinking about further enlargement, but neither should we deny access or resign from this powerful political instrument.

Brexit talks and the many different possible options of relations between the UK and the EU have shown that a more differentiated Europe, based around the idea of a variable geometry of integration, is indeed possible. In reality, some countries might be better off standing outside the core structure of the EU while still being a part of the Single Market or other policies. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, former Danish foreign minister, recalls that at the time of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, when different Danish opt-outs were discussed, such thinking was captured in the phrase: "To be or not to be, that is the question; to be and not to be, that is the answer".[57] Moreover, accession policy is still the major instrument shaping the EU's relations with its neighbours, and a road to continue looking at 2030.

Adaptation to the major power shifts in the world means a need for the fundamental rebalancing of foreign policy. The EU should strengthen its presence in Asia, beyond China, in particular. Asian middle powers (e.g., Japan, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia) offer economic opportunities and potential for political cooperation in areas such as green transformation or restraining Chinese influences. Europe should not resign from building a strong position in the fastest developing region in the world. The Europe of 2030 should forge stronger political ties with the central powers in all continents, but especially in Asia and with the - rapidly - developing powers of this region. ◼

---

57 "Europe's Future Is Multi-Speed and Multi-Tier", The Economist (23 March 2017), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/03/23/europes-future-is-multi-speed-and-multi-tier.

CONCLUSION:

Liberals tend to believe in reforms rather than big revolutionary ideas. As Adam Gopnik writes: "The one central truth liberals know is that effective reform almost never happens as the result of big ideas sweeping through the world and revolutionizing life. Whenever we look at how the big problems got solved, it was rarely a big idea that solved them. It was the intercession of a thousand small sanities. A thousand small sanities are usually wiser than one big idea".[58]

The main argument of this chapter is in line with this way of thinking: European foreign and security policy need no revolution but rather a set of necessary reforms, smaller and bigger steps that allow the EU to adapt to a changing world and use its political power to change the world. We should reform the EU with full awareness achieving a state of Union by 2030 will require... a set of necessary reforms. We will have to advocate against particularisms that split and impair, plan adaptations to the changing international environment, search for ways to promote our values in the world, and answer the question of how to keep Europeans safe. Like it or not, liberals always see something that needs to be reformed.

58 Gopnik

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEE –
Central and Eastern Europe

CFSP –
Common Foreign and Security Policy

EC –
European Commission

EDA –
European Defence Agency

EEAS –
European External Action Service

EP –
European Parliament

MFF –
Multiannual Financial Framework

TTIP –
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acuto Michele, Steve Rayner, "*City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging (New) Lock-Ins?*", International Affairs 92, no. 5 (2016), pp. 1147–66.

Amt, Auswärtiges, The Foreign Service - Staff (German Federal Foreign Office), accessed 9 November 2020.

Anthony, Ian, "*Cities and Security*", SIPRI (26 November 2015).

Bayer, Lili, "*Meet von Der Leyen's 'Geopolitical Commission'*", POLITICO (4 December 2019).

Belhay, Salima, "*A European Army by and for Europeans*" (Initiative Policy Document, May 2019).

Bělín, Matěj, Jan Hanousek, "*Which Sanctions Matter? Analysis of the EU/Russian Sanctions of 2014*", Journal of Comparative Economics (21 July 2020).

Biden, Joseph R. and Michael Carpenter, "*How to Stand Up to the Kremlin*", Foreign Affairs (2018).

Biden, Joseph R., "*Why America Must Lead Again*", Foreign Affairs (2020).

Bradford, Anu, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

Brzozowski, Alexandra, "*Poland Rejects Southern Europe's Push for Mandatory Relocation of Migrants*", Euractiv (blog) (18 September 2020).

Cianciara, Agnieszka K., *The Politics of the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Routledge, 2020).

Davis Cross, Mai'a K. and Jan Melissen, *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work* (Springer, 2013).

Drum, Kevin, "*Tech World. Welcome to the Digital Revolution*", Foreign Affairs (2018).

EEAS, Human Resources Report 2019 (European External Action Service, July 2020).

Esser, F. and J. Strömbäck, eds., *Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014).

European Commission, *Connecting Europe & Asia: The EU Strategy* (19 September 2018)

European Commission, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union (Brussels: 21 March 2019)

European Commission, *EU-China – A Strategic Outlook* (12 March 2019)

European Commission "*WHITE PAPER on Levelling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies*" (Brussels, 17 June 2020).

European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016).

European Union, "*The Maastricht Treaty*", Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed 28 November 2020

Eyskens, Mark, "*The Importance of a European Foreign and Security Policy*", The Economist (23 March 2017).

Fletcher, Tom, *The Naked Diplomat* (William Collins, 2017).

Freedom House, *Democracy in Retreat. Freedom in the World* 2019 (2019).

Ganesh, Janan, "*US Shift to Asia Is More than a Short-Term Pivot*", Financial Times (20 February 2019).

Gopnik, Adam, *A Thousand Small Sanities: The Moral Adventure of Liberalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2019).

Kamiński, Tomasz, "*The Sub-State Dimension of the European Union Relations with China*", European Foreign Affairs Review 24, no. 3 (1 October 2019), pp. 367–85.

Kenton, Will, "*Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)*", Investopedia, accessed 28 November 2020.

Khanna, Parag, "*How Megacities Are Changing the Map of the World*", Ted Talks (2016).

Khanna, Parag, *The Future Is Asian (New York: Simon & Schuster*, 2019).

Koenig, Nicole, Nils Redeker, "*After One Year of the 'geopolitical' Commission, It's Time to Get Real*", Euractiv (blog) (14 September 2020).

Monar, Jörg, "*EU Internal Security Governance: The Case of Counter-Terrorism*", European Security 23, no. 2 (3 April 2014): pp. 195–209.

Newman, Edward, "*Critical Human Security Studies*", Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (January 2010), pp. 77–94.

Nielsen, Kristian L., "*EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap*", Journal of Contemporary European Research 9, no. 5 (28 November 2013).

Novaky, Niklas, "*The Budget Deal and EU Defence Cooperation: What Are the Implications?*", Euractiv (blog) (22 July 2020).

Nye, Joseph, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, New Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005)

Paris, Roland, "*Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?*", International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), pp. 87–102.

Pomerantsev, Peter, *This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality, Main edition* (Faber & Faber, 2019).

Rachman, Gideon, *Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century, 1st edition* (London: Vintage, 2017).

Rifkin, Jeremy, T*he European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Reprint edition* (New York: TarcherPerigee, 2005).

Schilde, Kaija E., Stephanie B. Anderson, and Andrew D. Garner, "*A More Martial Europe? Public Opinion, Permissive Consensus, and EU Defence Policy*", European Security 28, no. 2 (3 April 2019).

SIPRI Yearbook 2020 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020).

Smith, Michael E., "*The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus: Organizing for Effectiveness or Incoherence?*", Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 9 (1 October 2013): pp. 1299–1315.

Szczudlik Justyna, "*The EU's New China Policy Works*", China Observers (blog) (14 October 2020).

Sziklai, Balázs R., László Á. Kóczy, and Dávid Csercsik, "*The Impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European Gas Market Bargaining Positions*", Energy Policy 144 (1 September 2020): 111692.

The Economist "*Europe's Future Is Multi-Speed and Multi-Tier*", (23 March 2017).

UN, The Paris Agreement | UNFCCC, accessed 28 November 2020.

Valatsas, Dimitris, "*Green Deal, Greener World*", Foreign Policy (17 December 2019).

Young, Mitchell, *Knowledge Power Europe: What Science Diplomacy Can Teach Us about the EU* (ECPR General Conference, Wrocław, September 2019).