https://doi.org/10.18778/8331-310-8.11

Karol Żakowski

University of Lodz
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2715-570X

Overcoming Animosities: History Issues and Japan's Cooperation with Southeast Asia

Abstract
Although anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia initially remained strong after the Second World War, since the 1970s, Tokyo has managed to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Cordial relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states contrasted with periodic reemergence of history issues between Japan and China or South Korea. This article examines the causes of this difference. It analyzes the international and domestic factors behind rapprochement between Japan and such states as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Vietnam. It is argued that reconciliation with ASEAN countries was a part of Japan's foreign policy strategy. Initially, it was aimed at promoting mutually beneficial trade through the Fukuda Doctrine, but over time, it started serving as one of the ways of containing and counterbalancing China's rise in the region.

Keywords: *Japan, Southeast Asia, international relations, Fukuda Doctrine*

1. Introduction

Since the late 1970s, relations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries have generally remained friendly and cordial. On the other hand, in the immediate postwar period, they were characterized by distrust and enmity stemming from the memory about the Japanese invasion during the Second World War. This article examines how both sides managed to overcome history issues and establish mutually beneficial cooperation.

History problems between Japan and Southeast Asia have been less frequently researched than similar problems between Tokyo and Seoul or Beijing. Peng Er Lam (2015, p. 44) argues that reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asia ended in a success due to four factors: 1) Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia lasted shorter than the invasion of China and South Korea; 2) Southeast Asian states displayed pragmatic approach in putting economic and security problems before sentiments; 3) authoritarian regimes in the region ignored anti-Japanese feelings of ordinary citizens; and 4) Japan succeeded in addressing the issue of difficult past relatively early through the Fukuda Doctrine. Other authors pointed to religious (Chamberlain, 2019, p. 6) or geopolitical factors (Mikalsen Grønning, 2018) that facilitated improvement of relations between Southeast Asian countries and Japan.

The impact of history problems on foreign policy may be interpreted through the lenses of three major theories of international relations: neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Neorealists draw attention to objectively definable national interests that determine decisions of statespersons (Waltz, 2010). In this light, rather than being influenced by the difficult past between both countries, relations between Japan and Southeast Asia depend on such strategic factors as consideration paid by ASEAN states to Tokyo as a counterweight against Beijing's growing regional ambitions. History problems can, at most, constitute an instrument of applying political pressure on Japan whenever such policy is beneficial to the concerned governments. Neoliberal scholars, in turn, put emphasis on the significance of growing economic interdependence as a factor that assuages international disputes (Nye, 1976, pp. 130–161). According to them, mutually beneficial trade exchange and foreign direct investments between Japan and Southeast Asia should mitigate the impact of history issues on bilateral contacts. By contrast, constructivists tend to consider intersubjective identity of nations, based on such factors as history of mutual interaction, as a crucial determinant of foreign policy (Wendt, 1999). According to this theory, lack of reconciliation between Tokyo and ASEAN states would constitute a severe obstacle in bilateral relations, though mutual perception may change over time due to friendly cooperation.

This article draws on the discoveries of all the three abovementioned theories to analyze the process of reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asian countries after the Second World War. In line with constructivism, it stresses importance of emotional factors that hindered

cooperation between Tokyo and the region in the immediate postwar period. Based on neorealism and neoliberalism, however, it examines the pragmatic rapprochement between Japan and Southeast Asian states since the 1970s. Significance of Japan both as a counterweight against growing influence of Beijing and as a leading investor contributing to economic growth in the region facilitated overcoming mutual animosities.

The article is composed of three sections. The first one briefly describes the history problems between Japan and Southeast Asia. The following sections, in turn, analyze how Tokyo managed to reconcile with the countries in the region – at first through symbolic gestures and development assistance, and later by becoming a strategic geopolitical partner against external threats.

2. History Issues Between Japan and Southeast Asia

Immediately after the Second World War, anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia were as strong as in China or on the Korean Peninsula. The atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army were remembered not only by the societies, but also by the governments, which severely complicated Tokyo's diplomacy towards the region.

Due to rich deposits of energy resources, European and American colonies in Southeast Asia, particularly Dutch East Indies, became an important target of Japanese territorial expansionism during the War on Pacific that began in late 1941. Until Tokyo's surrender in 1945, the Japanese occupation of the region was accompanied by numerous atrocities and crimes against local population. Within the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Japan implanted puppet regimes in most of Southeast Asian countries. While Japanese propaganda maintained that the aim of the empire was to liberate Asian nations from Western colonialism, Japanese occupation abounded in greater brutality than the European or American rule. In Indonesia, Japanese troops enslaved millions and murdered at least half a million of forced laborers, called *romusha*. Moreover, they killed hundreds of *romusha* in a medical experiment to develop tetanus vaccination (Baird & Marzuni, 2015). In Singapore, Japanese soldiers executed Chinese population in *Sook Ching* massacre and bayoneted medical staff and patients of hospitals. In the Philippines, they organized the Bataan death march, killing thousands of Filipino and hundreds of American prisoners. In current

Myanmar, numerous Asian laborers and POWs who built Thailand–Burma Railway died of ill treatment and overwork. In the occupied countries, the Japanese military police Kenpeitai tortured members of local population suspected of espionage or sabotage. Other examples of war atrocities in Southeast Asia included massacres, murders, torture and beatings, forced marches, forced prostitution, decapitation of prisoners, neglect of the detainees' welfare and health, rapes, pillages, and even cannibalism (Wilson et al., 2017, pp. 3–17).

Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Tokyo was to negotiate payment of war reparations bilaterally with the concerned governments. After Southeast Asian states gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, they established diplomatic relations with Japan. As a result of bilateral talks, Tokyo provided as war compensations and development grants 200 million USD to Burma in 1954 (with additional 140 million USD in 1963), 550 million USD to the Philippines in 1956, 223 million USD to Indonesia in 1958, as well as 39 million USD to South Vietnam in 1959 (Kuriyama, 2016, p. 36). These funds contributed to the rebuilding of the concerned countries from war destruction.

Despite receiving war reparations, Southeast Asian nations felt strong resentment against Japan. In 1962, as many as 120.000 Singaporeans participated in a demonstration, demanding erection of a memorial after discovery of mass graves of the victims of *Sook Ching* massacre (Lam, 2015, p. 53). The memory of war atrocities was often accompanied by the fear of Japanese economic domination. As exemplified by Japanese products boycott movement in Thailand in 1972, history issues hindered Japan's trade with the region (Sudo, 1988, p. 511). Anti-Japanese feelings made bilateral diplomatic exchange an extremely delicate matter. For instance, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in January 1974 was accompanied by violent riots and demonstrations in major cities. In particular, in Jakarta violent mobs attacked Japanese companies, burned vehicles made in Japan, and demanded dismissal of pro-Japanese advisors to President Suharto who were accused of giving excessive economic privileges to Japan (Anwar, 1990, p. 238). At that time, the fear of potential revival of Japanese militarism made Southeast Asian governments reject the possibility of Japan's participation in political affairs of the ASEAN, established in 1967 (Singh, 2002, p. 282).

The scale of war atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War made it difficult for Southeast Asian

nations to reconcile with postwar Japan. While war reparations provided by Tokyo contributed to the economic development of the region, the fear of revival of Japanese militarism and economic domination of Japan was omnipresent. As a result, in order to develop cooperation with ASEAN states, Japan first had to heal the wounds it had caused.

3. Overcoming History Problems Through "Heart-to-Heart" Relationship

While it is not easy to change the perception of one nation by another, constructivist theory claims that such development is possible. The expression of regret for the difficult past, coupled with gestures of goodwill by Japan, initiated the process of a shift in its perceived role from the one of an enemy to the one of a partner, and potentially even a friend. What is important, the reconciliation policy was pursued not only by Japan, but also by the governments of Southeast Asian states.

The geopolitical situation in the 1970s favored Tokyo's growing interest in Southeast Asia. The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam created a political vacuum in the region, which Japan, as a new economic power, intended to fill. When Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo attended the first ASEAN–Japan meeting in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977, he delivered a historic speech that became the foundation for the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine." It was announced that Japan would never again become a military power, that it wanted to establish "heart-to-heart" relationship with Southeast Asian nations, and that both sides should treat each other as equal partners in contributing to prosperity and stability in the region (Haddad, 1980, p. 10). The Fukuda Doctrine was continued by successive Japanese prime ministers, which contributed to overcoming mutual animosities.

The Filipino government started making efforts for reconciliation with Japan as one of the first governments in Southeast Asia. In the 1970s, Tokyo was allowed to fund construction of numerous memorials commemorating Japanese soldiers who had died in that country, such as the Caliraya Memorial in Batangas Province. In 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos invited Japanese veterans, including convicted war criminals, to visit the Philippines. As stressed by Sharon Chamberlain (2019, pp. 3–6), the Filipino political elites used the narrative of Christian forgiveness to assuage anti-Japanese sentiments.

In the 1990s, Japan made symbolic gestures that served reconciliation with Southeast Asian countries. Murayama Tomiichi, the first socialist prime minister of Japan since the 1940s, was particularly eager to properly apologize to all countries that had suffered from Japanese territorial expansionism. When he visited Southeast Asian countries in August 1994, he stressed that in its diplomacy towards Asia Japan should always keep in mind that its acts of aggression and colonial rule in the past had inflicted "unbearable suffering and sorrow" to many people. What is important, he laid a wreath in the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore. He made this gesture despite strong protests from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that emphasized there were doubts about the number of victims of the massacre instituted by the Imperial Army. Murayama, however, stressed that such details did not matter as there were no doubts that the massacre had taken place (Murayama & Sataka, 2009, pp. 45–47). In August 1995, Prime Minister Murayama issued a revolutionary statement, in which he expressed his "feelings of deep remorse" and "heartfelt apology" to those Asian countries which had experienced "colonial rule and aggression" from Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995).

Reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asian nations was symbolized by the fact that governments and NGOs from the region cooperated with the Asian Women's Fund – an institution established in 1995 to compensate the so-called "comfort women," that is, sexual slaves abused by the Imperial Army during the Second World War. For instance, the Philippines, despite initial skepticism, decided to fully respect the will of victims and agreed to participate in the project. The most controversial was cooperation with the Suharto regime in Indonesia. Jakarta insisted on receiving lump-sum grants from the fund to construct 50 welfare facilities for the elderly instead of paying atonement money to individuals. Unfortunately, the constructed facilities only to a small extent served former "comfort women." Still, Southeast Asian countries were much more cooperative than South Korea and China, which rejected the whole idea of accepting apology letters and indemnities from Tokyo (Ōnuma, 2007, pp. 33–75).

Reconciliation with Japan was reflected in official documents issued by the governments of ASEAN states. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in August 2015, Manila stated:

> Since the middle of the 20th century, the Philippines' relationship with Japan, in particular, has been characterized by trust and unfailing support in so many fields, as Japan has acted with compassion and in accordance with international law, and has more actively and more positively engaged the region and the world. This 70-year history demonstrates to the world that through their relentless efforts, peoples of two countries can attain a remarkable achievement in overcoming issues of the past and establishing strong friendship (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, 2015).

Less cordial, but equally future-oriented, was statement by Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson:

> In the 1960s, there was a period when we discovered the mass graves where the civilians had been massacred in Singapore. (...) There was a big outcry, I think the Japanese government made an apology, donated some money and we built a memorial. So between Singapore and Japan, the chapter is closed. Officially, we have moved on. And we have very good relations between Singapore and Japan since then – investments, trade, cooperation in many areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, 2013).

The other Southeast Asian governments did not even feel the necessity to issue official statements on the anniversary.

What is significant, while anti-Japanese sentiments were usually transmitted to the younger generations in China or South Korea, the youth in Southeast Asian countries perceived Japan as the source of rich popular culture rather than a former invader. This difference resulted mainly from the way the Second World War was narrated at schools. According to an analysis of the contents of history textbooks in ASEAN countries conducted by Peng Er Lam (2015, pp. 48–58), Japanese war atrocities tended to be either downplayed or depicted as less destructive than the colonial occupation by Western powers (Lam, 2015, pp. 48–58).

Opinion polls indicate that Japan's "heart-to-heart" diplomacy towards Southeast Asia contributed to amelioration of Japan's perception in the region. According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2015, 84% of respondents had a favorable view of Japan in Malaysia, 82% in Vietnam, 81% in the Philippines, and 71% in Indonesia, compared to only 12% in China and 25% in South Korea. Interestingly, despite the shared experience of Japanese occupation, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Indonesians perceived South Korea less positively than Japan (Vietnamese perceived both countries equally positively) (Stokes, 2015). Another poll, conducted by TNS Singapore in 2008, showed that majority of Southeast Asians thought about history problems that "Japan did some bad things, but they are not an issue now" – 78% in Vietnam, 70% in Indonesia, 69% in Singapore, 68% in Thailand, 65% in Malaysia, and 59% in the Philippines

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008). This pro-Japanese attitude indicates that while Southeast Asian nations never forgot war atrocities, they did not intend to excessively dwell upon the difficult past.

Both Tokyo and Southeast Asian governments put a lot of effort into overcoming the mutual animosities. Japanese politicians issued historic declarations, such as the Fukuda Doctrine and the Murayama Statement, as well made symbolic gestures, e.g. laying wreath at the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore by Prime Minister Murayama, which contributed to reconciliation. Most importantly, words and gestures were accompanied by compensations and atonement money to the victims of Japanese invasion. However, acceptance of these apologetic acts probably would have been more problematic without a future-oriented, pragmatic stance of Southeast Asian leaders.

4. Overcoming History Problems Through Joint National Interests

The reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asian nations was fuelled by joint national interests. Initially, they were related mainly to mutual benefits from bilateral trade exchange and foreign direct investments. Over time, however, Southeast Asian governments started perceiving Japan as a potential counterweight against China's growing ambitions in the region.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, cooperation between Tokyo and Southeast Asia focused mainly on the economic dimension. ASEAN took advantage of Japan's economic assistance to strengthen regional cooperation, while Japan perceived relations with Southeast Asia as an instrument for developing multilateral economic cooperation. In November 1977, the Fukuda cabinet promised to provide 1 billion USD to ASEAN industrial projects, agreed to reduce barriers on trade, and offered to establish bilateral cultural exchange programs (Sudo, 1988, pp. 514–522). In 1990, one-third of Japan's whole Official Development Assistance (ODA) was devoted to finance various projects in ASEAN states, which amounted to 2.299 billion USD. Japan's position in the region was symbolized by the fact that in 1996 Japan was the largest ODA donor to all of the ASEAN countries except for Malaysia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998).

Some of Southeast Asian governments started openly admitting that Japan's economic development became a model for them to emulate.

Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew made a pragmatic choice of overcoming the painful memory of war in order to establish mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Japan as early as 1966, when he accepted 25 million USD in war reparations from Tokyo. Japanese investments in the city-state propelled reconciliation between both countries. Yaohan, a Japanese supermarket chain opened in Plaza Singapura in 1976, became an icon among the Singaporeans. In the 1980s, Singapore introduced a system of community-oriented neighborhood police posts modeled after the Japanese *kōban*. At the same time, Japanese corporate practices were emulated by local companies, and Prime Minister Lee made Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel's bestseller *Japan as Number One* – a book that lauded Japanese business model – a recommended reading for the Singapore Cabinet (Lam, 2017, pp. 71–72).

Similar development was observed in Malaysia. In 1982, Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad launched "Look East" policy, which was fuelled by his anti-Western nationalism. Japan, along with South Korea, became a model of economic development for Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur actively encouraged Malaysians to emulate Japanese work ethics, management style and values, and even established a special scholarship program for those who wanted to study in Japan. Most importantly, Malaysia offered tax incentives to Japanese corporations to persuade them to establish joint-ventures with Malaysian counterparts. This policy resulted in a considerable increase in Japanese investments in the country. At the beginning of the 1990s, Mahathir Muhammad together with Lee Kuan Yew proposed a concept of East Asian Economic Caucus composed exclusively of the states representing East Asian civilization. His aim was to make Japan leader of this initiative, but Tokyo distanced itself from the plan so as not to damage its good relations with the US (Furuoka, 2007, pp. 505–519).

Gradually, security concerns became as important incentive for strengthening ties between Japan and Southeast Asia as economic cooperation. After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, China started emerging as the strongest political, economic, and military power in the region. Concerns related to China's sudden rise were shared by Japan with many Southeast Asian governments. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei were involved in a territorial dispute with Beijing over the Spratly Island in the South China Sea, reminiscent of Japan's dispute with the People's Republic of China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. In the 1990s, Beijing started demonstrating an

assertive posture in both seas through frequent incursions into territorial waters of the neighbouring countries. Tensions peaked at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. A collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the East China Sea in September 2010, followed by nationalization of three islands of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Archipelago by the Noda cabinet in September 2012, caused a series of diplomatic crises between Beijing and Tokyo (Zakowski, 2015, pp. 134–140, 185–192). In parallel, dangerous incidents took place in the South China Sea. An aggressive approach of two Chinese patrol ships to a Philippine survey vessel at the Reed Bank in March 2011 as well as incursion of Chinese fishing boats to the waters near the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 prompted Manila to hasten modernization of its army (Cruz de Castro, 2017, pp. 37–38). For that reason, it is not surprising that many ASEAN states perceived Tokyo as a counterweight against Beijing's growing ambitions.

In particular, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō strengthened security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries under his long term in office from 2012 to 2020. During his visit to ASEAN in January 2013, he announced "Five Principles to Build the Future," which included protection of freedom of speech, ensuring rule of the law in the seas, "pursuing free, open, interconnected economies," as well as promotion of cultural and youth exchange with the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013). Protection of open seas was a camouflaged criticism of China's rising maritime ambitions. In December 2013, Japan published the National Security Strategy and announced the concept of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" (*sekkyokuteki heiwashugi*), aimed at strengthening Japan's deterrence capabilities, enhancing alliance with the US, as well as protecting regional and global stability based on universal values. In April 2014, the Abe administration relaxed the ban on arms export so as to allow transfer of military technology, provided it "contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation" or "the transfer contributes to Japan's security" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). In February 2015, in turn, Tokyo revised the rules of providing the ODA to allow financing projects involving armed forces upon the condition that they are related to "development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, pp. 10–11). Most importantly, in July 2014, the Japanese government revised interpretation of the Constitution to legalize collective self-defense, which was confirmed by

the security bills passed in the Diet in the summer of 2015. The new law enabled Japan to provide military assistance to "a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan" in case it was attacked by a hostile army (Zakowski, 2021a, pp. 206–229). These revolutionary changes paved the way towards Japan's greater involvement in maintaining regional balance of power.

Japan's new security strategy enabled strengthening cooperation with those Southeast Asian countries that could serve Tokyo to contain the rising China. In particular, Japan developed strategic partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam based on regular security dialogue meetings, high-level political interaction, diplomatic support against Chinese maritime claims, financial assistance, and military cooperation (Mikalsen Grønning, 2018, pp. 535–540). During his visit to the Philippines in July 2013, Prime Minister Abe promised to equip the Philippine Coast Guard with ten patrol vessels. Two years later, the contract on the construction of ships was signed by the Japan Marine United Corporation. Symbolically, in June 2015, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C surveillance aircraft took part in joint drills with the Philippine Navy off the coast of Palawan Island near the Spratly Archipelago. In September 2016, Tokyo decided to provide the Philippines with two additional large patrol ships through a yen loan, transfer Maritime Self-Defense Force's TC-90 training aircraft, and assist in training the Philippine Navy pilots. Similar cooperation was launched with Vietnam. In August 2014, Japan finalized negotiations over free provision of six used patrol vessels to this country, and in January 2017, it promised to provide six new patrol ships to the Vietnamese maritime law enforcement entities (Żakowski, 2021b, pp. 193–194).

The China factor also compelled Japan to further promote economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. Rivalry between both powers in the region was particularly visible in the infrastructure sector. Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank by Beijing in 2015 prompted Tokyo to launch the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initiative in the same year. In August 2016, Prime Minister Abe announced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy aimed at improving connectivity both through developing transportation infrastructure and enhancing maritime law enforcement. While Japan focused on promoting construction of East--West economic corridors, China's goal was to build North-South Pan--Asian Railway Network and integrate it with the Belt and Road Initiative – a new silk route linking Asia and Europe (Zhao, 2019, pp. 558–574).

Both economic and security cooperation fuelled reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asia. Focused on economic development, ASEAN countries not only downplayed commemoration of war atrocities committed by the Imperial Army to attract Japanese investments, but also perceived Japan as a model to emulate. After the end of the Cold War, Tokyo additionally became a potential counterweight against China's growing position in the region. Joint national interests explain why Southeast Asian elites avoided antagonizing Japan through reference to history problems.

5. Conclusions

The relative success of postwar reconciliation between Japan and Southeast Asian nations stemmed both from the gestures made by Tokyo and from the convergence of the national interests of both sides. Japanese leaders relatively early after the Second World War started perceiving ASEAN states as important partners, which explains their willingness to pay war reparations and express regret for the past invasion. Most of Southeast Asian governments, in turn, treated Japanese occupation as a relatively short interlude in their struggle for independence against colonial powers. In line with constructivist theory, it was thus possible to gradually change the perception of Japan in Southeast Asia from an enemy to a partner and friend. Historic declarations and gestures by Japanese prime ministers, such as announcement of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977 or laying wreath at the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi facilitated this process.

Nevertheless, as stressed by neoliberal and neorealist interpretations, reconciliation was largely fuelled by a pragmatic choice. Such countries as Singapore and Malaysia were eager to attract Japanese investments and emulate the Japanese corporate culture. Japan's ODA largely contributed to the economic development of ASEAN states. After the end of Cold War, in turn, security concerns became crucial in understanding Tokyo's cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. In particular, Vietnam and the Philippines treated Japan as the only power in the region that could counterbalance the growing influence of China. Announcement of the "Five Principles to Build the Future" by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2013 showed the strategic convergence between Tokyo and most of ASEAN

states. For these reasons, Southeast Asian governments and nations did not excessively dwell upon the past and managed to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan.

Acknowledgements

This article is a result of research conducted as a part of project "Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Japan's Policy on History Problems" financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (DEC-2019/33/B/HS5/00846).

References

Anwar D.F. (1990), Indonesia's Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 225–246.

Baird J.K. & Marzuni S. (2015), *War Crimes in Japan-Occupied Indonesia: A Case of Murder by Medicine*, Nebraska: Potomac Books.

Chamberlain S.W. (2019), *A Reckoning: Philippine Trials of Japanese War Criminals*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Cruz de Castro R. (2017), 21st Century Japan–Philippines Strategic Partnership: Constraining China's Expansion in the South China Sea, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 31–51.

Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (2015), *On the Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Abe on the 70th Anniversary of World War II*, 14 August, https://dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/7127-on-the-statement-of-japanese-prime-minister-abe-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-worldwar-ii

Furuoka F. (2007), Malaysia-Japan Relations under the Mahathir Administration: Case Studies of the 'Look East' Policy and Japanese Investment in Malaysia, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 505–519.

Haddad W.W. (1980), Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 10–29.

Kuriyama T. (2016), *Sengo Nihon Gaikō. Kiseki to Kadai* [Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan. Trajectories and Issues], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Lam P.E. (2015), Japan's Postwar Reconciliation with Southeast Asia, *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 43–63.

Lam P.E. (2017), Singapore's Excellent Relations with Post-War Japan: A Convergence of Interests and Values, *Commentary*, Vol. 26, pp. 67–75.

Mikalsen Grønning B.E. (2018), Japan's Security Cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 533–552.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1995), *Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 'On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End'*, 15 August, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1998), *Relationship between Japan and ASEAN*, December, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/relation.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2008), *Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries*, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/survey/qa0803.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013), *The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy*, Jakarta, 18 January, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014), *The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology*, 6 April, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000083.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015), *Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter*, 10 February, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (2013), *MFA Spokesman's Comments in response to media queries on the Global Times website article 'Lee Hsien Loong: China could gain Diaoyu Islands but lose its international standing'*, 21 August, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2013/08/MFA-Spokesmans-Comments-in-response-to-media-queries-on-the-Global-Times-website-article-Lee-Hsien-L

Murayama T. & Sataka M. (2009), *'Murayama Danwa' to wa Nani ka* [What Is the 'Murayama Statement'?], Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten.

Nye J.S. (1976), Independence and Interdependence, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 22, Spring, pp. 130–161.

Ōnuma Y. (2007), *Ianfu' Mondai to wa Nan Datta no ka* [What Was the 'Comfort Women' Problem?], Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha.

Singh B. (2002), ASEAN's Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 276–296.

Stokes B. (2015), *How Asia-Pacific Publics See Each Other and Their National Leaders*, Pew Research Center, 2 September, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/09/02/how-asia-pacific-publics-see-each-other-and-their-national-leaders/

Sudo S. (1988), Japan–ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 509–525.

Waltz K.N. (2010), *Theory of International Politics*, 2nd edition, Long Grove: Waveland Press.

Wendt A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson S., Cribb R., Trefalt B. & Aszkielowicz D. (2017), *Japanese War Criminals. The Politics of Justice After the Second World War*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Zhao H. (2019), China–Japan Compete for Infrastructure Investment in Southeast Asia: Geopolitical Rivalry or Healthy Competition?, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 28, No. 118, pp. 558–574.

Zakowski K. (2015), *Decision-Making Reform in Japan: The DPJ's Failed Attempt at a Politician-Led Government*, London–New York: Routledge.

Zakowski K. (2021a), *Gradual Institutional Change in Japan. Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration*, London–New York Routledge.

Żakowski K. (2021b), From the Fukuda Doctrine to the Abe Doctrine: Japan's Policy toward ASEAN under the Second Abe Cabinet, in: A.W. Ziętek, G. Gil (eds), *ASEAN in a Changing World*, Berlin: Peter Lang, pp. 181–198.