<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<title>Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris 49 (2/2020)</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/32524" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/32524</id>
<updated>2026-04-04T01:33:37Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-04T01:33:37Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Argument z ukrytości a religia ewolucyjna Johna L. Schellenberga</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33850" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Sieczkowski, Tomasz</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33850</id>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:42:52Z</updated>
<published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Argument z ukrytości a religia ewolucyjna Johna L. Schellenberga
Sieczkowski, Tomasz
In this short essay, I discuss Schellenberg's hiddenness argument and&#13;
try to answer the question of whether it can be treated as an argument&#13;
for atheism. Juxtaposing it with the concept of skeptical evolutionary&#13;
religion developed by the Canadian philosopher, I show that instead of&#13;
proving the non-existence of God, what this argument does is rather&#13;
opening the possibility of articulating a new vision of religiosity,&#13;
appropriate for our species place in evolutionary time.
</summary>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Zupełnie inaczej. Nad książką Nekrofilna produkcja akademicka i pieśni partyzantów Oskara Szwabowskiego</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33849" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Kruszelnicki, Michał</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Kruszelnicki, Wojciech</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33849</id>
<updated>2021-02-25T02:20:51Z</updated>
<published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Zupełnie inaczej. Nad książką Nekrofilna produkcja akademicka i pieśni partyzantów Oskara Szwabowskiego
Kruszelnicki, Michał; Kruszelnicki, Wojciech
The article comments the stronger and the more disputable points&#13;
of Oskar Szwabowski’s book Necrofiliac Academic Production and the&#13;
Songs of Partisans (2019). The authors engage in a polemics with&#13;
the assertion that autoethnography is able to depict more efficiently&#13;
than other scientific discourses the reality of the university after the&#13;
neo-liberal reforms. We also oppose „the workers’ perspective” as promoted by O. Szwabowski, which is to replace the traditional view&#13;
of the university as an elitist site and of the faculty as a particularly&#13;
privileged class. Further, the article points out at certain shortcomings&#13;
of theoretical Marxism which O. Szwabowski uses to criticize and&#13;
envision the change of the functioning of the academic milieu along&#13;
with the transformation of the very way we perceive social research –&#13;
from an individualistic and competetive perspective, to one that&#13;
is collective and geared in social engagement and intervention.&#13;
Ultimately, we charge Oskar Szwabowski with an inconsistency which&#13;
amounts to a contradiction between his notorious call upon academics&#13;
to realize that the university has become a mass-production company,&#13;
and the faculty have been turned into the new proletariat, and his&#13;
resonant grievance upon the poor conditions of work therein.
</summary>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Uprawnienia indywidualne w filozofii politycznej Roberta Nozicka</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33848" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Saar, Marcin</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33848</id>
<updated>2021-02-25T02:20:54Z</updated>
<published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Uprawnienia indywidualne w filozofii politycznej Roberta Nozicka
Saar, Marcin
With respect to Robert Nozick’s political philosophy (as it is to be found&#13;
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia), one of the most prominent theses is the one that asserts that in Nozick’s mind individual rights are founded&#13;
on the principle of self-ownership - the principle that says that all&#13;
individuals have, with regard to themselves, rights identical with&#13;
(or parallel to) rights of property. In this paper we want to focus&#13;
on slightly different interpretation of Nozick’s thought. First,&#13;
we summarize Nozick’s account of rights: its main points being the&#13;
individual being proper subject of rights and the nature of rights&#13;
as side-constraints. Then we turn our attention to the metnioned&#13;
interpretation itself. It was proposed by Mark D. Friedman, and&#13;
it synthesizes Nozick’s insights on this topic scattered throughout his&#13;
book. It focuses on argument “from moral form to moral content” (from&#13;
the fact that the form of morality includes side-constraints to the&#13;
content of libertarian constraint against aggression) suggested&#13;
by Nozick and on features in virtue of which persons have rights - this&#13;
features being free will, rationality, moral agency and ability to live&#13;
one’s life according to some general conception of it.
</summary>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Względna identyczność Petera Geacha a koncepcja różnicy w filozofii Gilles'a Deleuze'a</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33846" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Kociołek, Kamil</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Sonek, Robert</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/33846</id>
<updated>2021-02-25T02:20:54Z</updated>
<published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Względna identyczność Petera Geacha a koncepcja różnicy w filozofii Gilles'a Deleuze'a
Kociołek, Kamil; Sonek, Robert
The area in which the philosophy attributed to the "analytic" tradition&#13;
turns out to consider similar problems as the "continental" thinkers still&#13;
seems to be too little explored. The aim of the work is to indicate such&#13;
similarities between the Peter Geach’s concept of relative identity and&#13;
the Gilles Deleuze’s concept of difference.&#13;
According to Geach, identity is mediated in concepts. We think about the&#13;
identity of "a" and "b" only in the sentence "a is the same X as b". The&#13;
consequences of this observation are twofold: on the one hand, it shows&#13;
the degree of our entanglement in conceptual grids; on the other,&#13;
it shows a being as a dynamic, relational structure. In this aspects, this perspective agrees with Deleuze's proposal. A being&#13;
is an ambiguous intersection of dynamic relations expressed in the&#13;
sentence "a is different from b", whereas the identity is an&#13;
effect of totalitarian thought movement which reduces differences by&#13;
imposing static conceptual categories on their dynamic system.&#13;
We are going to present the ontological view on identity question which&#13;
synthesizes two mentioned conceptions and include a polemical&#13;
characterization of difficulties implied by discussed perspective and&#13;
their consequences for practical functioning in the world.
</summary>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
</feed>
