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<title>Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris 30 (3/2015)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20335</link>
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<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20537"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20535"/>
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<dc:date>2026-04-04T00:24:25Z</dc:date>
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<title>Pochwała eklektyzmu</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20539</link>
<description>Pochwała eklektyzmu
Grabarczyk, Paweł; Sieczkowski, Tomasz
Wybór tekstów zamieszczonych w numerze 30 Internetowego Czasopism Filozoficznego HYBRIS, stanowi pokłosie jubileuszowego, X Zlotu Filozoficznego, który odbył się w Warszawie w dniach 3-5 lipca 2014.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20537">
<title>Tradition as a Communication System. A Pragmatic Approach</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20537</link>
<description>Tradition as a Communication System. A Pragmatic Approach
Grad, Paweł
A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional&#13;
communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were&#13;
discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity.&#13;
In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of&#13;
formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality&#13;
developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a&#13;
competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a&#13;
conceptual toolkit of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain&#13;
practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition&#13;
as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim&#13;
is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of&#13;
language game. This structure includes defined principles of&#13;
communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community&#13;
and rule of inclusion for potential new members.&#13;
Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication&#13;
within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with&#13;
normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic&#13;
communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom.&#13;
After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates&#13;
between closed system of tradition-based community and his&#13;
environment.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20535">
<title>Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Modals in the Framework of Dynamic Semantics</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20535</link>
<description>Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Modals in the Framework of Dynamic Semantics
Kostic, Milana
In dynamic semantics meaning of a statement is not equated with its truth&#13;
conditions but with its context change potential. It has also been claimed&#13;
that dynamic framework can automatically account for certain paradoxes&#13;
that involve epistemic modals, such as the following one: it seems odd and&#13;
incoherent to claim: (1) “It is raining and it might not rain”, whereas&#13;
claiming (2) “It might not rain and it is raining” does not seem equally odd&#13;
(Yalcin, 2007). Nevertheless, it seems that it cannot capture the fact that&#13;
statement (2) seems odd as well, even though not as odd as the statement&#13;
(1) (Gauker, 2007). I will argue that certain probabilistic extensions to the&#13;
dynamic model can account for this subtlety of our linguistic intuitions and&#13;
represent if not an improved than at least an alternative framework for&#13;
capturing the way contexts are updated and beliefs revised with uncertain&#13;
information.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20534">
<title>How Much Do We Learn about Hallucinations from Thought-Experiments?</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11089/20534</link>
<description>How Much Do We Learn about Hallucinations from Thought-Experiments?
Szelegieniec, Joanna Helena
The idea that our sensory experience cannot serve as a ground for&#13;
knowledge lingers on within philosophical thinking from its very&#13;
beginning. Since even the ancient sceptics argued against the possibility&#13;
of knowledge based on sense perception due to its potentially illusory or&#13;
hallucinatory character, it seems reasonable to address the issue of&#13;
hallucination itself.&#13;
The purpose of this paper is to discuss upon the philosophical&#13;
account of hallucination present in current debates. I will mainly work&#13;
on the so-called ‘argument from hallucination’ which provides a&#13;
prevalent objection both against the direct realism theory of perception,&#13;
and externalist theories of content of experience. My primary intention&#13;
will be to single out the ontological claims concerning hallucinatory&#13;
experience that constitute the core of the argument from hallucination.&#13;
Moreover, the legitimacy of philosophical theses concerning&#13;
hallucination will be discussed both by means of philosophical analysis,&#13;
and in the light of chosen empirical findings.
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<dc:date>2015-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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