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dc.contributor.authorŻegleń, Urszula M.
dc.contributor.editorKaczmarek, Janusz
dc.contributor.editorKleszcz, Ryszard
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-01T10:24:39Z
dc.date.available2017-09-01T10:24:39Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationŻegleń U.M., Between Contingency and Necessity of Human Action. Are WeFree in our Choices?, [w:] Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, s. [169]-180, doi: 10.18778/8088-538-7.14pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn978-83-8088-538-7
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/22485
dc.description.abstractThe point of departure of this paper is the characterization of human action as contingent or necessary (obligatory). The key question concerns the place for choice in the human action, i.e. are we free in our choices? Thus, the aim of this paper is to search for the answer to the question concerning human freedom and free will. In searching for the answer to this controversial question, consideration is focused on the cognitive structure of human beings. The research refers to Roman Ingarden’s conception of the human being as a relatively isolated system of a higher order, contained in a compound hierarchical structure. In this way, the argumentation for the place of free will is supported by the structure of the human being, and joins both the ontological and the epistemic aspects. In consequence, methodologically they are treated as a primary to inquiries into the theory of action on one side, and into the biological approach of cognitive science on the other.pl_PL
dc.language.isoenpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofKaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016;
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/*
dc.subjectHuman actionspl_PL
dc.subjectcontingency and necessity of actionspl_PL
dc.subjectconcept of chancepl_PL
dc.subjecthuman freedompl_PL
dc.subjectfree willpl_PL
dc.titleBetween Contingency and Necessity of Human Action. Are We Free in our Choices?pl_PL
dc.typeBook chapterpl_PL
dc.rights.holder© Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016pl_PL
dc.page.number[169]-180pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationNicolaus Copernicus University, Department of Cognitive Science and Epistemology, Institute of Philosophypl_PL
dc.identifier.eisbn978-83-8088-539-4
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dc.identifier.doi10.18778/8088-538-7.14


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