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dc.contributor.authorSławiński, Andrzej
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-03T07:02:46Z
dc.date.available2015-07-03T07:02:46Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.issn0208-6018
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/10541
dc.description.abstractThe recent global banking crisis was caused by an intertwined process consisting of the emergence of universal financial conglomerates, the development of global interbank money markets, and of regulatory capture leading to an excessively libertarian approach to financial regulation and supervision. All these factors produced the three main sources of risks that brought about the global banking crisis, namely, enhanced credit pro-cyclicality, banks’ interconnectedness, and their growing exposure to balance sheet losses. The experiences with unsustainable lending booms of the previous decade showed that stabilizing inflation is not sufficient to stabilize the economy. These experiences underscore that macro-prudential policy should be a second weapon in central banks’ countercyclical policy arsenal.pl_PL
dc.description.abstractNiedawny światowy kryzys bankowy był efektem splotu powiązanych ze sobą przyczyn w postaci rozwinięcia się globalnych rynków pieniężnych, które stały się głównym źródłem finansowania niestabilnych boomów kredytowych, oraz powstania wielkich uniwersalnych konglomeratów finansowych, które uzyskały decydujący wpływ na kształt regulacji finansowych, doprowadzając do nadmiernej liberalizacji systemu regulacji i nadzoru bankowego. Wszystkie te czynniki stworzyły trzy główne źródła zagrożeń – w postaci zwiększonej procykliczności akcji kredytowej, rosnącej współzależności banków i rosnącego ryzyka ponoszenia przez banki strat bilansowych – które spowodowały globalny kryzys bankowy. Doświadczenia, związane z pojawieniem się w ostatniej dekadzie niestabilnych boomów kredytowych, pokazały, że stabilizowanie inflacji nie wystarczy dla stabilizowania gospodarki. Doświadczenia te wykazały, że polityka makroostrożnościowa powinna stać się drugim instrumentem polityki stabilizacyjnej banku centralnego.pl_PL
dc.language.isoenpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesActa Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Oeconomica;295
dc.subjectglobal banking crisispl_PL
dc.subjectregulation and supervisionpl_PL
dc.subjectmacro-prudential policypl_PL
dc.titleInstitutional Causes of the Global Banking Crisis and the Emergence of Macro-Prudential Countercyclical Policypl_PL
dc.title.alternativeInstytucjonalne przyczyny globalnego kryzysu bankowego i pojawienie się polityki makroostrożnościowejpl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number[7]-24pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationWarsaw School of Economics, Department of Financial Markets and Institutionspl_PL
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