| dc.contributor.author | Kobos, Katarzyna | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-22T09:24:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-02-22T09:24:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/24142 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This study aims to bring out the explanatory potential of embodied
predictionism versus passive feed-forward model of sensory stimulation
in the pursuit of a parsimonious naturalist account of sensation as a
salient feature and an end point of conscious experience. Theoretical
approaches towards sensory experience are tested against specific
scenarios of the absence of observable or palpable qualities including but
not limited to the thought-experimental phenomenon of negative
synesthesia at the conclusion of the argument. . Predictionism is first
explored in its own right only to be found insufficient to do justice to the
actual mechanism behind full-blown immediate perception. A case is
made for the soundness of predictionism reconciled with the doctrine of
embodiment. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83). | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris;38 | |
| dc.subject | embodied predictionism | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | representation; embodiment | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | sensory deprivation | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | absence of sensory stimuli | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | sensory perception | pl_PL |
| dc.title | What Does the Sensory Apparatus Do When There Is Nothing to Perceive? The Salience of Sensory Absence | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 42-57 | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Clark, A. (2015). Embodied Prediction, in: Metzinger, T. & Windt, J.M. (ed.), “Open MIND”. | pl_PL |
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| dc.references | Keeley, B. (1999). Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: the neuroethology of electroreception. Biology and Philosophy 14: 395–430. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Maruszewski, T. (2001). Psychologia poznawcza. Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Sorensen, R. (2008) Hearing Silence: The perception and introspection of absences, Forthcoming in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan, New York: Oxford University Press | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Sorensen, Roy (1999). Blanks: Signs of Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 36/4: 309–321. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Sorensen, Roy (2007). Seeing Dark Things. New York: Oxford University Press. | pl_PL |
| dc.references | Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and Persons. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. | pl_PL |
