Completeness, Categoricity and Imaginary Numbers: The Debate on Husserl
| dc.contributor.author | Aranda, Víctor | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-11T06:25:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-11T06:25:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-06-30 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0138-0680 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/35467 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Husserl's two notions of "definiteness" enabled him to clarify the problem of imaginary numbers. The exact meaning of these notions is a topic of much controversy. A "definite" axiom system has been interpreted as a syntactically complete theory, and also as a categorical one. I discuss whether and how far these readings manage to capture Husserl's goal of elucidating the problem of imaginary numbers, raising objections to both positions. Then, I suggest an interpretation of "absolute definiteness" as semantic completeness and argue that this notion does not suffice to explain Husserl's solution to the problem of imaginary numbers. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Bulletin of the Section of Logic;2 | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 | |
| dc.subject | Husserl | en |
| dc.subject | completeness | en |
| dc.subject | categoricity | en |
| dc.subject | relative and absolute definiteness | en |
| dc.subject | imaginary numbers | en |
| dc.title | Completeness, Categoricity and Imaginary Numbers: The Debate on Husserl | en |
| dc.type | Other | |
| dc.page.number | 109–125 | |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Departamento de Lingüística General, Lenguas Modernas, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia | en |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 2449-836X | |
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| dc.contributor.authorEmail | victor.aranda@uam.es | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/0138-0680.2020.07 | |
| dc.relation.volume | 49 |
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