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dc.contributor.authorKaluziński, Bartosz
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-21T09:18:45Z
dc.date.available2021-07-21T09:18:45Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1689-4286
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/38066
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this paper is to analyse prescriptive interpretations of the thesis that meaning is normative, which was introduced by Saul Kripke and later developed by Paul Boghossian. We are going to show that meaning prescriptivism is counter-intuitive and has implausible consequences. Attempts to save prescriptive interpretations by appealing to prima facie obligations or „normativity of judgment” are unsuccessful.pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherInstytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInternetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS;28
dc.subjectNormativity of meaningpl_PL
dc.subjectsemantic prescriptivismpl_PL
dc.subjectprima facie obligationspl_PL
dc.subjectKripkepl_PL
dc.subjectBoghossianpl_PL
dc.titlePreskryptywna eksplikacja tezy o normatywności znaczenia i trudności z nią związanepl_PL
dc.title.alternativePrescriptive Explication of the Normativity of Meaning Thesispl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number94-115pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUAM w Poznaniupl_PL
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dc.relation.volume1pl_PL
dc.disciplinefilozofiapl_PL


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