| dc.contributor.author | Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-07-21T09:20:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-07-21T09:20:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/38068 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The discovery of mirror neurons and the characterization of their
response properties is certainly an important achievement in
neurophysiology and cognitive neuroscience. The reference to the role of
mirror neurons in ‘reading’ the intentions of other creatures and in the
learning process fulfils an explanatory function in understanding many
cognitive phenomena beginning from imitating, towards understanding,
and finishing with complex social interactions. The focus of this paper is
to review selected approaches to the role of mirror neurons in mental
activity as understanding, and to conclude with some possible
implications for researches on mirror neurons for philosophical theories
of understanding. | pl_PL |
| dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS;28 | |
| dc.subject | mirror neurons | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | understanding | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | intentionality | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | selfreflection | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | concepts | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | self-knowledge | pl_PL |
| dc.title | Can we Build Theories of Understanding on the Basis of Mirror Neurons? | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
| dc.page.number | 141-157 | pl_PL |
| dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń | pl_PL |
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| dc.relation.volume | 1 | pl_PL |
| dc.discipline | filozofia | pl_PL |
