dc.contributor.author | Hartman, Jan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-17T13:12:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-17T13:12:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1689-4286 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/40656 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper attempts to develop a theoretical perspective which combines
ethics and metaethics jointly with their links to the rational plots of the
living moral reality. The author claims that the nature of morality is
strictly emotional and criticizes false attempts to rationalize moral
sphere, in many cases resulting from the ideas and arguments produced by the academic ethics or metaethics and subsequently infiltrating the
social life. Imposed by the very theoretical nature of philosophy,
intellectualism of the theoretical developments in ethics has a wrongful
effect for public morals, falsifying the emotional nature of morality and
providing individuals with false and rhapsodic, pseudo-theoretical topoi
of contention, justifying and assessment. The article may be read as
fundamentally undermining ethics as a historically influential moral as
well as theoretical enterprise (with exclusion of the emotionalist
tradition). | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS;53 | |
dc.subject | etyka | pl_PL |
dc.subject | metaetyka | pl_PL |
dc.subject | emocjonalizm | pl_PL |
dc.subject | emotywizm | pl_PL |
dc.subject | ethics | pl_PL |
dc.subject | metaethics | pl_PL |
dc.subject | emotionalism | pl_PL |
dc.subject | emotivism | pl_PL |
dc.title | Radykalny emocjonalizm jako stanowisko metametaetyczne | pl_PL |
dc.title.alternative | Radical emotionalism as a meta-metaethical position | pl_PL |
dc.type | Article | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | 30-55 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Jagielloński | pl_PL |
dc.references | Blacburne S. 1984. Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brandt R. The Definition of an `Ideal Observer` Theory in Ethics”. w: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15 (1995). | pl_PL |
dc.references | Hartman J. Istotowy formalizm filozofii praktycznej, w: E. Nowak-Juchacz (red.), Transcendentalna filozofia praktyczna, Poznań : WN UAM 2000, s. 169-180. | pl_PL |
dc.references | Hartman J. 2007. Tożsamość etyka, czyli uprawianie etyki jako problem moralny, w: Diametros 14 (2007). s. 14-21; tekst dostępny online pod adrsem: https://bazhum.muzhp.pl/media/files/Diametros/Diametrosr2007-t-n14/Diametros-r2007-t-n14-s12-31/Diametros-r2007-t-n14- s12-31.pdf. | pl_PL |
dc.references | Jaśtal J. 2007, Teoria idealnego obserwatora a problem relatywizmu, w: Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 43/2, s. 92-108. van Roojen M. Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism. W: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moralcognitivism/#Emo). | pl_PL |
dc.references | Smith A. 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. s. 110-180. | pl_PL |
dc.relation.volume | 2 | pl_PL |
dc.discipline | filozofia | pl_PL |