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dc.contributor.authorHartman, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-17T13:12:48Z
dc.date.available2022-02-17T13:12:48Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn1689-4286
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/40656
dc.description.abstractThis paper attempts to develop a theoretical perspective which combines ethics and metaethics jointly with their links to the rational plots of the living moral reality. The author claims that the nature of morality is strictly emotional and criticizes false attempts to rationalize moral sphere, in many cases resulting from the ideas and arguments produced by the academic ethics or metaethics and subsequently infiltrating the social life. Imposed by the very theoretical nature of philosophy, intellectualism of the theoretical developments in ethics has a wrongful effect for public morals, falsifying the emotional nature of morality and providing individuals with false and rhapsodic, pseudo-theoretical topoi of contention, justifying and assessment. The article may be read as fundamentally undermining ethics as a historically influential moral as well as theoretical enterprise (with exclusion of the emotionalist tradition).pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherInstytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesInternetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny HYBRIS;53
dc.subjectetykapl_PL
dc.subjectmetaetykapl_PL
dc.subjectemocjonalizmpl_PL
dc.subjectemotywizmpl_PL
dc.subjectethicspl_PL
dc.subjectmetaethicspl_PL
dc.subjectemotionalismpl_PL
dc.subjectemotivismpl_PL
dc.titleRadykalny emocjonalizm jako stanowisko metametaetycznepl_PL
dc.title.alternativeRadical emotionalism as a meta-metaethical positionpl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number30-55pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniwersytet Jagiellońskipl_PL
dc.referencesBlacburne S. 1984. Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brandt R. The Definition of an `Ideal Observer` Theory in Ethics”. w: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15 (1995).pl_PL
dc.referencesHartman J. Istotowy formalizm filozofii praktycznej, w: E. Nowak-Juchacz (red.), Transcendentalna filozofia praktyczna, Poznań : WN UAM 2000, s. 169-180.pl_PL
dc.referencesHartman J. 2007. Tożsamość etyka, czyli uprawianie etyki jako problem moralny, w: Diametros 14 (2007). s. 14-21; tekst dostępny online pod adrsem: https://bazhum.muzhp.pl/media/files/Diametros/Diametrosr2007-t-n14/Diametros-r2007-t-n14-s12-31/Diametros-r2007-t-n14- s12-31.pdf.pl_PL
dc.referencesJaśtal J. 2007, Teoria idealnego obserwatora a problem relatywizmu, w: Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 43/2, s. 92-108. van Roojen M. Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism. W: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moralcognitivism/#Emo).pl_PL
dc.referencesSmith A. 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. s. 110-180.pl_PL
dc.relation.volume2pl_PL
dc.disciplinefilozofiapl_PL


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