Show simple item record

An Epistemological Study of Theory Change

dc.contributor.authorAravanis, Theofanis
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-19T14:13:25Z
dc.date.available2022-05-19T14:13:25Z
dc.date.issued2021-11-09
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/41866
dc.description.abstractBelief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics (revision) of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;1en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.subjectBelief revisionen
dc.subjectepistemologyen
dc.subjectParikhen
dc.subjectrelevanceen
dc.subjectKuhnen
dc.subjectscientific knowledgeen
dc.titleAn Epistemological Study of Theory Changeen
dc.typeOther
dc.page.number1-26
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Patras School of Economics & Business Department of Business Administration Patras 265 00, Greece; University of the Peloponnese School of Engineering Department of Mechanical Engineering Patras 263 34, Greeceen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
dc.referencesC. Alchourrón, P. Gärdenfors, D. Makinson, On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 50(2) (1985), pp. 510–530, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239en
dc.referencesF. Ansermet, P. Magistretti, Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, Experience, and the Unconscious, Routledge (2007).en
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, Relevance and Knowledge Dynamics for Intelligent Agents, Ph.D. thesis, Department of Business Administration, School of Economics & Business, University of Patras, Patras, Greece (2019).en
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, On uniform belief revision, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 30 (2020), pp. 1357–1376, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa058en
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, P. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, Epistemic-entrenchment characterization of Parikh’s axiom, [in:] Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2017) (2017), pp. 772–778, DOI: https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/107en
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, P. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, Full characterization of Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 66 (2019), pp. 765–792, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11838en
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, P. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, An investigation of parametrized difference revision operators, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 89 (2019), pp. 7–28, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09625-xen
dc.referencesT. Aravanis, P. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, A study of possible-worlds semantics of relevance-sensitive belief revision, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 30 (2020), pp. 1125–1142, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa029en
dc.referencesM. Atiyah, R. Dijkgraaf, N. Hitchin, Geometry and physics, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, vol. 368 (2010), pp. 913–926, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2009.0227en
dc.referencesW. Bechtel, R. C. Richardson, Vitalism, [in:] E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge (1998), DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-Q109-1en
dc.referencesG. Brewka, T. Eiter, M. Truszczyński, Answer Set Programming at a glance, Communications of the ACM, vol. 54(12) (2011), pp. 93–103, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2043174.2043195en
dc.referencesM. Dalal, Investigations into theory of knowledge base revision: Preliminary report, [in:] Proceedings of the 7th National Conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 1988), The AAAI Press, Menlo Park, California (1988), pp. 475–479.en
dc.referencesE. Fermé, S. O. Hansson, Belief Change: Introduction and Overview, Springer International Publishing (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60535-7en
dc.referencesP. Gärdenfors, Knowledge in Flux – Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1988).en
dc.referencesP. Gärdenfors, Belief revision and relevance, [in:] PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (1990), pp. 349–365, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/193079en
dc.referencesP. Gärdenfors, D. Makinson, Revisions of knowledge systems using epistemic entrenchment, [in:] Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK 1988), Morgan Kaufmann, Pacific Grove, California (1988), pp. 83–95.en
dc.referencesS. Harnad, The symbol grounding problem, Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, vol. 42 (1990), pp. 335–346, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6en
dc.referencesH. Katsuno, A. Mendelzon, Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 52(3) (1991), pp. 263–294, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(91)90069-Ven
dc.referencesJ. G. Kemeny, Mathematics without numbers, Daedalus, vol. 88(4) (1959), pp. 577–591, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026529en
dc.referencesG. Kourousias, D. Makinson, Parallel interpolation, splitting, and relevance in belief change, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 72(3) (2007), pp. 994–1002, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1191333851en
dc.referencesT. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1970).en
dc.referencesE. J. Olsson, S. Enqvist (eds.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science, Springer, Dordrecht (2011), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8en
dc.referencesR. Parikh, Beliefs, belief revision, and splitting languages, [in:] L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg, M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation, vol. 2, CSLI Publications (1999), pp. 266–278.en
dc.referencesP. Peppas, Belief revision, [in:] F. van Harmelen, V. Lifschitz, B. Porter (eds.), Handbook of Knowledge Representation, Elsevier Science (2008), pp. 317–359, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-6526(07)03008-8en
dc.referencesP. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, Constructive modellings for theory change, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 36(1) (1995), pp. 120–133, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308831en
dc.referencesP. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, Parametrised difference revision, [in:] Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2018) (2018), pp. 277–286.en
dc.referencesP. Peppas, M.-A. Williams, S. Chopra, N. Foo, Relevance in belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 229 (2015), pp. 126–138, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.08.007en
dc.contributor.authorEmailfaravanis@hotmail.com
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2021.26
dc.relation.volume51


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
1-26_Aravanis.pdf
Size:
530.0Kb
Format:
PDF
View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0