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Introduction: Bilateralism and Proof-Theoretic Semantics (Part II)

dc.contributor.authorAyhan, Sara
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-26T14:25:15Z
dc.date.available2023-10-26T14:25:15Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-30
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/48182
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;3en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.titleIntroduction: Bilateralism and Proof-Theoretic Semantics (Part II)en
dc.typeOther
dc.page.number267-274
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationRuhr University Bochum, Institute of Philosophyen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
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dc.referencesH. Wansing, S. Ayhan, Logical Multilateralism (2023), submitted.en
dc.contributor.authorEmailsara.ayhan@rub.de
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2023.24
dc.relation.volume52


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