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Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism

dc.contributor.authorKürbis, Nils
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-26T14:25:17Z
dc.date.available2023-10-26T14:25:17Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-18
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/48184
dc.description.abstractIn bilateral logic formulas are signed by + and –, indicating the speech acts assertion and denial. I argue that making an assumption is also speech act. Speech acts cannot be embedded within other speech acts. Hence we cannot make sense of the notion of making an assumption in bilateral logic. Attempts to solve this problem are considered and rejected.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;3en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.subjectassertionen
dc.subjectdenialen
dc.subjectnegationen
dc.subjectsuppositionen
dc.subjectassumptionsen
dc.subjectspeech actsen
dc.titleSupposition: A Problem for Bilateralismen
dc.typeOther
dc.page.number301-327
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Bochum, Department of Philosophy I; University College London, Department of Philosophy; University of Lodz, Department of Logic and Methodology of Scienceen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
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dc.contributor.authorEmailnils.kuerbis@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2023.07
dc.relation.volume52


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