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Bilateral Rules as Complex Rules

dc.contributor.authorCeragioli, Leonardo
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-26T14:25:18Z
dc.date.available2023-10-26T14:25:18Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-18
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/48185
dc.description.abstractProof-theoretic semantics is an inferentialist theory of meaning originally developed in a unilateral framework. Its extension to bilateral systems opens both opportunities and problems. The problems are caused especially by Coordination Principles (a kind of rule that is not present in unilateral systems) and mismatches between rules for assertion and rules for rejection. In this paper, a solution is proposed for two major issues: the availability of a reduction procedure for tonk and the existence of harmonious rules for the paradoxical zero-ary connective \(\bullet\). The solution is based on a reinterpretation of bilateral rules as complex rules, that is, rules that introduce or eliminate connectives in a subordinate position. Looking at bilateral rules from this perspective, the problems faced by bilateralism can be seen as special cases of general problems of complex systems, which have been already analyzed in the literature. In the end, a comparison with other proposed solutions underlines the need for further investigation in order to complete the picture of bilateral proof-theoretic semantics.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;3en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.subjectbilateralismen
dc.subjectseparabilityen
dc.subjectharmonyen
dc.titleBilateral Rules as Complex Rulesen
dc.typeOther
dc.page.number329-375
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Pisa, Department of Civilizations and Forms of Knowledgeen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
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dc.contributor.authorEmailleonardo.ceragioli@unifi.it
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2023.13
dc.relation.volume52


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