dc.contributor.author | Łukowski, Piotr | |
dc.contributor.author | Rudnicki, Konrad | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-05T13:36:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-02-05T13:36:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-10-08 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0138-0680 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/54522 | |
dc.description.abstract | When humans reason, they are able to revise their beliefs in light of new information and abandon obsolete conclusions. Logicians argued, that in some cases, such reasonings appear to be non-monotonic. Thus, many different, seemingly non-monotonic systems were created to formally model such cases. The purpose of this article is to re-examine the definition of non-monotonicity and its implementation in non-monotonic logics and in examples of everyday human reasoning. We will argue that many non-monotonic logics employ some weakened versions of the definitions of non-monotonicity, since in-between different steps of reasoning they either: a) allow previously accepted premises to be removed, or b) change the rules of inference. Of the two strategies, the second one seems downright absurd, since changing the rules of a given logic is a mere replacement of that logic with the rules of another. As a consequence we obtain two logics, whereas the definition of a non-monotonic logic is supposed to define one. The definition of non-monotonicity does not permit either of these cases, which means that such logics are monotonic. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Bulletin of the Section of Logic;4 | en |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 | |
dc.subject | non-monotonicity | en |
dc.subject | reasoning | en |
dc.subject | belief revision | en |
dc.title | Exploring the Definition of Non-Monotonicity – Logical and Psychological Considerations | en |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.page.number | 419-453 | |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Łukowski, Piotr - Jagiellonian University, Department of Logic, Kraków, Poland | en |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Rudnicki, Konrad - University of Antwerp, Department of Communication Science, Antwerp, Belgium | en |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2449-836X | |
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dc.contributor.authorEmail | Łukowski, Piotr - piotr.lukowski@uni.lodz.pl | |
dc.contributor.authorEmail | Rudnicki, Konrad - konrad.rudnicki@uantwerpen.be | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/0138-0680.2024.14 | |
dc.relation.volume | 53 | |