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dc.contributor.authorŁukowski, Piotr
dc.contributor.authorRudnicki, Konrad
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-05T13:36:53Z
dc.date.available2025-02-05T13:36:53Z
dc.date.issued2024-10-08
dc.identifier.issn0138-0680
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/54522
dc.description.abstractWhen humans reason, they are able to revise their beliefs in light of new information and abandon obsolete conclusions. Logicians argued, that in some cases, such reasonings appear to be non-monotonic. Thus, many different, seemingly non-monotonic systems were created to formally model such cases. The purpose of this article is to re-examine the definition of non-monotonicity and its implementation in non-monotonic logics and in examples of everyday human reasoning. We will argue that many non-monotonic logics employ some weakened versions of the definitions of non-monotonicity, since in-between different steps of reasoning they either: a) allow previously accepted premises to be removed, or b) change the rules of inference. Of the two strategies, the second one seems downright absurd, since changing the rules of a given logic is a mere replacement of that logic with the rules of another. As a consequence we obtain two logics, whereas the definition of a non-monotonic logic is supposed to define one. The definition of non-monotonicity does not permit either of these cases, which means that such logics are monotonic.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBulletin of the Section of Logic;4en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.subjectnon-monotonicityen
dc.subjectreasoningen
dc.subjectbelief revisionen
dc.titleExploring the Definition of Non-Monotonicity – Logical and Psychological Considerationsen
dc.typeArticle
dc.page.number419-453
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationŁukowski, Piotr - Jagiellonian University, Department of Logic, Kraków, Polanden
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationRudnicki, Konrad - University of Antwerp, Department of Communication Science, Antwerp, Belgiumen
dc.identifier.eissn2449-836X
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dc.contributor.authorEmailŁukowski, Piotr - piotr.lukowski@uni.lodz.pl
dc.contributor.authorEmailRudnicki, Konrad - konrad.rudnicki@uantwerpen.be
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0138-0680.2024.14
dc.relation.volume53


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