Stopień niezależności banku centralnego a inflacja

Abstract

he objective of the article is an analysis of influence of a degree of central bank independence on a rate of inflation. Inflation theories of dynamic inconsistency were developed e.g. by Kydland and Prescott [1977], Barro and Gordon [1983] and Rogoff [1985]. On the basis of mentioned theories higher degree of central bank independence may result in lower rate of inflation. The first part of the article presents theorical basis of analysed relationship and is based on articles by Rogoff [1985], Alesina and Summers [1993], Posen [1993] and Eijjfinger and de Hann [1996]. However, the theory does not conclusively indicate the direction of this influence. Hence, the aroused purpose was to verify whether an institutional forms of monetary policy influences the rate of inflation. The next part includes empirical research. The degree of central bank independence was described by qualitative measures, which as well as transformed rate of inflation were derived from articles by Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini [1991] and Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti [1992]. The relation was estimated with the use of a linear regression. Results suggest that the influence of the degree of central bank independence on the rate of inflation is negative. Research done by other authors confirm the hypothesis pointed out in the article, however further analyses are recommended. Remove selected