dc.contributor.author | Miksa, Joanna | |
dc.contributor.editor | Gensler, Marek | |
dc.contributor.editor | Gralińska-Toborek, Agnieszka | |
dc.contributor.editor | Kazimierska-Jerzyk, Wioletta | |
dc.contributor.editor | Kędziora, Krzysztof | |
dc.contributor.editor | Miksa, Joanna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-28T07:20:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-06-28T07:20:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Miksa J., Miejsce szczęścia w Kantowskiej antropologii moralnej, [w:] M. Gensler, A. Gralińska-Toborek, W. Kazimierska-Jerzyk, K. Kędziora, J. Miksa (red.), współpr. M. Mansfeld, Practica et Speculativa. Studies Offered to Professor Andrzej M. Kaniowski, WUŁ, Łódź 2022, https://doi.org/10.18778/8220-570-1.05 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-83-8220-570-1 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11089/42266 | |
dc.description.abstract | In my paper I propose to analyse the problem of happiness in Kantian philosophy by
taking into consideration the anthropological perspective. I undertake to show that
contrary to what is often said about Kant, he respected the pivotal role of quest after
happiness in human nature. Kantian anthropology consists of two parts: practical and
pragmatic. Practical anthropology is a science whose object is the human nature as it is
actually given. The happiness there is defined as a goal shared by the whole humankind.
Pragmatic anthropology is a project of evolution of the human kind according to
the laws prescribed by the pure practical reason. The notion of happiness is included in
the notion of the highest goodness. Kant defines it as happiness that belongs to those
who are morally good. The happiness is a subject of analysis in the framework of discussion
on duties of virtue. The imperative of love for our next of kin should be put into
practice through helping the others to achieve whatever that makes them happy – as
long as their aims are compatible with the moral law. All the arguments I gathered in
this paper make one say that according to Kant happiness and morality do not exclude
each other. Happiness is a part of the description of the human nature and morality
a project of the evolution of moral agents, but their moral evolution is not to consist in
destroying their natural characteristics. Morality only requires that a normative order
should be introduced as far as satisfying natural needs is concerned and the assumption
is that morality and our nature can become harmonised. Especially interesting is the
duty of helping the others in their search after happiness. Its presence in Kant’s philosophy
can be interpreted as an argument for rethinking of the relation between morality
and empirically given nature of the humankind. Even though as far as its origin is concerned,
the moral law does not have anything in common with the empirically given
nature of the humankind, still, the putting into practice of the moral law is not conceived
as a plan to fight the human nature but rather to limit it according to the moral law. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego | pl_PL |
dc.relation.ispartof | Practica et Speculativa. Studies Offered to Professor Andrzej M. Kaniowski; | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Międzynarodowe | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | anthropology | pl_PL |
dc.subject | practical philosophy | pl_PL |
dc.subject | happiness | pl_PL |
dc.subject | duties of virtue | pl_PL |
dc.subject | Kant | pl_PL |
dc.title | Miejsce szczęścia w Kantowskiej antropologii moralnej | pl_PL |
dc.type | Book chapter | pl_PL |
dc.page.number | 99-116 | pl_PL |
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation | Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Filozoficzno-Historyczny | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.eisbn | 978-83-8220-571-8 | |
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dc.identifier.doi | 10.18778/8220-570-1.05 | |