Debata Habermasa z Rortym o uzasadnianiu i prawdzie

Szubka, Tadeusz

dc.contributor.author	Szubka, Tadeusz
dc.contributor.editor	Gensler, Marek
dc.contributor.editor	Gralińska-Toborek, Agnieszka
dc.contributor.editor	Kazimierska-Jerzyk, Wioletta
dc.contributor.editor	Kędziora, Krzysztof
dc.contributor.editor	Miksa, Joanna
dc.date.accessioned	2022-06-28T07:45:21Z
dc.date.available	2022-06-28T07:45:21Z
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.identifier.citation	Szubka T., Debata Habermasa z Rortym o uzasadnianiu i prawdzie, [w:] M. Gensler, A. Gralińska-Toborek, W. Kazimierska-Jerzyk, K. Kędziora, J. Miksa (red.), współpr. M. Mansfeld, Practica et Speculativa. Studies Offered to Professor Andrzej M. Kaniowski, WUŁ, Łódź 2022, https://doi.org/10.18778/8220-570-1.07	pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn	978-83-8220-570-1
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11089/42268
dc.description.abstract	Jürgen Habermas and Richard Rorty share many philosophical commitments. However, their ways have parted when Habermas has begun to emphasize the essential or internal connection between justification and truth, and especially with its feature which may be described as unconditional or universal validity. Rorty strongly disagrees with Habermas’s contention about the essential connection between justification and truth, and puts into doubt the unconditionality claim involved in the latter notion. In this debate Habermas is arguably more convincing, but his arguments may be strengthened by pointing out that not only we do need the notion of truth over and above the notion of justification, but the notion of truth is also involved in the very notion of justification.	pl_PL
dc.language.iso	pl	pl_PL
dc.publisher	Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego	pl_PL
dc.relation.ispartof	Practica et Speculativa. Studies Offered to Professor Andrzej M. Kaniowski;
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Międzynarodowe	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Jürgen Habermas	pl_PL
dc.subject	Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz	pl_PL
dc.subject	Richard Rorty	pl_PL
dc.subject	epistemic conception of truth	pl_PL
dc.subject	semantic conception of truth	pl_PL
dc.subject	justification	pl_PL
dc.title	Debata Habermasa z Rortym o uzasadnianiu i prawdzie	pl_PL
dc.type	Book chapter	pl_PL
dc.page.number	129-139	pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliation	Uniwersytet Szczeciński	pl_PL
dc.identifier.eisbn	978-83-8220-571-8
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dc.identifier.doi	10.18778/8220-570-1.07