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dc.contributor.authorGrothe, Magdalena
dc.contributor.authorŻukowski, Bartosz
dc.contributor.editorŁukowski, Piotr
dc.contributor.editorGemel, Aleksander
dc.contributor.editorŻukowski, Bartosz
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-10T08:18:22Z
dc.date.available2020-10-10T08:18:22Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationGrothe M., Żukowski B., Short- and long-term social interactions from the game theoretical perspective: A cognitive approach, [w:] Cognition, Meaning and Action. Lodz-Lund Studies in Cognitive Science, Łukowski P., Gemel A., Żukowski B. (red.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Łódź-Kraków 2015, s. 181-191, doi: 10.18778/7969-759-5.12pl_PL
dc.identifier.isbn978-83-7969-759-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/32324
dc.description.sponsorshipUdostępnienie publikacji Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego finansowane w ramach projektu „Doskonałość naukowa kluczem do doskonałości kształcenia”. Projekt realizowany jest ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Wiedza Edukacja Rozwój; nr umowy: POWER.03.05.00-00-Z092/17-00.pl_PL
dc.language.isoenpl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofŁukowski P., Gemel A., Żukowski B. (red.), Cognition, Meaning and Action. Lodz-Lund Studies in Cognitive Science, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Łódź-Kraków 2015;
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Międzynarodowe*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectsocial interactionspl_PL
dc.subjectgame theoretical perspectivepl_PL
dc.subjectcognitive approachpl_PL
dc.titleShort- and long-term social interactions from the game theoretical perspective: A cognitive approachpl_PL
dc.typeBook chapterpl_PL
dc.page.number181-191pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationEuropean Central Bankpl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniwersytet Łódzki, Departament of Cognitive Sciencepl_PL
dc.identifier.eisbn978-83-7969-760-1
dc.contributor.authorBiographicalnoteMagdalena Grothe (born Malinowska) works in the Directorate Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank. She holds PhD from the University of Cologne (2008, scholarship of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). Between 1999 and 2005 she studied at the University of Lodz (M.Sc. in Economics), University of Mannheim (Erasmus scholarship) and University of Cologne (Dipl.-Volksw., Mummert scholarship). Her research focuses on liquidity, risk pricing, market microstructure and inflation expectations. Her work at the ECB involves on analysing euro area financial markets from the monetary policy perspective. She contributes to ECB publications and is involved in the process of monetary policy preparation and implementation.pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorBiographicalnoteBartosz Żukowski is Assistant Professor at the Department of Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Łódź. His research focuses on the semantics of natural language, theory of truth, philosophy of mind and early modern thought. He is author of Esse est percipi? George Berkeley’s Metaphysics of Idea (2012, in Polish).pl_PL
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dc.identifier.doi10.18778/7969-759-5.12


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