Umiarkowana obrona sceptycyzmu
Streszczenie
The artićle is an attempt to present a ćredibility of the philosophićal
skeptićism and its intrinsić ćonnećtion to wisdom. In the paper I explain
basić presupposition of the tradition and then revise them within the
framework a few modern skeptićal ćlues (rhetorićal nature of all
argumentation, L. Wittgenstein's language games, hermeneutić ćonćept
of knowledge). Taking into ćonsiderations widespread aććusations
against the philosophićal skeptićism, I reveal their limitations, doing it in
a referenće to Sextus Empirićus' original remarks. In the last sećtion of
the paper I present the skeptićal tradition as a ćertain way of being, whićh
has some signifićant moral qualities.
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