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dc.contributor.authorKoleśnik, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-19T10:43:49Z
dc.date.available2024-03-19T10:43:49Z
dc.date.issued2023-12-31
dc.identifier.issn2391-6478
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/50883
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of the article/hypothesis. The main aim of this article is to assess the direction and scale of risk transfer via systemically important banks in the euro area. This paper also critically analyses and proposes practical applications of supervisory and complex measures of SIBs identification.Methodology. The impact of systemic risk transfer via O-SIBs on the home and host countries was examined using the supervisory measure of an individual bank’s contribution in the national systemic risk. Additionally, the SRISK model was used.Results of the research. The conducted research has shown that the nature of risk transfer is potentially unidirectional, i.e., from the ‘old EU’ countries to the other countries in the same group or to the ‘new EU’ states. Also, three other SIBs have been found to pose a greater threat to the national banking system than their parent entities do in their home countries. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that in three countries, the aggregate risk contribution of the local O-SIBs – being subsidiaries of O-SIBs from other Eurozone countries – exceeds 25%.en
dc.description.abstractCel artykułu. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest ocena kierunków i skali transferu ryzyka w ramach strefy euro za pośrednictwem banków systemowo ważnych. W artykule dokonano także krytycznej analizy oraz praktycznego zastosowania nadzorczych i złożonych miar identyfikacji banków systemowo ważnych.Metoda badawcza. Wpływ transferu ryzyka systemowego za pośrednictwem banków systemowo ważnych dla krajów macierzystych i goszczących zbadano za pomocą nadzorczej miary udziału pojedynczego banku w krajowym ryzyku systemowym. Dodatkowo wykorzystano także model SRISK.Wyniki badań. Przeprowadzone badania wykazały, że transfer ryzyka potencjalnie ma charakter jednokierunkowy, tzn. z krajów tzw. starej unii do krajów w ramach tej grupy lub do krajów tzw. nowej unii. Zidentyfikowane zostały przy tym trzy banki systemowo ważne, które są większym zagrożeniem dla krajowego systemu bankowego, niż ich podmioty dominujące w swoich krajach. Dodatkowo wykazano, iż w przypadku trzech krajów łączny wkład do ryzyka lokalnych banków systemowo ważnych, będących podmiotami zależnymi banków systemowo ważnych z innych krajów strefy euro przekracza 25%.pl
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFinanse i Prawo Finansowe;2pl
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectsystemically important banksen
dc.subjectsystemic risken
dc.subjectthe euro areaen
dc.subjectSRISKen
dc.subjectrisk transferen
dc.subjectbanki systemowo ważnepl
dc.subjectryzyko systemowepl
dc.subjectstrefa europl
dc.subjectSRISKpl
dc.subjecttransfer ryzykapl
dc.titleSystemically Important Banks – Risk Transfer in the Euro Areaen
dc.title.alternativeBanki systemowo ważne – transfer ryzyka w ramach strefy europl
dc.typeArticle
dc.page.number57-79
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationSGH Warsaw School of Economicsen
dc.identifier.eissn2353-5601
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dc.contributor.authorEmailan.kolesnik@sgh.waw.pl
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/2391-6478.S2.2023.03


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