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Negotiating Personhood Beyond the Human: A Relational Legal Thought Experiment

dc.contributor.authorFolková, Zsófia
dc.date.accessioned2026-04-28T08:11:19Z
dc.date.available2026-04-28T08:11:19Z
dc.date.issued2025-12-31
dc.identifier.issn0208-6069
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/58219
dc.description.abstractThis article explores the ontological foundations of legal personhood in light of contemporary philosophical challenges to the human–nonhuman divide. Drawing on Bruno Latour’s theory of quasi-objects and Guido Sprenger’s animist notion of fluid personhood, it examines how shifting metaphysical assumptions may reshape legal personhood. The article argues that legal theory should move beyond fixed, anthropocentric categories and engage in a deeper negotiation of who – or what – counts in law.en
dc.description.abstractArtykuł bada ontologiczne podstawy podmiotowości prawnej w świetle współczesnych filozoficznych wyzwań wobec podziału na to, co ludzkie i nieludzkie. Odwołując się do teorii quasi-obiektów Bruna Latoura oraz animistycznej koncepcji płynnej podmiotowości Guido Sprengera artykuł analizuje, w jaki sposób zmieniające się założenia metafizyczne mogą przekształcać rozumienie osoby prawnej i jej podmiotowości. Artykuł dowodzi, że teoria prawa powinna wyjść poza sztywne, antropocentryczne kategorie i podjąć głębsze negocjacje dotyczące tego, kto – lub co – jest uwzględniane w prawie jako podmiot.pl
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl
dc.relation.ispartofseriesActa Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridicaen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
dc.subjectlegal personhooden
dc.subjectflat ontologiesen
dc.subjectfluid personhooden
dc.subjectBruno Latouren
dc.subjectposthumanismen
dc.subjectanthropocentrismen
dc.subjectpodmiotowość prawnapl
dc.subjectosobowość prawnapl
dc.subjectontologie płaskiepl
dc.subjectpłynna podmiotowośćpl
dc.subjectBruno Latourpl
dc.subjectposthumanizmpl
dc.subjectantropocentryzmpl
dc.titleNegotiating Personhood Beyond the Human: A Relational Legal Thought Experimenten
dc.title.alternativeNegocjowanie podmiotowości prawnej, poza tym co ludzkie: relacyjny eksperyment myślowy w teorii prawapl
dc.typeArticle
dc.page.number91-104
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationCharles University Pragueen
dc.identifier.eissn2450-2782
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dc.contributor.authorEmailzsofia.folkova@prf.cuni.cz
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/0208-6069.113.06
dc.relation.volume113


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