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dc.contributor.authorSoin, Maciej
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-10T11:16:01Z
dc.date.available2016-10-10T11:16:01Z
dc.date.issued2016-09-15
dc.identifier.issn1899-2226
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11089/19854
dc.description.abstractPhilosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory – which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics – are connected first of all with questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism, which in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood at the same time as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. To the assumptions belongs a false dilemma taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, as a result of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a return to a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.pl_PL
dc.language.isoplpl_PL
dc.publisherLodz University Presspl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAnnales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym;3
dc.subjectstakeholder theorypl_PL
dc.subjectpragmatismpl_PL
dc.subjectfacts and valuespl_PL
dc.subjectFreemanpl_PL
dc.subjectRortypl_PL
dc.titleFilozoficzne trudności teorii interesariuszypl_PL
dc.title.alternativePhilosophical Difficulties of Stakeholder Theorypl_PL
dc.typeArticlepl_PL
dc.page.number7-16pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationLodz University of Technologypl_PL
dc.identifier.eissn2353-4869
dc.referencesEvan W.M., R.E. Freeman, Spółka i osoby żywotnie zainteresowane. Kapitalizm kantowski [w:] Etyka biznesu. Z klasyki współczesnej myśli amerykańskiej, red. L.V. Ryan CSV, J. Sójka, przeł. E. Dratwa, Wydawnictwo „W drodze”, Poznań 1997 (pierwodruk: W.M. Evan, R.E. Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism [w:] Ethical Theory and Business, red. T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1983).pl_PL
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dc.contributor.authorEmailmsoin@poczta.onet.plpl_PL
dc.identifier.doi10.18778/1899-2226.19.3.01
dc.relation.volume19pl_PL
dc.subject.jelA13
dc.subject.jelL21
dc.subject.jelM14


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