Związki filozofii i teorii prawa. Zagadnienia metodologiczne
Date
1987Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
The paper is a developmen of J. Wroblewski's analyses. The author presents
the basic problems, arguing with the critical remarks of J. Woleński. Hedefends the
thesis of the need to distinguish two spheres when examining the relationship between philosophy and theory of law: the relationship of reference and relationship of
ascription. He points that the aim of the analysisis not giving a method of logical
criterion of identification of philosophical and theoretical theses, but examination of relationship between the theses. An answer is sought to the question what kind of
relationship can appear, and whether the dependence of theory on the accepted
philosophical assumptions can be graded. According to the author's opinion, the degree of dependence can be assessed due to the systemic or a systemic character of
philosoph and theory, and the type of logic or quasi-logic rules of ascription of
philosophical thesis to theory , in the case of theories expressing a philosophical attitude,
the ro les of ascription may be the technique of „new rhetoric" of Ch. Perelman,
allowing to keep ait least a loose connection with philosophy. To reconstruct
the philosophical assumptions of a philosophical theories the rules of logic are necessary. To define the series of philosophical theses and the rules of ascription, the
author makes use of the idea of presupposition , defined for the sake of legal discourse by J Wróblewski.
Collections